fellow-servant rule in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayersgreen scotus · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020Co. (1943) 318 U.S. 54, 58 ; see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers (2003) 538 U.S. 135 , 144–145 (Norfolk).) In addition to establishing the right to seek damages for an employer’s negligence under section 51, FELA abolished common law tort defenses that “had effectively barred recovery by injured workers,” such as the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence (which FELA replaced with comparative negligence), and assumption of risk (eliminated in a 1939 amendment).	1	1
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshallgreen scotus · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020(Gottshall, at pp. 542–543; see §§ 53–55.) In section 55, Congress also “prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract.” (Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 543 .) Section 55 states in full: “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this act [ 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.], shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act [ibid.], such common	1	1
Danek v. Hommergreen nj · 1952 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976 2 sentences 1976We can see no reason why the employer should also be held liable for collateral damages to third persons whose rights, at common law, were derivative from those of the employee.” (P. 870.) The Gillespie court adopted the reasoning of decisions from other jurisdictions to the effect that the workers’ compensation laws were intended to provide a complete and all-inclusive scheme of recovery for industrial injuries to employees. “ ‘It would be anomalous to hold that the employer is under no liability in tort to a married employee but is liable in tort to her husband for the consequences to him of 1976We can see no reason why the employer should also be held liable for collateral damages to third persons whose rights, at common law, were derivative from those of the employee.” (P. 870.) The Gillespie court adopted the reasoning of decisions from other jurisdictions to the effect that the workers’ compensation laws were intended to provide a complete and all-inclusive scheme of recovery for industrial injuries to employees. “ ‘It would be anomalous to hold that the employer is under no liability in tort to a married employee but is liable in tort to her husband for the consequences to him of	1	1
Munn v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1877 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964 2 sentences 1964It considered it to be a proper exercise of the police power under the authority of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 [ 24 L.Ed. 77, 87 ], which it quoted (p. 696) : “ ‘A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law. 1964It considered it to be a proper exercise of the police power under the authority of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 [ 24 L.Ed. 77, 87 ], which it quoted (p. 696) : “ ‘A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.	1	1
Hedge v. Williamsgreen cal · 1901 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1955–1955 2 sentences 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ]; 8 Cal.Jur. 988-989, 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer. 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ]; 8 Cal.Jur. 988-989, 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer.	1	1
Crabbe v. Mammoth Channel Gold Mining Co.green cal · 1914 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1955–1955 2 sentences 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ]; 8 Cal.Jur. 988-989, 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer. 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ]; 8 Cal.Jur. 988-989, 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer.	1	1
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal.green scotus · 1935 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1938–1938 2 sentences 1938In the exercise of this power, the legislature was not limited with respect either to the form of the contract, or the nature of the consideration, or the absolute or conditional character of the engagement.” Some of the other eases in which statutes restricting the freedom of employer and employee to contract regarding their relationship have been upheld are Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Com., (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 543 [55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L. 1938In the exercise of this power, the legislature was not limited with respect either to the form of the contract, or the nature of the consideration, or the absolute or conditional character of the engagement.” Some of the other eases in which statutes restricting the freedom of employer and employee to contract regarding their relationship have been upheld are Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Com., (1935) 294 U. S. 532, 543 [55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad green scotus · 1943 1 sentence 2020Co. (1943) 318 U.S. 54, 58 ; see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers (2003) 538 U.S. 135 , 144–145 (Norfolk).) In addition to establishing the right to seek damages for an employer’s negligence under section 51, FELA abolished common law tort defenses that “had effectively barred recovery by injured workers,” such as the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence (which FELA replaced with comparative negligence), and assumption of risk (eliminated in a 1939 amendment).	1	2020–2020
Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad green scotus · 1948 1 sentence 2020(Gottshall, at pp. 542–543; see §§ 53–55.) In section 55, Congress also “prohibited employers from exempting themselves from FELA through contract.” (Gottshall, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 543 .) Section 55 states in full: “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this act [ 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.], shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act [ibid.], such common	1	2020–2020
Gillespie v. Northridge Hospital Foundation green calctapp · 1971 2 sentences 1976Foundation (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 867 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 134 ], wherein section .3600 was construed to bar a husband’s action against his wife’s employer for the loss of her services resulting from a work-related injury covered by workers’ compensation. 4 “The whole scheme of workmen’s compensation contemplates that, in exchange for imposing on the employer a liability without fault and denying to him the common law defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, he is assured of a single liability, limited by a statutory scheme, which provides for medical expenses and which allots 1976Foundation (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 867 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 134 ], wherein section .3600 was construed to bar a husband’s action against his wife’s employer for the loss of her services resulting from a work-related injury covered by workers’ compensation. 4 “The whole scheme of workmen’s compensation contemplates that, in exchange for imposing on the employer a liability without fault and denying to him the common law defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, he is assured of a single liability, limited by a statutory scheme, which provides for medical expenses and which allots	1	1976–1976
Giberson v. Fink green calctapp · 1915 1 sentence 1964An earlier instance of “legislative overhauling and revision of common law tort rules” 1 is in our system of workmen’s compensation laws, the constitutionality of which was upheld by our California Supreme Court in 1915 in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [ 151 P. 398 ], There the court, although stating (p. 692) the legislation to be “radical, not to say revolutionary” in sweeping out of existence (in the covered field) questions of common law negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule, held it did not violate either due process or equ	1	1964–1964
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury green cal · 1915 1 sentence 1964An earlier instance of “legislative overhauling and revision of common law tort rules” 1 is in our system of workmen’s compensation laws, the constitutionality of which was upheld by our California Supreme Court in 1915 in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [ 151 P. 398 ], There the court, although stating (p. 692) the legislation to be “radical, not to say revolutionary” in sweeping out of existence (in the covered field) questions of common law negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule, held it did not violate either due process or equ	1	1964–1964
Brunnings v. Townsend neutral cal · 1901 2 sentences 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ]; 8 Cal.Jur. 988-989, 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer. 1955Co. (1914), 168 Cal. 500, 504-506 [ 143 P. 714 ] ; 8 Cal. Jur. 988-989, § 41.) And in 1901 (prior to abolition of the fellow-servant doctrine in this state by Stats. 1911, p. 796) it was declared in Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 457 [ 63 P. 721 , 64 P. 106 , 82 Am.St.Rep. 366 ], that if the death had been caused by negligence of a fellow servant of the deceased, then the heirs could not recover against the employer.	1	1955–1955
Méndez v. Baldassari neutral prsupreme · 1920 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
People v. Llamas neutral prsupreme · 1923 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
Kevern v. Providence Gold & Silver Mining Co. neutral cal · 1886 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
Trewatha v. Buchanan Gold Mining & Milling Co. neutral cal · 1892 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
Bank of Chico v. Spect neutral cal · 1886 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
Luman v. Golden Ancient Channel Mining Co. green cal · 1903 2 sentences 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , 66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff. 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , 66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912
Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co. neutral cal · 1899 1 sentence 1912(See Luman v. Golden etc. Co., 140 Cal. 700, 707 , [ 74 Pac. 307 ]; Vizelich v. Southern Pacific Co., 126 Cal. 587 , [ 59 Pac 1291 ; Trewatha v. Buchanan etc. Co., 96 Cal. 494 , *66 500, [ 28 Pac. 571 , 31 Pac. 561 ]; Kevern v. Providence etc. Co., 70 Cal. 392 , [ 11 Pac. 740 ].) As we have said, in view of the fellow-servant rule, defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for these injuries, if they were solely due to the mere negligence of Vargas, a fellow-servant of plaintiff.	1	1912–1912

Where else courts name it

NY 34 (1909–2022) GA 24 (1903–2026) IL 21 (1899–2021) MO 19 (1905–2012) WA 16 (1906–2008) MN 15 (1909–2013) KY 15 (1911–1998) MS 12 (1901–2018) IN 12 (1906–2010) NC 11 (1902–2023) FL 10 (1930–2007) MA 10 (1919–1990) KS 10 (1907–2006) MI 10 (1895–2010) TN 10 (1922–2015) TX 9 (1916–2016) OH 8 (1929–2018) OK 8 (1910–1991) NJ 8 (1913–2020) NM 7 (1892–1982) MD 7 (1902–2025) AZ 7 (1962–2005) IA 7 (1902–1912) ND 6 (1891–1997) ID 6 (1911–1975) LA 6 (1903–2003) CA 6 (1912–2020) VA 6 (1908–2017) WV 5 (1938–2000) AR 5 (1923–1957) WY 4 (1971–2014) MT 4 (1909–2004) SD 4 (1967–2021) WI 4 (1977–2024) AL 4 (1923–2007) OR 4 (1914–2016) VT 3 (1908–1917) RI 3 (1894–1916) CT 3 (1912–1985) PA 3 (1913–1939) SC 2 (1912–1932)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check