fellow-servant rule in Ohio

2018Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. , 92 Ohio St.3d 115 , 118-119, 748 N.E.2d 1111 (2001).

2018Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. , 92 Ohio St.3d 115 , 118-119, 748 N.E.2d 1111 (2001).

2016Id. at 293 . {¶5} The fellow servant immunity doctrine, which has been codified at R.C. 4123.741 provides: No employee of any employer, as defined in division (B) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code, shall be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury or occupational disease, received or contracted by any other employee of such employer in the course of and arising out of the latter employee's employment, or for any death resulting from such injury or occupational disease, on the condition that such injury, occupational disease, or death is found to be compensab

2011A prison “ ‘may confront [a negligence] claimant with the ordinary common law defenses — contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and perhaps even the fellow servant rule.’ ” Id. at 183 , quoting Watson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

2007The court in Webb held that an insurer is not liable to its insured on an uninsured-motorist claim when the tortfeasor-motorist who caused the insured’s injuries has liability insurance but is immune from liability under the fellow-servant immunity statute, R.C. 4123.741. 54 Ohio St.3d 61 , 562 N.E.2d 132 , syllabus.

2007The court in Webb held that an insurer is not liable to its insured on an uninsured-motorist claim when the tortfeasor-motorist who caused the insured’s injuries has liability insurance but is immune from liability under the fellow-servant immunity statute, R.C. 4123.741. 54 Ohio St.3d 61 , 562 N.E.2d 132 , syllabus.

2005Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S. 532, 542-543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 . {¶ 17} Although the FELA is not a workers’ compensation statute, in that some showing of fault is required, id. at 543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 , “the special features of this statutory negligence action * * * make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific RR.

2005Rail Corp. v. Gottshall (1994), 512 U.S. 532, 542-543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 . {¶ 17} Although the FELA is not a workers’ compensation statute, in that some showing of fault is required, id. at 543 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 , “the special features of this statutory negligence action * * * make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific RR.

2004Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 ; Zemcik v. La Pine Truck Sales Equipment (1998), 124 Ohio App.3d 581 , 585 , 706 N.E.2d 860 .

2004Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 ; Zemcik v. La Pine Truck Sales Equipment (1998), 124 Ohio App.3d 581 , 585 , 706 N.E.2d 860 .

2004Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 90 , 100 , 15 OBR 246, 255, 472 N.E.2d 1046 , 1055 .

2004Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 90 , 100 , 15 OBR 246, 255, 472 N.E.2d 1046 , 1055 .

2004Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 ; Zemcik v. La Pine Truck Sales Equipment (1998), 124 Ohio App.3d 581 , 585 , 706 N.E.2d 860 .

2004The Ohio Supreme Court recently restated the appropriate test in Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-70 , 696 N.E.2d 201 as follows: {¶ 11} "Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor." {¶ 12} With regard to the fellow servant rule, we note that in K

2004The Ohio Supreme Court recently restated the appropriate test in Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-70 , 696 N.E.2d 201 as follows: {¶ 11} "Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor." {¶ 12} With regard to the fellow servant rule, we note that in K

2004The Ohio Supreme Court recently restated the appropriate test in Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-70 , 696 N.E.2d 201 as follows: {¶ 11} "Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor." {¶ 12} With regard to the fellow servant rule, we note that in K

2004The Ohio Supreme Court recently restated the appropriate test in Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 367 , 369-70 , 696 N.E.2d 201 as follows: {¶ 11} "Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor." {¶ 12} With regard to the fellow servant rule, we note that in K

1929That this, rather than the nature and character of the work *494 being done, is the controlling and governing test in this state, would seem to be well settled by the following authorities: Railroad Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St., 201 ; Railway Co. v. Lewis, 33 Ohio St., 196 ; Railway Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio St., 665 .” This principle is affirmed again by the Supreme Court in the case of Gildersleeve v. Newton Steel Co., 109 Ohio St., 341 , at page 354, 142 N. E., 678 , 682: “The defendant was also entitled to the fellow-servant defense, even if such superior employe was in a separate department, esp

1929That this, rather than the nature and character of the work *494 being done, is the controlling and governing test in this state, would seem to be well settled by the following authorities: Railroad Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St., 201 ; Railway Co. v. Lewis, 33 Ohio St., 196 ; Railway Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio St., 665 .” This principle is affirmed again by the Supreme Court in the case of Gildersleeve v. Newton Steel Co., 109 Ohio St., 341 , at page 354, 142 N. E., 678 , 682: “The defendant was also entitled to the fellow-servant defense, even if such superior employe was in a separate department, esp