explanation challenge in Illinois

2015Id. at 293 (citing People ex rel.

2015Id. at 293 (citing People ex rel.

1994In Harris I, this court rejected the trial judge's finding as erroneous, noting that the prosecutor, in his explanation for the challenge to Taylor, had made no reference to the location of the defendant's home. ( Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 186 , 135 Ill.Dec. 861 , 544 N.E.2d 357 .) On remand, the trial judge again upheld the State's explanation for its challenge to Taylor, citing all three reasons mentioned by the prosecutor at the earlier hearing.

1994(Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 186 .) On remand, the trial judge again upheld the State’s explanation for its challenge to Taylor, citing all three reasons mentioned by the prosecutor at the earlier hearing.

2014There, the trial court held a Batson hearing off the record, and therefore, the supreme court did not know what defense counsel argued; instead, the record reflected the trial court’s request that the State provide an explanation for its challenge to a prospective juror “without a ‘formal’ objection by defense counsel.” Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 366 .

2013We note that this court’s explanation of the rule in People v. Perfecto, 26 Ill. 2d 228 (1962), was approved in People v. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d 352, 359 (1982), as the “most precise explanation” of the criteria for establishing the corpus delicti. -7- In Perfecto, we found “an abundance of evidence corroborating” the defendant’s confession that he had beaten a 75-year-old woman after she resisted his attack and then sexually assaulted her.

1995(See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (9th Cir. 1995), 43 F.3d 1311 .) These explanations would have tended to assist the jury in resolving conflicting testimony of some of the witnesses.

1993(Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 288-89 , 604 N.E.2d at 886 .) The State’s explanation for its challenge of each African-American venireperson must be reviewed because the exclusion of even one venireperson on the basis of race is constitutionally infirm.

1993(Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 288-89 , 604 N.E.2d at 886 .) The State’s explanation for its challenge of each African-American venireperson must be reviewed because the exclusion of even one venireperson on the basis of race is constitutionally infirm.

1992(See also People v. Cannon (1992), 227 Ill.

1992(See also People v. Cannon (First Dist.1992), 227 Ill.App.3d 551, 554 , 169 Ill.Dec. 681 , 592 N.E.2d 168 .) We therefore find that the State failed to rebut the Batson challenge and did not offer race-neutral explanations to satisfactorily rebut the inference that it had excluded Woodall and Harris from the jury due to their race.

1992Which issues are mandatory, and which are not, will be very fact-specific questions, which the IELRB is eminently qualified to resolve." 149 Ill.2d at 523 , 174 Ill.Dec. at 821 , 599 N.E.2d at 905 .

1992Which issues are mandatory, and which are not, will be very fact-specific questions, which the IELRB is eminently qualified to resolve." 149 Ill.2d at 523 , 174 Ill.Dec. at 821 , 599 N.E.2d at 905 .

1986The court stated, however, that “[t]he fact that appellee [the vendor] demanded more than it was entitled to receive, did not of itself render the forfeiture void.” ( 379 Ill. 375, 385 , 41 N.E.2d 526 .) The explanation for that rule was that the contract itself provided the measure of payment necessary for reinstatement, and the purchaser, by tendering that amount within the time prescribed by the notice, would have been able to avoid forfeiture.

1986The court stated, however, that “[t]he fact that appellee [the vendor] demanded more than it was entitled to receive, did not of itself render the forfeiture void.” ( 379 Ill. 375, 385 , 41 N.E.2d 526 .) The explanation for that rule was that the contract itself provided the measure of payment necessary for reinstatement, and the purchaser, by tendering that amount within the time prescribed by the notice, would have been able to avoid forfeiture.

