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8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vaccarezza v. Sanguinettigreen1 sentence1960The idea intended to be expressed here is well stated in Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal App2d 687, 698, 163 P2d 470, 477 (1945): “* * * The statement appearing in some cases that an inference cannot be based upon an inference, usually without citation and certainly without adequate discussion, does not and cannot mean that an inference cannot be based upon a fact which is itself based upon circumstantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Salinger v. Loiselgreen2 sentences1958The explanation for the rule at common law is well stated in Salinger v. Loisel, 265 US 224, 230 (1924) as follows: "* * * In early times when a refusal to discharge was not open to appellate review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number. 1958The explanation for the rule at common law is well stated in Salinger v. Loisel, 265 US 224, 230 (1924) as follows: * * In early times when a refusal to discharge was not open to appellate review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Caswell v. Day Law and Associates, P. C.
neutral
1 sentence2021Caswell objected, and the court denied Cite as 309 Or App 367 (2021) 371 the motion, nearly two years after the first petition for fees, again without an explanation or a hearing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Silvertooth v. Kelley
neutral
1 sentence2011However, the quote from Williston begins with the explanation that the presumption in favor of joint liability derives by *649 “analogy of the rule of real property that an estate granted to two persons created a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common.” Silvertooth, 162 Or at 389 (quoting Williston on Contracts § 322). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2005In State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), this court, relying on an explanation of that doctrine by the United States Supreme Court, confirmed that more is required to justify a suppression of evidence than a mere “but for” causal link between the evidence and a prior police illegality: “The United States Supreme Court has held that the existence of a police illegality does not automatically require suppression of evidence discovered subsequent to that illegality. 2005In State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , 624 P2d 99 (1981), this court, relying on an explanation of that doctrine by the United States Supreme Court, confirmed that more is required to justify a suppression of evidence than a mere “but for” causal link between the evidence and a prior police illegality: “The United States Supreme Court has held that the existence of a police illegality does not automatically require suppression of evidence discovered subsequent to that illegality. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2005In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 LEd 2d 441 (1963), the Court rejected a “but for’ test which would require that evidence must be suppressed if it would not have been discovered “but for’ the illegal police actions. 2005In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 LEd 2d 441 (1963), the Court rejected a “but for’ test which would require that evidence must be suppressed if it would not have been discovered “but for’ the illegal police actions. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Pratt
green
2 sentences2000We turn to an explanation of that doctrine, which was discussed most recently in State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205 , 785 P2d 350 (1990). 2000We turn to an explanation of that doctrine, which was discussed most recently in State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205 , 785 P2d 350 (1990). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Mendacino
green
2 sentences1983In State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 237 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979), the court said: “[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. 1983In State v. Mendacino, 288 Or 231, 237 , 603 P2d 1376 (1979), the court said: “[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Chan Hi v. Bloomer
neutral
1 sentence1971Apparently the first such case was Kunz v. Oregon Railroad & N. Co., 51 Or 191 , 93 P 141 , 94 P 504 (1908), in which the following explanation of the rule was given: “A traveler on a public road that intersects a railway at grade, is entitled to use the crossing; but as passengers and freight, when transported by rail, must be carried with speed, a locomotive and the cars which it draws have'the right of way to which a person, desiring to cross the track, and having reasonable notice of the near approach of a train, must yield on the ground that in doing so the greatest good will result to th | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Kunz v. Oregon Railroad & N. Co.
green
2 sentences1971Apparently the first such case was Kunz v. Oregon Railroad & N. Co., 51 Or 191 , 93 P 141 , 94 P 504 (1908), in which the following explanation of the rule was given: “A traveler on a public road that intersects a railway at grade, is entitled to use the crossing; but as passengers and freight, when transported by rail, must be carried with speed, a locomotive and the cars which it draws have'the right of way to which a person, desiring to cross the track, and having reasonable notice of the near approach of a train, must yield on the ground that in doing so the greatest good will result to th 1971If a contrary rule prevailed, the operation of trains would be practically prevented across streets at grade in cities where many persons are constantly passing.” 51 Or at 202 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
McKay v. State Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1960In State *600 v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 79 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 (1945), Mr. Justice Brand states that “The rule was not intended, and must not he applied, te inhibit or prevent any of the logical inductive or deductive processes by which the mind arrives at reasoned conclusions from adequate data.” A similar explanation of the rule is expressed by Mr. Justice Lusk in McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 161 Or 191 , 87 P2d 202 (1939) at page 199 where he says that the rule “is merely a means of testing logically the relevancy or sufficiency of evidence to prove a fact in dispute.” As Wigmore, op 1960In State *600 v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 79 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 (1945), Mr. Justice Brand states that “The rule was not intended, and must not he applied, te inhibit or prevent any of the logical inductive or deductive processes by which the mind arrives at reasoned conclusions from adequate data.” A similar explanation of the rule is expressed by Mr. Justice Lusk in McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 161 Or 191 , 87 P2d 202 (1939) at page 199 where he says that the rule “is merely a means of testing logically the relevancy or sufficiency of evidence to prove a fact in dispute.” As Wigmore, op | 1 | 1960–1960 |
State v. Dennis
green
2 sentences1960In State *600 v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 79 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 (1945), Mr. Justice Brand states that “The rule was not intended, and must not he applied, te inhibit or prevent any of the logical inductive or deductive processes by which the mind arrives at reasoned conclusions from adequate data.” A similar explanation of the rule is expressed by Mr. Justice Lusk in McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 161 Or 191 , 87 P2d 202 (1939) at page 199 where he says that the rule “is merely a means of testing logically the relevancy or sufficiency of evidence to prove a fact in dispute.” As Wigmore, op 1960In State *600 v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 79 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 (1945), Mr. Justice Brand states that “The rule was not intended, and must not he applied, te inhibit or prevent any of the logical inductive or deductive processes by which the mind arrives at reasoned conclusions from adequate data.” A similar explanation of the rule is expressed by Mr. Justice Lusk in McKay v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 161 Or 191 , 87 P2d 202 (1939) at page 199 where he says that the rule “is merely a means of testing logically the relevancy or sufficiency of evidence to prove a fact in dispute.” As Wigmore, op | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.