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10 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Glass v. City of Chattanoogagreen2 sentences1997Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the public duty doctrine and the policemen and firemen’s rule in these cases, we note that the Court has abolished the fellow servant doctrine, which formerly relieved an employer from liability "for any injuries to an employee resulting from the negligence of a fellow worker engaged in common employment,” provided there had been "due care in selection and employment of the tortfeasor.” Glass v. City of Chattanooga, 858 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tenn.1993). . 1994Comment, Employees' Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice?, 52 Tenn.L.Rev. 35, 38 (1984). 9 .It was also in Priestly v. Fowler, supra, that Lord Abinger created the fellow-servant doctrine which this Court recently abandoned in Glass v. City of Chattanooga, 858 S.W.2d 312 (1993). 10 . | 1 | 2 |
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co.green1 sentence2015King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 Tenn. L.Rev. 405, 406 (1988) (footnote omitted), and were necessary because of the “difficulty of proving fault in the industrial setting and the availability of the [defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule, which] more often than not defeated the worker’s hope for recovery,” Clanton v. Cainr-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tenn. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Salinas v. Vierstragreen2 sentences1994Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984 , 695 P.2d 369, 372 (1985); Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259 , 737 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1987). 11 . 1994Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984 , 695 P.2d 369, 372 (1985); Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259 , 737 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1987). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
Naomi Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc.green2 sentences1994Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984 , 695 P.2d 369, 372 (1985); Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259 , 737 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1987). 11 . 1994Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984 , 695 P.2d 369, 372 (1985); Mizushima v. Sunset Ranch, Inc., 103 Nev. 259 , 737 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1987). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Covert
green
2 sentences1993Anderson v. Covert, 193 Tenn. 238 , 245 S.W.2d 770 (1952). 1993Anderson v. Covert, 193 Tenn. 238 , 245 S.W.2d 770 (1952). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Crilly v. Ballou
green
2 sentences1991Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 307-308 , 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958). 1991Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 307-308 , 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1991Co., 420 Mich. 308 , 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act were directed to different ends; the former to protect against “ ‘the prejudices and biases’ one race, sex, or religion bears against another,” the latter to protect victims of industrial injuries who had been deprived of other remedies because of common-law doctrines such as contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. 1991Co., 420 Mich. 308 , 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act were directed to different ends; the former to protect against “ ‘the prejudices and biases’ one race, sex, or religion bears against another,” the latter to protect victims of industrial injuries who had been deprived of other remedies because of common-law doctrines such as contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Knox v. Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1965We have read and considered the case of Knox v. Southern Railroad, 1898, 101 Tenn. 375 , 47 S.W. 491 , cited and relied upon by defendants and hold that the ruling of such case is not controlling of the case at bar. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Williams v. McElhaney
neutral
2 sentences1965Williams v. McElhaney, 1958, 203 Tenn. 602 , 315 S.W.2d 106 . 1965Williams v. McElhaney, 1958, 203 Tenn. 602 , 315 S.W.2d 106 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co.
neutral
1 sentence1958See 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, Sec. 173, 175, 183, 353, 358; Smith v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 115 Tenn. 543, 558 , 92 S.W. 62 , 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1180. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1948Code Section 6862; Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co., 31 Tenn. App. 155 , 212 S. W. (2d) 908 ; Moore Coal Co. v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 516 , 64 S. W. (2d) 3 ; Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Cir., 104 F. (2d) 290. 1948Code Section 6862; Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co., 31 Tenn. App. 155 , 212 S. W. (2d) 908 ; Moore Coal Co. v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 516 , 64 S. W. (2d) 3 ; Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Cir., 104 F. (2d) 290. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Moore Coal Co. v. Brown
green
2 sentences1948Code Section 6862; Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co., 31 Tenn. App. 155 , 212 S. W. (2d) 908 ; Moore Coal Co. v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 516 , 64 S. W. (2d) 3 ; Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Cir., 104 F. (2d) 290. 1948Code Section 6862; Duncan v. Dickie Rector Lumber Co., 31 Tenn. App. 155 , 212 S. W. (2d) 908 ; Moore Coal Co. v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 516 , 64 S. W. (2d) 3 ; Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Cir., 104 F. (2d) 290. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Allen v. Chamberlain
neutral
2 sentences1947Code sec. 6862. “(3) Defendant, however, insists that the evidence established without dispute its defense, interposed after the remand, that if it employed plaintiff such employ *518 ment was ‘casual’ and not ‘in the usual course’ of its business under Code sec. 6856(b); that this section excludes the operation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case so as to leave open to defendant these common law defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule; and that on the authority of Brown v. [Chattanooga] Electric Railway Co., supra, Allen v. Chamberla 1947Code sec. 6862. “(3) Defendant, however, insists that the evidence established without dispute its defense, interposed after the remand, that if it employed plaintiff such employ *518 ment was ‘casual’ and not ‘in the usual course’ of its business under Code sec. 6856(b); that this section excludes the operation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case so as to leave open to defendant these common law defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule; and that on the authority of Brown v. [Chattanooga] Electric Railway Co., supra, Allen v. Chamberla | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Gibbons v. Roller Estates, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1947“Code sec. 6856(b) provides that the Act shall not apply to ‘any person whose employment at the time of the injury is casual, that is, one who is not employed in the usual course of trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employei\’ The test is whether the employee ‘is engaged with reference to the usual course of the master’s trade, business, etc.’ If so engaged, he is within the Act, ‘ although his employment itself is casual as distinguished from regular employment.’ Gibbons v. Roller Estates, Inc., 163 Tenn. 373, 376 , 43 S. W. (2d) 198, 199 . 1947“Code sec. 6856(b) provides that the Act shall not apply to ‘any person whose employment at the time of the injury is casual, that is, one who is not employed in the usual course of trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employei\’ The test is whether the employee ‘is engaged with reference to the usual course of the master’s trade, business, etc.’ If so engaged, he is within the Act, ‘ although his employment itself is casual as distinguished from regular employment.’ Gibbons v. Roller Estates, Inc., 163 Tenn. 373, 376 , 43 S. W. (2d) 198, 199 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Hawkins v. Smith
green
2 sentences1922Stat. 1909, sections 5440-5444; Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo., 688 , 147 S. W., 1042 ); declaring invalid contracts made by employees with corporations limiting the liability of the latter in the event of injury to the employee (section 5437, Rev. 1922Stat. 1909, sections 5440-5444; Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo., 688 , 147 S. W., 1042 ); declaring invalid contracts made by employees with corporations limiting the liability of the latter in the event of injury to the employee (section 5437, Rev. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
State v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1922Co., 242 Mo., 339 , 147 S. W., 118 ); abolishing the fellow-servant rule as applying to mining corporations (Whittaker Rev. 1922Co., 242 Mo., 339 , 147 S. W., 118 ); abolishing the fellow-servant rule as applying to mining corporations (Whittaker Rev. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.