proceedings claim in California

2025To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 .) In this case, without a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings at the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, we cannot evaluate any evidence presented or offers of proof made to the trial court, and we do not know what arguments, objections, or concessions were made by the parties, including any discussion bearing on whether a further evidentiary hearing was necessary.

2025To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 .) Without a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings at the hearing, we cannot evaluate the evidence and arguments presented to the trial court.

2023(Ibid.) In addressing the defendant’s claims, the Alexander court perceived “five distinct possible grounds for claims of error: (1) a statutory violation of Evidence Code section 954, the attorney-client privilege; (2) a violation of his federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) a violation of his federal Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair trial; (4) a violation of his federal Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process; and (5) a violation of his state constitutional right to counsel.” (Ibid.) The Alexander court rejected the defendant’s claim the interception violated the

2023(Ibid.) The Alexander court further held interception of attorney-client communications does not constitute a complete denial of the right to counsel; rather, “unless the record supports ‘at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.’” ( Alexander, supra, at p. 888 ; accord, Weatherford v. Bursey, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 558 .) The Alexander court further concluded, even assuming the defendant’s state right to 36. counsel had been violated, the defendant could not show a reasonable probability he would have obtai

2016Because the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, we must reverse.3 (See Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 635 [ 125 S.Ct. 2007 ] (Deck); People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282 , 291–292 (Duran); People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 742 (McDaniel).) A. Relevant Background During a discussion of motions in limine prior to trial, appellant interrupted the proceedings, prompting the court to warn that further vocal outbursts would result in his removal from the courtroom.

2016Because the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, we must reverse.3 (See Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 635 [ 125 S.Ct. 2007 ] (Deck); People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282 , 291–292 (Duran); People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 742 (McDaniel).) A. Relevant Background During a discussion of motions in limine prior to trial, appellant interrupted the proceedings, prompting the court to warn that further vocal outbursts would result in his removal from the courtroom.

2025However, as Isabella G. explained, “Section 361.3 requires the juvenile court to evaluate a number of factors, including the child’s best interest.” (Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 724 .) “‘When the proceedings take place under an inappropriate statute, even one requiring similar findings, the parties are not afforded the opportunity to tailor their case to the correct statute, and the trial court 44. cannot fulfill its responsibility to make findings of fact within the provisions of that statute.’” (Ibid.) Thus, while we reject the Department’s claim that the court erred in finding

2023When, as here, a child is under age three on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parents, services should not exceed six months unless the court finds a substantial probability of return with an extended 12- or 18-month period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528 .) Further, a “parent may waive his or her constitutional rights to relationships with the child ‘as long as the waivers are “voluntary [citations] and knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ [Ci

2023When, as here, a child is under age three on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parents, services should not exceed six months unless the court finds a substantial probability of return with an extended 12- or 18-month period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528 .) Further, a “parent may waive his or her constitutional rights to relationships with the child ‘as long as the waivers are “voluntary [citations] and knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ [Ci

2021The defect is fatal and requires affirmance. “[T]he cardinal rule of appellate review [is] that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 , citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; see also Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 (plur. opn. of Grodin, J.).) The trial court’s rationale for denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is not reflected anywhere in the record, and without anything to memorialize all that transpired

2021The defect is fatal and requires affirmance. “[T]he cardinal rule of appellate review [is] that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 , citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; see also Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 (plur. opn. of Grodin, J.).) The trial court’s rationale for denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is not reflected anywhere in the record, and without anything to memorialize all that transpired

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018(See People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 , 504, 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ( Elliot ) [defendant was denied the right under " section 868 of the Penal Code, to require that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during the preliminary examination"]; People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 Cal. 641 , 644-645, 39 P. 29 [defendant was denied the right to counsel]; see also Harris v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1129 , 1144, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 [defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel "had a material conflict of interest with him at the time of hi

2018(See People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 , 504, 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ( Elliot ) [defendant was denied the right under " section 868 of the Penal Code, to require that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during the preliminary examination"]; People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 Cal. 641 , 644-645, 39 P. 29 [defendant was denied the right to counsel]; see also Harris v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1129 , 1144, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 [defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel "had a material conflict of interest with him at the time of hi

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018(See People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 , 504, 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ( Elliot ) [defendant was denied the right under " section 868 of the Penal Code, to require that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during the preliminary examination"]; People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 Cal. 641 , 644-645, 39 P. 29 [defendant was denied the right to counsel]; see also Harris v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1129 , 1144, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 [defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel "had a material conflict of interest with him at the time of hi

2018(See People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 , 504, 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ( Elliot ) [defendant was denied the right under " section 868 of the Penal Code, to require that all unauthorized persons be excluded from the courtroom during the preliminary examination"]; People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 Cal. 641 , 644-645, 39 P. 29 [defendant was denied the right to counsel]; see also Harris v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1129 , 1144, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 780 [defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel "had a material conflict of interest with him at the time of hi

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2018VI, § 13.) Because the defendant made "no showing that he was denied a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice from the closure of the preliminary examination," we affirmed the judgment of conviction. ( Id. at p. 530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 .) In reaching this conclusion, we held that "irregularities in the preliminary examination procedures which are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense shall be reviewed under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error and shall require reversal only if defendant can show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejud

2016(Conservatorship of Ramirez (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 390, 401 .) “In making that determination, we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings. [Citations.] We must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) We have no record of the proceedings on the hearing on Mother’s petition to remove the conservator except for the court’s minute order denying the petition.