proceedings issue in Oregon

2025Nonetheless, having reviewed the record, we conclude that it is not obvious and beyond reasonable dispute that Golditch’s testimony, or any portion thereof, was scientific evidence that required a special foundation rather than testimony Nonprecedential Memo Op: 342 Or App 127 (2025) 131 based on her knowledge, skill, experience, training and edu- cation.

2025Nonetheless, having reviewed the record, we conclude that it is not obvious and beyond reasonable dispute that Golditch’s testimony, or any portion thereof, was scientific evidence that required a special foundation rather than testimony Nonprecedential Memo Op: 342 Or App 127 (2025) 131 based on her knowledge, skill, experience, training and edu- cation.

2022To make a case for plain error review, then, an appellant must “identify the precise error, specify the state of the proceedings when the error was made, and Nonprecedential Memo Op: 322 Or App 97 (2022) 99 set forth pertinent quotations of the record where the chal- lenged error was made.” ORAP 5.45(4)(b).

2019PROCEEDINGS The issue in this case was presented on the pleadings, affidavits, declarations, and other evidence as permitted by ORCP 21 A. 1 Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction. *917 Sutherland v. Brennan , 131 Or.

2019App. 25 , 28, 883 P.2d 1318 (1994), aff'd on other grounds , 321 Or. 520 , 901 P.2d 240 (1995).

2019App. 25 , 28, 883 P.2d 1318 (1994), aff'd on other grounds , 321 Or. 520 , 901 P.2d 240 (1995).

2019App. 25 , 28, 883 P.2d 1318 (1994), aff'd on other grounds , 321 Or. 520 , 901 P.2d 240 (1995).

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

2014See Nelson, 318 Or at 104 (under issue-preclusion doctrine, a prior decision “may preclude relitigation of the issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Romanov, 210 Or App 198, 202 , 149 P3d 1224 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 633 (2007) (“Issue preclusion can prevent * * * the relitigation of a factual issue decided in a prior proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).

2011On plaintiffs unopposed motions, the trial court abated the proceedings on that claim for relief and entered a limited judgment under ORCP 67 B dismissing plaintiffs reinstatement and *416 reemployment claims for relief, finding “that there [was] no just reason for delay in the entry of a limited judgment to permit plaintiff to seek review of the dismissal of such claims.” See ORCP 67 B (permitting that disposition); Interstate Roofing, Inc. v. Springville Corp., 347 Or 144, 152-53 , 218 P3d 118 (2009) (discussing the same). 8 For the purposes of the issues that the parties raise, ORS 659A.043

1929Statutes authorizing the condemnation of private property for a public use are wholly in invitum and, since they are in derogation of vested rights, must be strictly construed and proceedings taken in pursuance of them must comply strictly with all the requirements of the statute; otherwise such proceedings will be null and void: Clark v. City of Portland, 62 Or. 124 ( 123 P. 708 ); Spencer v. City of Portland, 114 Or. 381 ( 235 P. 279 ).

1929Statutes authorizing the condemnation of private property for a public use are wholly in invitum and, since they are in derogation of vested rights, must be strictly construed and proceedings taken in pursuance of them must comply strictly with all the requirements of the statute; otherwise such proceedings will be null and void: Clark v. City of Portland, 62 Or. 124 ( 123 P. 708 ); Spencer v. City of Portland, 114 Or. 381 ( 235 P. 279 ).

1929Statutes authorizing the condemnation of private property for a public use are wholly in invitum and, since they are in derogation of vested rights, must be strictly construed and proceedings taken in pursuance of them must comply strictly with all the requirements of the statute; otherwise such proceedings will be null and void: Clark v. City of Portland, 62 Or. 124 ( 123 P. 708 ); Spencer v. City of Portland, 114 Or. 381 ( 235 P. 279 ).

1929Statutes authorizing the condemnation of private property for a public use are wholly in invitum and, since they are in derogation of vested rights, must be strictly construed and proceedings taken in pursuance of them must comply strictly with all the requirements of the statute; otherwise such proceedings will be null and void: Clark v. City of Portland, 62 Or. 124 ( 123 P. 708 ); Spencer v. City of Portland, 114 Or. 381 ( 235 P. 279 ).