24 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lamb v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Wilson, 76 So.3d at 1088 ; see Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (“Trial in every case is a critical stage.”). 2011See Pall v. State, 632 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bloodsaw v. State, 949 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 698-99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Cf. Plichta v. Plichta, 899 So.2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“It was error for the trial court to include these depleted marital assets in the equitable distribution scheme because the Husband used this sum during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, and no misconduct was asserted.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pall v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Pall v. State, 632 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bloodsaw v. State, 949 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 698-99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Bloodsaw v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Pall v. State, 632 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bloodsaw v. State, 949 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 698-99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Ferguson v. Stategreen1 sentence2008"A mistrial is a device used to halt the proceedings when the error is so prejudicial and fundamental that the expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful if not futile." Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1982); see also Smith v. State, 866 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2004) (holding mistrial is required only when error is so prejudicial as to vitiate entire trial). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2008"A mistrial is a device used to halt the proceedings when the error is so prejudicial and fundamental that the expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful if not futile." Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla.1982); see also Smith v. State, 866 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2004) (holding mistrial is required only when error is so prejudicial as to vitiate entire trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2003Obviously, allegations of juror misconduct must be taken seriously at any stage of the proceedings and inquiry is always warranted. [ State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 , 668 A.2d 1288, 1305 (1995) ]. "[A]fter a jury verdict has been accepted, [however] other state interests emerge that favor proceedings limited in form and scope." Id. 2003Obviously, allegations of juror misconduct must be taken seriously at any stage of the proceedings and inquiry is always warranted. [ State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 , 668 A.2d 1288, 1305 (1995) ]. "[A]fter a jury verdict has been accepted, [however] other state interests emerge that favor proceedings limited in form and scope." Id. | 1 | 1 |
Berk v. Berkgreen1 sentence1995See Berk v. Berk, 423 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kaminski v. State
green
2 sentences2009He contends that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion to suppress, based upon the general proposition that “when a conviction is reversed it is a nullity, and the effect of the reversal is to restore the defendant to the point in the proceedings where the error was made.” Griffith v. State, 654 So.2d 936 , 944 n. 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla.1954)), quashed on other grounds, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996). 1995Ex Parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); and Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 , 75 S.Ct. 55 , 99 L.Ed. 656 (1954). | 2 | 1995–2009 |
Ex Parte: Livingston
green
2 sentences2009He contends that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion to suppress, based upon the general proposition that “when a conviction is reversed it is a nullity, and the effect of the reversal is to restore the defendant to the point in the proceedings where the error was made.” Griffith v. State, 654 So.2d 936 , 944 n. 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla.1954)), quashed on other grounds, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996). 2009He contends that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion to suppress, based upon the general proposition that “when a conviction is reversed it is a nullity, and the effect of the reversal is to restore the defendant to the point in the proceedings where the error was made.” Griffith v. State, 654 So.2d 936 , 944 n. 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla.1954)), quashed on other grounds, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996). | 2 | 1995–2009 |
Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Barron, 531 So. 2d at 116 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence2013Wilson, 76 So.3d at 1088 ; see Lamb v. State, 535 So.2d 698, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (“Trial in every case is a critical stage.”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Castor v. State
green
1 sentence2010As with the requirement for contemporaneous objection, “[djelay and an unnecessary use of the appellate process result from a failure to cure early that which must be cured eventually.” Murphy, 766 So.2d at 1017 (quoting Castor, 365 So.2d at 703 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Griffith
green
1 sentence2009He contends that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion to suppress, based upon the general proposition that “when a conviction is reversed it is a nullity, and the effect of the reversal is to restore the defendant to the point in the proceedings where the error was made.” Griffith v. State, 654 So.2d 936 , 944 n. 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla.1954)), quashed on other grounds, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Griffith v. State
green
1 sentence2009He contends that he was entitled to a new hearing on his motion to suppress, based upon the general proposition that “when a conviction is reversed it is a nullity, and the effect of the reversal is to restore the defendant to the point in the proceedings where the error was made.” Griffith v. State, 654 So.2d 936 , 944 n. 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Ex parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla.1954)), quashed on other grounds, 675 So.2d 911 (Fla.1996). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Peloquin v. State
green
