jury was given instruction in Illinois

2006While acknowledging the “one good count” rule established in People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305 , 185 N.E.2d 158 (1962), may be a basis to affirm a general finding of guilt where proof is sufficient on the good count in an indictment, the defendant contends that “the ‘one good count’ rule [does not apply] to cases where a general verdict of guilt was tainted by a legally deficient count.” (Emphasis in original.) As support for his position, the defendant quotes a passage from our supreme court in People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 83 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997), quoting People v. Griffin, 247 Ill.

2006While acknowledging the “one good count” rule established in People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305 , 185 N.E.2d 158 (1962), may be a basis to affirm a general finding of guilt where proof is sufficient on the good count in an indictment, the defendant contends that “the ‘one good count’ rule [does not apply] to cases where a general verdict of guilt was tainted by a legally deficient count.” (Emphasis in original.) As support for his position, the defendant quotes a passage from our supreme court in People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 83 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997), quoting People v. Griffin, 247 Ill.

2006While acknowledging the “one good count” rule established in People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305 , 185 N.E.2d 158 (1962), may be a basis to affirm a general finding of guilt where proof is sufficient on the good count in an indictment, the defendant contends that “the ‘one good count’ rule [does not apply] to cases where a general verdict of guilt was tainted by a legally deficient count.” (Emphasis in original.) As support for his position, the defendant quotes a passage from our supreme court in People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 83 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997), quoting People v. Griffin, 247 Ill.

2006While acknowledging the “one good count” rule established in People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305 , 185 N.E.2d 158 (1962), may be a basis to affirm a general finding of guilt where proof is sufficient on the good count in an indictment, the defendant contends that “the ‘one good count’ rule [does not apply] to cases where a general verdict of guilt was tainted by a legally deficient count.” (Emphasis in original.) As support for his position, the defendant quotes a passage from our supreme court in People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 83 , 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997), quoting People v. Griffin, 247 Ill.

2025Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d at 64-65 .

2024Reviewing the instructions as a whole, as we must (Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 273-74 ), the jury was given the appropriate definition. ¶ 34 As for circularity, we would agree that it is a bit redundant to state that “the defendants were negligent in one or more of the following respects: Negligently performed hernia surgery resulting in injury to plaintiff’s aorta.” The adverbial form was unnecessary.

2021Id. at 503 .

2013Flynn, 269 Ill.

2011The defendant attempts to show her trial was fundamentally flawed with the claim that “the State effectively used the faulty instructions on intent to circumvent the entire trial.” ¶ 171 “A fair trial, however, is different from a perfect trial. [Citation.] The plain-error doctrine does not instruct a reviewing court to consider all forfeited errors. [Citation.] It is not a ‘general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill

2011The defendant attempts to show her trial was fundamentally flawed with the claim that “the State effectively used the faulty instructions on intent to circumvent the entire trial.” ¶ 171 “A fair trial, however, is different from a perfect trial. [Citation.] The plain-error doctrine does not instruct a reviewing court to consider all forfeited errors. [Citation.] It is not a ‘general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill

1993(People v. Easley (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 281 , 592 N.E.2d 1036 .) In Easley, the jury was given an instruction setting forth the two propositions required to sustain a charge of first degree murder.

1993(People v. Easley (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 281 , 592 N.E.2d 1036 .) In Easley, the jury was given an instruction setting forth the two propositions required to sustain a charge of first degree murder.

1993The jury was also given the following non-IPI jury instruction, which was tendered by defendant: "If you find from a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff violated said statute and that she was negligent in so doing and that such negligence, if any, on the part of plaintiff proximately caused the occurrence in question, then you may find in favor of the defendants.” ( 92 Ill.

1991In People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536, 543 , 309 N.E.2d 544 , the jury was given an instruction on felony murder even though the defendant was indicted for murder and not felony murder.

