fellow-servant rule in Georgia

1969In Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509, 511 ( 77 SE 618 ), it is held: "Omitting the fellow-servant doctrine, the general rule is that a master is liable for the tort of his servant, whether negligent *478 or voluntary, if done by his command or in the prosecution and scope of his business.

1969In Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509, 511 ( 77 SE 618 ), it is held: “Omitting the fellow-servant doctrine, the general rule is that a master is liable for the tort of his servant, whether negli- gent or voluntary, if done by his command or in the prosecution and scope of his business.

2026Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645 (1876) (the fellow servant rule, which ordinarily limits 71 injuries — a right that existed in the late 1700s and was protected in the constitution — can vanish upon the creation of an alternative and exclusive 26 statutory scheme?

1988Accord Murphy v. ARA Svcs., supra. See generally Alterman v. Jinks, 122 Ga. App. 859, 862 ( 179 SE2d 92 ) (1970); Saunders v. Vikers, 116 Ga. App. 733 (3) ( 158 SE2d 324 ) (1967).

1988Accord Murphy v. ARA Svcs., supra. See generally Alterman v. Jinks, 122 Ga. App. 859, 862 ( 179 SE2d 92 ) (1970); Saunders v. Vikers, 116 Ga. App. 733 (3) ( 158 SE2d 324 ) (1967).

1988The fellow-servant doctrine is set forth at OCGA § 34-7-21 as follows: “[T]he employer shall not be liable to one employee for injuries arising from the negligence or misconduct of other employees about the same business.” While this doctrine would appear to insu *869 late the appellee from any vicarious liability for Whitehead’s alleged conduct which might otherwise be imposed pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, compare Gaylor v. Jay & Gene’s Chrysler &c., 183 Ga. App. 255 ( 358 SE2d 655 ) (1987), it has been held that the fellow-servant doctrine does not protect an employer from

1988The fellow-servant doctrine is set forth at OCGA § 34-7-21 as follows: “[T]he employer shall not be liable to one employee for injuries arising from the negligence or misconduct of other employees about the same business.” While this doctrine would appear to insu *869 late the appellee from any vicarious liability for Whitehead’s alleged conduct which might otherwise be imposed pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, compare Gaylor v. Jay & Gene’s Chrysler &c., 183 Ga. App. 255 ( 358 SE2d 655 ) (1987), it has been held that the fellow-servant doctrine does not protect an employer from

1969Co., 108 Ga. 807 , supra. Hence, it cannot rely on Washburn and Griffith , and could be held for failure to make a proper inspection and the necessary correction. (b) Glynn Plymouth’s remaining contention is that recovery is barred by the fellow-servant doctrine.

1969Union Cotton Mills v. Harris, 144 Ga. 716 (2a) ( 87 SE 1029 ).

1969Union Cotton Mills v. Harris, 144 Ga. 716 (2a) ( 87 SE 1029 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1959Standard Cotton Mills v. Collum, 6 Ga. App. 426 (1) ( 65 S. E. 195 ); Durham v. Whittier Mills Co., 9 Ga. App. 26 ( 70 S. E. 195 ); Moseley v. Schofield’s Sons Co., 123 Ga. 197 ( 51 S. E. 309 ).

1953Co. v. Walker, 21 Ga. App. 603 (3) ( 94 S. E. 855 ): “It is incumbent upon the injured servant . ' . . except where the employer is a railroad company, to show the following facts: first, that the fellow servant was incompetent; [and] second, that the injury complained of resulted directly or proximately from such incompetency.” (Italics ours.) While this ruling was made in a case involving an application of the fellow-servant rule, it is nevertheless applicable in a case such as the instant one where a third person has been injured by the negligence of the servant and is seeking to hold the m

1953Co. v. Walker, 21 Ga. App. 603 (3) ( 94 S. E. 855 ): “It is incumbent upon the injured servant . ' . . except where the employer is a railroad company, to show the following facts: first, that the fellow servant was incompetent; [and] second, that the injury complained of resulted directly or proximately from such incompetency.” (Italics ours.) While this ruling was made in a case involving an application of the fellow-servant rule, it is nevertheless applicable in a case such as the instant one where a third person has been injured by the negligence of the servant and is seeking to hold the m

1947Roberts v. Ethridge, supra; Davis v. Davis Foundry & Machine Works, 18 Ga. App. 508 ( 89 S. E. 600 ).

1947Roberts v. Ethridge, supra; Davis v. Davis Foundry & Machine Works, 18 Ga. App. 508 ( 89 S. E. 600 ).

1926Georgia Coal & Iron Co. v. Bradford, 131 Ga. 289 (supra).

1908Cheeney v. Ocean Steamship Co., 92 Ga. 726 ( 19 S. E. 33 , 44 Am.

1908Cheeney v. Ocean Steamship Co., 92 Ga. 726 ( 19 S. E. 33 , 44 Am.

1907In a suit for personal injuries, under the rulings of this court in the cases of Evans v. Josephine Mills, 119 Ga. 448 , and Crown Cotton Mills v. McNally, 127 Ga. 404 , the fellow-servant rule' applies to a youth 17 years of age, of ordinary intelligence, injured while engaged in the ■ operation of a dangerous machine. 2.

1904Co. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270 , the court held that while the fellow-servant rule should apply to one under twenty-one years of age, it should not be enforced against a child of tender years.

1903In Keith v. Walker Iron Co., 81 Ga. 49 , where the arch fell, the question involved was not the duty of a master to furnish a safe place, but a clear instance where the doctrine of fellow-servant applied; for the injured plaintiff was engaged in the construction of the arch along with the mason who was in charge of the work.

1903Under such circumstances, the doctrine of the fellow-servant rule would apply, as was held in Ocean Steamship Co. v. Gheeney, 86 Ga. 278 .

1903Under such circumstances, the doctrine of the fellow-servant rule would apply, as was held in Ocean Steamship Co. v. Gheeney, 86 Ga. 278 .

1903This is well illustrated in this very section changing the doctrine of fellow-servant; for this court, in holding that a receiver was not a railroad company, and therefore not within the language of section 2323 (3036), said, “It would be uncandid to deny that, to a certain extent, the same reasons of public policy and private justice which call for the protection of operatives on a railroad when the owners or lessees are in possession apply when receivers are in possession,” etc. Henderson v. Walker, 55 Ga. 483 ; Robinson v. Huidekoper, 98 Ga. 306 ; Ellington v. Beaver Dam Co., 93 Ga. 53 .

1903This is well illustrated in this very section changing the doctrine of fellow-servant; for this court, in holding that a receiver was not a railroad company, and therefore not within the language of section 2323 (3036), said, “It would be uncandid to deny that, to a certain extent, the same reasons of public policy and private justice which call for the protection of operatives on a railroad when the owners or lessees are in possession apply when receivers are in possession,” etc. Henderson v. Walker, 55 Ga. 483 ; Robinson v. Huidekoper, 98 Ga. 306 ; Ellington v. Beaver Dam Co., 93 Ga. 53 .