1 sentence2006Cazeau v. State, 858 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2001Brady Violation In issue two, Rose argues the State improperly withheld autopsy photographs until the current proceedings in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 2001Brady Violation In issue two, Rose argues the State improperly withheld autopsy photographs until the current proceedings in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Wishart v. Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Our conclusion flows from our decision in Wishart v. Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc., 573 So.2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Theard v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
green
1 sentence1995Ex Parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); and Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 , 75 S.Ct. 55 , 99 L.Ed. 656 (1954). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Estate of Scadron v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1995Ex Parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); and Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 , 75 S.Ct. 55 , 99 L.Ed. 656 (1954). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Reynolds v. Roll
green
1 sentence1995Ex Parte Livingston, 116 Fla. 640 , 156 So. 612 (1934); and Kaminski v. State, 72 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 , 75 S.Ct. 55 , 99 L.Ed. 656 (1954). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Rwk
green
1 sentence1990HRS claims that both the December 13, 1989, and January 12, 1990, orders were invalid because: (1) Section 39.09(3)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), does not give the court statutory authority to place the child in a specific facility or program as this court has ruled in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. R.W.K., 556 So.2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). (2) Dozier is a training school, and, in order to gain admission, the child must meet the requirements of section 39.113, Florida Statutes (1987), entitled "Juvenile *533 Boot Camp"; this child does not meet those requirements. (3) Sect | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Johnsen v. State
green
1 sentence1982Johnsen v. State, 332 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1976). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sessions v. Summers
green
1 sentence1968We cannot agree with appellants since we think the distinction attempted to be made by appellants is one without a difference and that testimony adduced by way of affidavits is testimony nevertheless, and that since appellants failed to object they waived their right at this stage in the proceedings and that the waiver continued throughout the proceeding as was held in Sessions, supra. This objection is further buttressed by the decision in Bordacs v. Kimmel, Fla.App.1962, 139 So.2d 506 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Bordacs v. Kimmel
green
1 sentence1968We cannot agree with appellants since we think the distinction attempted to be made by appellants is one without a difference and that testimony adduced by way of affidavits is testimony nevertheless, and that since appellants failed to object they waived their right at this stage in the proceedings and that the waiver continued throughout the proceeding as was held in Sessions, supra. This objection is further buttressed by the decision in Bordacs v. Kimmel, Fla.App.1962, 139 So.2d 506 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Dewey v. Allgire
green
2 sentences1957Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6 , 55 N.W. 276 , 40 Am.St.Rep. 468 . 1957Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6 , 55 N.W. 276 , 40 Am.St.Rep. 468 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Coy v. Downie
green
1 sentence1941Chillingworth, Circuit Judge, in recognizing the rule in Coy v. Downie supra, in part said: “The appellant Jones contends that persons having interests in the property paramount to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed are generally neither necessary nor proper parties to the foreclosure suit, because the only proper object of the proceedings is to bar all rights subsequent to the mortgage. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
White v. White
green
2 sentences1936In the case of White v. White, 108 Fla. 380 , 149 Sou. 375 , we said: “The contention is made by plaintiff in error first, that since the record' discloses a warrant was issued against the petitioner that issue, insofar as it was involved in the case, should have been found against the petitioner because it was not so defective in its allegations as to wholly fail to *380 allege an offense against the city ordinance; secondly, that as the petitioner grounded her right to a discharge upon the allegation that her 'conviction was based upon illegal evidence’ and as the writ of habeas corpus may n 1936In the case of White v. White, 108 Fla. 380 , 149 Sou. 375 , we said: “The contention is made by plaintiff in error first, that since the record' discloses a warrant was issued against the petitioner that issue, insofar as it was involved in the case, should have been found against the petitioner because it was not so defective in its allegations as to wholly fail to *380 allege an offense against the city ordinance; secondly, that as the petitioner grounded her right to a discharge upon the allegation that her 'conviction was based upon illegal evidence’ and as the writ of habeas corpus may n | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Meier v. Johnston
green
2 sentences1934S., on the ground that the same are taken against good faith and merely for delay; and it appearing that all briefs for the respective parties have been duly filed, and it further appearing from an inspection of the record and an examina *860 tion of'the briefs presented, that the judgment appealed from is obviously free from error and should be affirmed in any event, it is, upon consideration of the motion to dismiss the proceedings in error as frivolous, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that in lieu of a ruling upon the motion for dismissal of the writ of error, the judgment sha 1934S., on the ground that the same are taken against good faith and merely for delay; and it appearing that all briefs for the respective parties have been duly filed, and it further appearing from an inspection of the record and an examina *860 tion of'the briefs presented, that the judgment appealed from is obviously free from error and should be affirmed in any event, it is, upon consideration of the motion to dismiss the proceedings in error as frivolous, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that in lieu of a ruling upon the motion for dismissal of the writ of error, the judgment sha | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Roberts Bros. v. Langford
green
2 sentences1932Langford, 99 Fla. 1268 , 128 Sou. 1932Langford, 99 Fla. 1268 , 128 Sou. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Childs v. Dougherty green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| City of Bradentown v. State green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Whorley v. State neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.