explanation waiver in New Jersey

2021As we noted, defendant's remaining claims, asserting an explanation or defense to the charge to which he pleaded guilty, were not presented to the Family Part in a motion to withdraw his plea, thus depriving the court of an opportunity to make "qualitative assessments about the nature of . . . defendant's reasons for moving to withdraw his plea and the strength of his case ," and perhaps to make "credibility determinations about witness testimony." Tate, 220 N.J. at 404 .

2009In Spencer , the standard for determining a defendant's insanity was stated concisely: The simple question for you to decide... is "whether the accused at the time of doing the act was conscious that it was an act which he ought not to do?" If he was conscious of this, he cannot be excused on the score of insanity—he is then amenable to the law. [ Ibid. ] The explanation of the standard was less concise, but it was clearly and unequivocally tied to the M'Naghten test: As I said before, if the prisoner at the time of committing the act was conscious that he ought not to do it, the law holds him

2005By way of contrast, had the roles been reversed and the questioning of Sadlowski been carried out by agents of the State, we likely would have required that the statement be preceded by the explanation and waiver of Sadlowski's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966): that Sadlowski had the right to remain silent; that if he surrendered that right, what he said could be used against him; that he had a right to have counsel present during either of those interviews; and that if he could not afford counsel, counsel could be appointed free of charge.

2005For those reasons, there is no basis for the conclusion that "the PCR judge never should have permitted [Sadlowski's counsel], an attorney who did not represent a party in the case, to question a defense witness[,]" ante, 184 N.J. 248 , 877 A. 2d at 237 , or that the PCR court "then compounded that error by accepting Sadlowski's testimony after he invoked the privilege as a shield against cross-examination." Id. at 249 , 877 A. 2d at 238 . [8] The chronology of events is clear: counsel was appointed to represent Sadlowski, that assigned counsel then met with the prosecutor—when the prosecutor

2005By way of contrast, had the roles been reversed and the questioning of Sadlowski been carried out by agents of the State, we likely would have required that the statement be preceded by the explanation and waiver of Sadlowski's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): that Sadlowski had the right to remain silent; that if he surrendered that right, what he said could be used against him; that he had a right to have counsel present during either of those interviews; and that if he could not afford counsel, counsel could be appointed free of charge.

2005By way of contrast, had the roles been reversed and the questioning of Sadlowski been carried out by agents of the State, we likely would have required that the statement be preceded by the explanation and waiver of Sadlowski's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): that Sadlowski had the right to remain silent; that if he surrendered that right, what he said could be used against him; that he had a right to have counsel present during either of those interviews; and that if he could not afford counsel, counsel could be appointed free of charge.

2000Thus, while obtaining lien waivers is a prudent practice, an owner that does not require a contractor to furnish lien waivers *615 for subcontractors or suppliers ultimately is protected against double payment because no lien rights attach once payment for the work is made to the contractor. [ 163 N.J. at 521 , 750 A. 2d 743 (emphasis added).] We do not read the Court's explanation of the principle "[u]nderlying the lien fund concept" to mean that every payment to the prime contractor before the lien claim was filed automatically reduces the owner's liability to a lien claimant, no matter what

2000Thus, while obtaining lien waivers is a prudent practice, an owner that does not require a contractor to furnish lien waivers *615 for subcontractors or suppliers ultimately is protected against double payment because no lien rights attach once payment for the work is made to the contractor. [ 163 N.J. at 521 , 750 A. 2d 743 (emphasis added).] We do not read the Court's explanation of the principle "[u]nderlying the lien fund concept" to mean that every payment to the prime contractor before the lien claim was filed automatically reduces the owner's liability to a lien claimant, no matter what

1989Patrick, 39 Ill.Dec. at 453 , 404 N.E. 2d at 1044 .

1989Patrick, 39 Ill.Dec. at 453 , 404 N.E. 2d at 1044 .

1986In Handleman the Court referred to the "invitation test," and quoted the following explanation of that test: Rather it [the invitation test] bases `invitation' on the fact that the occupier by his arrangement of the premises or other conduct has led the entrant to believe `that [the premises] were intended to be used by visitors' for the purpose which this entrant was pursuing, `and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner [or possessor], but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the way or place was adapted and prepared. * * *' Such arrangement or oth