Gavron warning in California

2026A Gavron warning is a discretionary advisement to a supported spouse that they are expected to work to become self-sufficient. (§ 4330; In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705, 712 .) The purpose is to prevent the spouse from being blindsided by a reduction in support when the spouse was unaware they were expected to work.

2025(Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712 ; see also, Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1248-1249.) Thus, we are not persuaded by JoVonna’s argument the Gavron warnings she received were insufficient because they did not expressly warn of the possibility the court might terminate jurisdiction over spousal support. 19 B.

2025(In re Marriage of Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 55 .) It provides a trial court discretion to determine whether to issue a Gavron warning.

2023(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Maher & Strawn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 356 , 362 [recognizing as a Gavron warning an admonishment that the supported spouse “ ‘has an obligation to become self-supporting within a reasonable time’ ”]; In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55 [“what has become known as a ‘Gavron warning’ is a fair warning to the supported spouse he or she is expected to become self-supporting”].) That expectation was clearly communicated here.

2025Because “[t]rial courts have broad discretion in determining the meaning of ‘self-supporting’ in any particular case” (In re Marriage of 12 Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1247 ), the existence of a Gavron warning is only one factor the family court is to consider in determining whether the supported party made reasonable efforts to become self-supporting.

2025The court reasonably looked beyond the period of time since Sheri received the Gavron warning (two and a half years before the court’s December 2023 modification decision) and considered her conduct over the history of the case “as a whole.” (See In re Marriage of Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801, 809 [assessing spousal support modification decision, appellate court observed there is a “potential for injustice when . . . one judge . . . isn’t able to see the case as a whole”; holding judge acted “well within [its] discretion” by looking at “the whole of [the supported spouse’s] conduct over

2023Rather, the court found that despite issuing a Gavron warning to Kimberly over two years previously, she had made “no material efforts to secure meaningful employment . . . .” (See In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1204 [“When evidence exists that the party to be supported has unreasonably delayed or refused to seek employment consistent with his/her ability, that factor may be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of support in the first instance or in modification proceedings”]; In re Marriage of Mason (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 215, 221 [trial court did not abuse i

2021(See Marriage of Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712 [“Inherent in the concept that the supported spouse’s failure to at least make good-faith efforts to become self-sufficient can constitute a change in circumstances which could warrant a modification in spousal support is the premise that the supported spouse be made aware of the obligation to become 21 self-supporting”]; In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1204 [“absent provisions in the original support order designed to direct the spouse toward becoming self-supporting, an unemployed spouse should not be penalize

2026(In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [increased value of assets can establish changed circumstances]; compare In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 400 [changed circumstances cannot be based exclusively on accessibility to and imputed value of returns earned in retirement account awarded to supported party in dissolution].) For similar reasons, we reject wife’s argument that the trial court erred by considering her lack of employment without giving her a Gavron warning.

2015(E.g., Dietz, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 396 .) Further, the transcript of the hearing here shows that the court declined to terminate support based on its application of those factors, rather than solely based on the absence of a prior Gavron warning.

2023Rather, the court found that despite issuing a Gavron warning to Kimberly over two years previously, she had made “no material efforts to secure meaningful employment . . . .” (See In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1204 [“When evidence exists that the party to be supported has unreasonably delayed or refused to seek employment consistent with his/her ability, that factor may be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of support in the first instance or in modification proceedings”]; In re Marriage of Mason (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 215, 221 [trial court did not abuse i

2014(In re Marriage of Mason (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 215, 221 .) Gavron Warning Clarkson argues that the trial court erred in not giving a Gavron warning (In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 ) that he needed to become self- supporting.

2026(In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [increased value of assets can establish changed circumstances]; compare In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 400 [changed circumstances cannot be based exclusively on accessibility to and imputed value of returns earned in retirement account awarded to supported party in dissolution].) For similar reasons, we reject wife’s argument that the trial court erred by considering her lack of employment without giving her a Gavron warning.

2026“We do not consider arguments that are raised for the first time at oral argument.” (Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1554, fn. 9 .) 6 adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608-609 (Jameson).) We cannot evaluate A.J.’s claims of error without a full record of the materials submitted to and considered by the court in terminating spousal support and denying the motion for reconsideration.

