fellow-servant rule in Mississippi

1938Co. v. Brown, 143 Miss. 890 , 108 So. 50S, 504, the court, although holding that there was no liability in the case, reaffirmed the rule to the effect that “where the reasonably safe place to work doctrine applies, the fellow-servant doctrine has no application, because of the rule that the duty of the master in that respect is nondelegable.” In Thompson on Negligence, paragraphs 4856, 4863, the rule is announced that “If the negligence of the master . . . mingles with that one who stood in the relation of a fellow servant to the servant receiving the injury; and if the negligence of the maste

1933Co. v. Brown, 143 Miss. 890, 895 , 108 So. 503, 504 , this court said: “Where the reasonably safe place to work doctrine applies, the fellow-servant doctrine has no application, because of the rule that the duty of the master in that respect is nondelegable.” Based upon the foregoing statements, and upon like statements found in many other cases and in several texts, dealing with the subject, appellee argues that a foreman, superintendent, or other vice-principal may never divest himself of his character as such by anything that he may temporarily do, -so long as his acts are within the scope

1974In Thompson v. Thomas, 219 Miss. 552 , 69 So.2d 238 (1954) we said: Where the duty to use reasonable care to furnish a reasonably safe instrumentality applies, the fellow servant rule has no application, because such duty is non-delegable.

1974In Thompson v. Thomas, 219 Miss. 552 , 69 So.2d 238 (1954) we said: Where the duty to use reasonable care to furnish a reasonably safe instrumentality applies, the fellow servant rule has no application, because such duty is non-delegable.

1967The question is whether the fact that the negligent act was that of the foreman is sufficient to carry liability against the master.” 170 Miss, at 42, 154 So. at 266 . ****** “Since the negligent act which was the proximate cause of the injury was an act of the foreman done then and there as a workman or fellow laborer, and not in the actual exercise of his official authority as foreman, it was obligatory upon the trial judge, under the settled rule in this state, to grant the peremptory charge, which he did.” 170 Miss, at 43-44, 154 So. at 267 .

1967The question is whether the fact that the negligent act was that of the foreman is sufficient to carry liability against the master.” 170 Miss, at 42, 154 So. at 266 . ****** “Since the negligent act which was the proximate cause of the injury was an act of the foreman done then and there as a workman or fellow laborer, and not in the actual exercise of his official authority as foreman, it was obligatory upon the trial judge, under the settled rule in this state, to grant the peremptory charge, which he did.” 170 Miss, at 43-44, 154 So. at 267 .

1938A different statement of the doctrine is to say that, in order to relieve the master from liability for an injury to one of his servants the negligence of a fellow servant must have been the sole cause of the injury, and not commingled or combined with the negligence of the master or his representative.” See, also, Masonite Corp. v. Lochridge, 163 Miss. 364 , 140 So, 223 , 141 So. 758 ; Ross v. Louisville *753 & N. R.

1938A different statement of the doctrine is to say that, in order to relieve the master from liability for an injury to one of his servants the negligence of a fellow servant must have been the sole cause of the injury, and not commingled or combined with the negligence of the master or his representative.” See, also, Masonite Corp. v. Lochridge, 163 Miss. 364 , 140 So, 223 , 141 So. 758 ; Ross v. Louisville *753 & N. R.

1929Appellant contends that the case of the Great Southern Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Miss. 55 , 101 So. 787, 788 , is decisive of this question in appellant’s favor.

1929Appellant contends that the case of the Great Southern Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Miss. 55 , 101 So. 787, 788 , is decisive of this question in appellant’s favor.

1926Begarding it in this light, it is the ordinary case of one sustaining an injury in the course of his employment, in which he must bear the loss himself, or seek his remedy, if he has any, against the actual wrongdoer.’ ” The fellow-servant doctrine applies to this case, and, in our opinion, the facts in this case make it fall within the rule above quoted, as it likewise falls within the rule announced in the case of the Petroleum Iron Works v. Bailey, 124 Miss. 11 , 86 So. 644 , as follows: “The material testimony introduced by the plaintiff was to the effect that he and some other employees o

1926Begarding it in this light, it is the ordinary case of one sustaining an injury in the course of his employment, in which he must bear the loss himself, or seek his remedy, if he has any, against the actual wrongdoer.’ ” The fellow-servant doctrine applies to this case, and, in our opinion, the facts in this case make it fall within the rule above quoted, as it likewise falls within the rule announced in the case of the Petroleum Iron Works v. Bailey, 124 Miss. 11 , 86 So. 644 , as follows: “The material testimony introduced by the plaintiff was to the effect that he and some other employees o

1923This contention was ruled against the appellant by Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 106 Miss. 672 , 64 So. 461 , which case we do not think should be overruled.

1923This contention was ruled against the appellant by Easterling Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 106 Miss. 672 , 64 So. 461 , which case we do not think should be overruled.

1916Section 1 of chapter 194 of the Laws of Mississippi of 1908, at page 204 provides that: “Every employee of a railroad corporation, and all other corporations and individuals, using engines, locomotives or cars of any kind of description whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous agencies of steam, electricity, gas, gasoline or lever power, and running on tracks, shall have the same rights and remedies for an injury suffered by him from the act or omission of such railroad corporation or others, or their employees, as are allowed by law to other persons not employed. ’ ’ In Construction Co. v. Hefl

1916Section 1 of chapter 194 of the Laws of Mississippi of 1908, at page 204 provides that: “Every employee of a railroad corporation, and all other corporations and individuals, using engines, locomotives or cars of any kind of description whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous agencies of steam, electricity, gas, gasoline or lever power, and running on tracks, shall have the same rights and remedies for an injury suffered by him from the act or omission of such railroad corporation or others, or their employees, as are allowed by law to other persons not employed. ’ ’ In Construction Co. v. Hefl

1901It did not in the remotest degree touch or qualify the stringent fellow servant rule, illustrated in all its bald absurdity by the case of McMaster v. Railroad Co., 65 Miss., 264 ( 4 So.