1991The Allen court quoted the following from People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483, 492 , 244 N.E.2d 136 : “We find that the defendant here was charged with murder and convicted of that crime, and even if a variance did exist between the type of murder charged in the indictment and the types described in the instructions, it would not vitiate the conviction unless it was of such a character as to mislead the defendant in his defense or expose him to double jeopardy. [Citations.] There is no evidence in this case whatsoever that the defendant was misled in his defense, nor did counsel at any

1991The Allen court quoted the following from People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483, 492 , 244 N.E.2d 136 : “We find that the defendant here was charged with murder and convicted of that crime, and even if a variance did exist between the type of murder charged in the indictment and the types described in the instructions, it would not vitiate the conviction unless it was of such a character as to mislead the defendant in his defense or expose him to double jeopardy. [Citations.] There is no evidence in this case whatsoever that the defendant was misled in his defense, nor did counsel at any

1990In the second petition filed in case No. 81 — CF—194, defendant alleged (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel during proceedings in both the trial court and appellate court, all for failure to raise claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel; and (3) denial of equal protection and due process, and denial of the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, because the jury was given an instruction later determined by this court (People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 2

1985App. 3d 580 , 387 N.E.2d 816 , the court reviewed an attempted murder conviction where the jury was given an instruction which stated that one commits murder if “he knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death to that individual.” ( 69 Ill.

1985App. 3d 580 , 387 N.E.2d 816 , the court reviewed an attempted murder conviction where the jury was given an instruction which stated that one commits murder if “he knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death to that individual.” ( 69 Ill.

1985App. 3d 562, 569 , noted: “ ‘Although it is true that legal accountability for a crime is based on the defendant’s assistance before or during the commission of the criminal act, the defendant’s conduct subsequent to the offense may raise an inference of prior or concurrent participation. [Citations.]’ ” The Byas court also found no basis for overturning the jury’s credibility determination there where the testimony of the accomplice, even when viewed with the scrutiny accorded such testimony, was greatly corroborated by the defendants’ own statements, the jury was aware of the extent of the a

1981(People v. Dominique (1980), 86 Ill.

1980App. 3d 49 , 335 N.E.2d 521 .) We find no abuse of the court’s discretion in refusing the misleading instruction tendered by the defendant, particularly when the jury was given standard IPI instructions on self-defense and circumstantial evidence and was instructed that the State must prove the defendant was not justified in using the force that she used.

1980Co. v. Oswald (1930), 338 Ill. 270 , 170 N.E. 247 , which stated: “For a negligent act or omission to be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen might probably occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person charged with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury which might result from his act.

1980Co. v. Oswald (1930), 338 Ill. 270 , 170 N.E. 247 , which stated: “For a negligent act or omission to be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen might probably occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not essential that the person charged with negligence should have foreseen the precise injury which might result from his act.

1979(People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328 , 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276 , 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).) In the instant cause, the jury was given an instruction on the defense of insanity and the State does not challenge defendant’s assertion that he initially met his burden of raising the issue of insanity.

1979(People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328 , 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276 , 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).) In the instant cause, the jury was given an instruction on the defense of insanity and the State does not challenge defendant’s assertion that he initially met his burden of raising the issue of insanity.

1979Without objection, the jury was given the standard Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 5.03, which states: “A person is responsible for the conduct of another person when, either before or during the commission of a crime, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of the crime.” In addition, over defendant’s objection, the jury was given a non-IPI instruction, drawn from language in People v. Hill (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 125, 133 , 233 N.E.2d 367 .

1979Without objection, the jury was given the standard Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 5.03, which states: “A person is responsible for the conduct of another person when, either before or during the commission of a crime, and with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he knowingly solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of the crime.” In addition, over defendant’s objection, the jury was given a non-IPI instruction, drawn from language in People v. Hill (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 125, 133 , 233 N.E.2d 367 .

1979(People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328 , 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276 , 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).) In the instant cause, the jury was given an instruction on the defense of insanity and the State does not challenge defendant’s assertion that he initially met his burden of raising the issue of insanity.

1979(People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328 , 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People v. Skeoch, 408 Ill. 276 , 96 N.E.2d 473 (1951).) In the instant cause, the jury was given an instruction on the defense of insanity and the State does not challenge defendant’s assertion that he initially met his burden of raising the issue of insanity.

1975Following further deliberation, the jury was given the instruction for deadlocked juries as set out in People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 , 289 N.E.2d 601 .

1975Following further deliberation, the jury was given the instruction for deadlocked juries as set out in People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62 , 289 N.E.2d 601 .

1966The situation here is similar to that in People v. Garvin, 20 Ill2d 32, 34-36, 169 NE 2d 260 , where, over defendant’s objection, the jury was given an instruction to the effect that “exclusive possession ... of stolen property, ... if unexplained, may of itself raise an inference of guilt of the person having such possession, . . . .” Defendant there complained on appeal that the instruction assumed that the property was stolen and that it was error not to instruct the jury-on the identity of the stolen property.