2026(See In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1051 [appellant must establish any error was prejudicial by showing reasonable probability of more favorable result].) The errors claimed by A.J. would not have affected the family court’s findings that C.J. had already paid spousal support for nine years, A.J. had received a Gavron warning in 2018, and A.J. was in fact self-supporting by October 2024 based on her $6,606 monthly income and ownership of the condominium free and clear.

2025The court reasonably looked beyond the period of time since Sheri received the Gavron warning (two and a half years before the court’s December 2023 modification decision) and considered her conduct over the history of the case “as a whole.” (See In re Marriage of Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801, 809 [assessing spousal support modification decision, appellate court observed there is a “potential for injustice when . . . one judge . . . isn’t able to see the case as a whole”; holding judge acted “well within [its] discretion” by looking at “the whole of [the supported spouse’s] conduct over

2023(In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453.) Here, the court applied this exception, observing Sheila did not make efforts to comply with Gavron warnings.

2021(See Marriage of Gavron, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 712 [“Inherent in the concept that the supported spouse’s failure to at least make good-faith efforts to become self-sufficient can constitute a change in circumstances which could warrant a modification in spousal support is the premise that the supported spouse be made aware of the obligation to become 21 self-supporting”]; In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1204 [“absent provisions in the original support order designed to direct the spouse toward becoming self-supporting, an unemployed spouse should not be penalize

2021He wants her to hold up her end of the bargain.” 20 citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.’ ” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 28 [appeal from child support order]; accord, Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 222, fn. 15 [appeal from family court’s domestic violence restraining order between former spouses: appellate courts “may disregard statements not supported by proper” record references]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [an appellant “must” limit the summary of facts “to matters in the

2021He wants her to hold up her end of the bargain.” 20 citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived.’ ” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 28 [appeal from child support order]; accord, Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 222, fn. 15 [appeal from family court’s domestic violence restraining order between former spouses: appellate courts “may disregard statements not supported by proper” record references]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [an appellant “must” limit the summary of facts “to matters in the

2020In doing so, the court found in part as follows: “[Robert] paid for [Kathy’s] education enabling her to find employment as a beauty technician”; however, “[s]he has never worked outside the home”; although the parties “separated in 2001 and have been divorced since 2005” and Kathy “has received approximately six Gavron warnings,” Kathy “chose not to seek employment for the last 18 years”; during this time, Kathy “has had ample time and the ability to become self-supporting.” The court further found that, although Kathy “does need financial support,” she received “approximately $200,000” at the

2016"A trial court acts within its discretion in denying spousal support where the supported spouse has failed to diligently seek employment sufficient to become self-supporting." (In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1238 (Shaughnessy); see also In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885, 896 ["When evidence exists that the party to be supported has unreasonably delayed or refused to seek employment consistent with her or his ability . . . that factor may be taken into consideration by the trial court in fixing the amount of support in the first instance or in modifica

2013What I was going to revisit it about is what is going on now because I also gave [Sudharshi] a Gavron warning.” (Italics added.) Chaminda’s counsel said he would file an OSC, and the court agreed the OSC would address “what is going on now.” (Italics added.) In Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 627 , the appellate court concluded that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to retroactively modify a temporary support order to any date earlier than the date on which a proper pleading seeking modification of such order is filed.

2013What I was going to revisit it about is what is going on now because I also gave [Sudharshi] a Gavron warning.” (Italics added.) Chaminda’s counsel said he would file an OSC, and the court agreed the OSC would address “what is going on now.” (Italics added.) In Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 627 , the appellate court concluded that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to retroactively modify a temporary support order to any date earlier than the date on which a proper pleading seeking modification of such order is filed.

2013(Id. at p. 631; see In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1062 .) Subsequently, in Freitas, the same appellate court made clear that unless a trial court expressly reserves jurisdiction to amend a support award it has already made, such that the parties’ clear expectation was that the original support awards were not final as to the months already past, the court could not reconsider the support awarded for those months. ( Freitas, supra, at p. 1062 ; see also Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 : [“[Wife] was entitled to rely on the amount of temporary support ordered wit

2013(Id. at p. 631; see In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1062 .) Subsequently, in Freitas, the same appellate court made clear that unless a trial court expressly reserves jurisdiction to amend a support award it has already made, such that the parties’ clear expectation was that the original support awards were not final as to the months already past, the court could not reconsider the support awarded for those months. ( Freitas, supra, at p. 1062 ; see also Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 : [“[Wife] was entitled to rely on the amount of temporary support ordered wit