1985In Tate, the prosecutor’s closing argument included a statement that “ ‘the principle of recent unexplained possession [on a charge of theft auto] makes it incumbent upon the defense to come forward and explain why and how that possession came about’ ” and “ ‘[t]he rule is that they have to offer an explanation or this rule of law inures against him.’ ” (People v. Tate (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 540, 545 , 259 N.E.2d 791, 793 .) The reviewing court concluded that, when read in the context of the entire trial, any error occasioned by these statements was harmless, given that the jury was correctly inst

1985In Tate, the prosecutor’s closing argument included a statement that “ ‘the principle of recent unexplained possession [on a charge of theft auto] makes it incumbent upon the defense to come forward and explain why and how that possession came about’ ” and “ ‘[t]he rule is that they have to offer an explanation or this rule of law inures against him.’ ” (People v. Tate (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 540, 545 , 259 N.E.2d 791, 793 .) The reviewing court concluded that, when read in the context of the entire trial, any error occasioned by these statements was harmless, given that the jury was correctly inst

1984App. 3d 943, 950 , 361 N.E.2d 595, 600 , the court quoted the following explanation for that rule. “ ‘The courts have recognized a distinction between informers who are virtual agents of the police and ‘citizen informants’ who are chance witnesses to or victims of crime.

1981Should the Supreme Court ever relax the ‘one man, one vote’ standard, Illinois would not be precluded from creating districts within more flexible population limitations imposed by the courts.” (6 Proceedings 1293, 1354.) The explanation of this standard as given by Delegate Perona in the debates is, in part, as follows: “Insofar as the population standard, the committee has adopted the terminology from Reynolds v. Simms, [(1964), 377 U.S. 533 , 12 L.

1981Should the Supreme Court ever relax the ‘one man, one vote’ standard, Illinois would not be precluded from creating districts within more flexible population limitations imposed by the courts.” (6 Proceedings 1293, 1354.) The explanation of this standard as given by Delegate Perona in the debates is, in part, as follows: “Insofar as the population standard, the committee has adopted the terminology from Reynolds v. Simms, [(1964), 377 U.S. 533 , 12 L.

1981App. 3d 465 , 415 N.E.2d 1161 .) Had the defendant wanted an explanation of the factors considered by the court in sentencing defendant, he could have requested the court for a detailed recitation of the factors considered by the court.

1978App. 3d 297, 301 , 347 N.E.2d 848 , where the court stated: “In a motion to suppress, where the informant was not present at the time of arrest, did not participate in the crime and did not help to set up its commission, disclosure of the identity of the informant is not required.

1978An explanation of the privilege can be found in People v. Downing (1976), 37 Ill.

1978In such cases there is a duty upon the owner or other person in possession and control of the premises to exercise due care to remedy the condition or otherwise protect the children from injury resulting from it. ( Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368 .) The element of attraction is significant only in so far as it indicates that the trespass should be anticipated, the true basis of liability being the foreseeability of harm to the child." 5 Ill.2d 614, 625 , 126 N.E.2d 836, 842 .

1978In such cases there is a duty upon the owner or other person in possession and control of the premises to exercise due care to remedy the condition or otherwise protect the children from injury resulting from it. ( Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368 .) The element of attraction is significant only in so far as it indicates that the trespass should be anticipated, the true basis of liability being the foreseeability of harm to the child." 5 Ill.2d 614, 625 , 126 N.E.2d 836, 842 .

1978In such cases there is a duty upon the owner or other person in possession and control of the premises to exercise due care to remedy the condition or otherwise protect the children from injury resulting from it. ( Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368 .) The element of attraction is significant only in so far as it indicates that the trespass should be anticipated, the true basis of liability being the foreseeability of harm to the child." 5 Ill.2d 614, 625 , 126 N.E.2d 836, 842 .

1977A typical explanation of this test is found in Moseid v. McDonough (1968), 103 Ill.

1915A full explanation of the doctrine as settled by repeated decisions of the court will be found'in the case of Klofski v. Railroad Supply Co. 235 Ill. 146 , where the court, speaking of different rules deducible from the reported cases, said: “The distinction between the two classes of cases is readily discernible when the cases themselves are carefully studied and analyzed.

1902Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242 ; Philips v. Dickinson, Ibid. 14; Summit v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 200 ; T.

1898B., in Highby v. Hewett, 5 Exch. 240.” In Derry v. Fletner, supra, the Massachusetts court say: “The true inquiry is whether the injury sustained was such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably be anticipated.” In Hoag v. L.