Legislature created exception in California

2023Because subdivision (b)(1) through (3) of section 1170 is silent regarding the court’s discretion, the newly-enacted provision leaves unchanged a trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term of imprisonment based on a single aggravating factor (see People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182 ; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 [“[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term”]) and the sentence it believes to be appropriate to the case and the defendant being sentenced before it (see People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614 [“A judge’s su

2023Because subdivision (b)(1) through (3) of section 1170 is silent regarding the court’s discretion, the newly-enacted provision leaves unchanged a trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term of imprisonment based on a single aggravating factor (see People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182 ; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 [“[o]nly a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term”]) and the sentence it believes to be appropriate to the case and the defendant being sentenced before it (see People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614 [“A judge’s su

1984The court in People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ] recently relied on that analysis to specifically hold “that in enacting subdivision (i), the Legislature created an exception to or exclusion from the single-occasion rule promulgated in In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 .” (Id., at p. 35.) As the Bergman court explained: “Neither Edwards nor Cardenas is dispositive of the question whether subdivision (i) of section 1170.1, in fact, creates an exception to the Culbreth rule.

1984We hold that in enacting subdivision (i), the Legislature created an exception to or exclusion from the single-occasion rule promulgated in In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 .

2023(People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283 , 286; People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159-160 ; People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119 .) In response to this restrictive judicial construction, the Legislature created an exception to the preconviction limitation of a section 136.2 restraining order by adding subdivision (i).

2023(People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283 , 286; People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159-160 ; People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119 .) In response to this restrictive judicial construction, the Legislature created an exception to the preconviction limitation of a section 136.2 restraining order by adding subdivision (i).

2023(Stats. 2011, ch. 155, § 1; People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461, 465 .) That subdivision permits a court to issue a postconviction protective order of up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, certain enumerated sexual offenses, street terrorism, or crimes that require sex offender registration under section 290. (§ 136.2, subd (i)(1).) Except as set forth in subdivision (i)(1), “section 136.2 generally does not authorize a trial court to impose a postjudgment restraining order against a criminal defendant.” (Corrales, at p. 286; Beckemeye

2014(Estate of Fritschi (1963) 60 Cal.2d 367, 373 .) Further, the Legislature created a presumption that all persons have the capacity to make testamentary dispositions, which can only be rebutted with a showing that the person “is totally without understanding,” has an unsound mind, or suffers substantial mental deficits.

2013At that time, the Legislature created an exception to the broad immunity provided by the rule, by providing that “ ‘a cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against any [licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages] who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing, sale or giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by such person.’ ” (Strang v. Cabrol, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 723 , it

2013Code, § 25602.1.) Inasmuch as the case before us does not involve any licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages, our discussion is limited to the effect of section 1714 on plaintiffs’ causes of action. 4 For this reason, plaintiffs’ discussion of Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 ] and Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 *765 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ], regarding general principles of duty and forseeability of harm, is irrelevant to the issues in the instant case; as a matter of law, plaintiffs cannot establish proximate causati

2013Code, § 25602.1.) Inasmuch as the case before us does not involve any licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages, our discussion is limited to the effect of section 1714 on plaintiffs’ causes of action. 4 For this reason, plaintiffs’ discussion of Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 ] and Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 *765 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ], regarding general principles of duty and forseeability of harm, is irrelevant to the issues in the instant case; as a matter of law, plaintiffs cannot establish proximate causati

2013Code, § 25602.1.) Inasmuch as the case before us does not involve any licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages, our discussion is limited to the effect of section 1714 on plaintiffs’ causes of action. 4 For this reason, plaintiffs’ discussion of Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 ] and Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 *765 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ], regarding general principles of duty and forseeability of harm, is irrelevant to the issues in the instant case; as a matter of law, plaintiffs cannot establish proximate causati

2013Code, § 25602.1.) Inasmuch as the case before us does not involve any licensed purveyor of alcoholic beverages, our discussion is limited to the effect of section 1714 on plaintiffs’ causes of action. 4 For this reason, plaintiffs’ discussion of Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 ] and Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 *765 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ], regarding general principles of duty and forseeability of harm, is irrelevant to the issues in the instant case; as a matter of law, plaintiffs cannot establish proximate causati

2008(Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1247 .) According to the State and amicus curiae, the Legislature created such an exception for UCL actions brought on behalf of the public by governmental entities.

2007(See Lear v. Board of Retirement, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 434 .) As described above, section 31642’s “continuity of service” language is directly related to the statutory requirement that, to count as “service,” the employment must have been “uninterrupted.” By including the code section in the “Service” article and stating that the listed circumstances do not break the “continuity of service,” the Legislature created an exception to the general rule and allowed the earlier service to be counted for purposes of determining years of service at retirement.

2003The only change occurred in 1873, when the Legislature created the exception for carriers of telegraphic messages. [6] Hereafter, any references to Disney as a common carrier or to application of section 2168 to Disney should be construed as applying to Disney only insofar as it operates the Indiana Jones attraction at issue in this writ proceeding. [7] Disney's argument is analogous to a claim that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures should not apply to wiretapping because wire-tapping was "an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was ad

2003The only change occurred in 1873, when the Legislature created the exception for carriers of telegraphic messages. [6] Hereafter, any references to Disney as a common carrier or to application of section 2168 to Disney should be construed as applying to Disney only insofar as it operates the Indiana Jones attraction at issue in this writ proceeding. [7] Disney's argument is analogous to a claim that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures should not apply to wiretapping because wire-tapping was "an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was ad

1992(Id. at p. 1015 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 863 ].) The Supreme Court held that a Legislature-created exception was not enough to justify violating the face-to-face element of the confrontation *1727 clause.

1992(Id. at p. 1015 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 863 ].) The Supreme Court held that a Legislature-created exception was not enough to justify violating the face-to-face element of the confrontation *1727 clause.

1988(Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985) 169 *1381 Cal.App.3d 1010 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 101 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 52 ].) It may have been significant to the result in Nelson that the judiciary rather than the Legislature created the doctrine that a cause of action for asbestos-related injury accrues upon discovery of the injury.

1988(Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985) 169 *1381 Cal.App.3d 1010 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 101 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 52 ].) It may have been significant to the result in Nelson that the judiciary rather than the Legislature created the doctrine that a cause of action for asbestos-related injury accrues upon discovery of the injury.

1988(Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985) 169 *1381 Cal.App.3d 1010 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 101 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 52 ].) It may have been significant to the result in Nelson that the judiciary rather than the Legislature created the doctrine that a cause of action for asbestos-related injury accrues upon discovery of the injury.

1987In re Marriage of Leib, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at page 643 , concluded “the Legislature created the presumption against a cohabiting former spouse supported by a divorced husband or wife based on thinking that cohabitation establishes a status for the benefit of the supported spouse and such status therefore creates a change of circumstances so tied in with the payment of spousal support as to be significant enough by itself to require a re-examination of whether such need for support continues in such a way that it still should be charged to the prior spouse. [Fn. omitted.]” Professor Blumberg

1984The court in People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ] recently relied on that analysis to specifically hold “that in enacting subdivision (i), the Legislature created an exception to or exclusion from the single-occasion rule promulgated in In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 .” (Id., at p. 35.) As the Bergman court explained: “Neither Edwards nor Cardenas is dispositive of the question whether subdivision (i) of section 1170.1, in fact, creates an exception to the Culbreth rule.

1984The court in People v. Bergman (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 30 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 54 ] recently relied on that analysis to specifically hold “that in enacting subdivision (i), the Legislature created an exception to or exclusion from the single-occasion rule promulgated in In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330 .” (Id., at p. 35.) As the Bergman court explained: “Neither Edwards nor Cardenas is dispositive of the question whether subdivision (i) of section 1170.1, in fact, creates an exception to the Culbreth rule.

1984Support for this interpretation of subdivision (i) of section 1170.1 is found in People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], and *36 People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ].

1984Support for this interpretation of subdivision (i) of section 1170.1 is found in People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], and *36 People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ].

1984Support for this interpretation of subdivision (i) of section 1170.1 is found in People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], and *36 People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ].

1984Support for this interpretation of subdivision (i) of section 1170.1 is found in People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], and *36 People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ].