jury was given instruction in California

2016(Nazary, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 .) Instead, the jury was given an instruction on "grand theft by embezzlement," which included, word for word, the same elements necessary to sustain a conviction on a charge of embezzlement.

2016(Nazary, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 742 .) Instead, the jury was given an instruction on "grand theft by embezzlement," which included, word for word, the same elements necessary to sustain a conviction on a charge of embezzlement.

2003The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the death or danger to human life was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure but the natural and probable result of an aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act." "[T]he giving of a second degree felony-murder instruction in a murder prosecution has the effect of `relieving] the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the crime of murder' [citation], to wit, malice aforethought." ( People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p

2003The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent act could reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the death or danger to human life was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgment or misadventure but the natural and probable result of an aggravated, reckless or flagrantly negligent act." "[T]he giving of a second degree felony-murder instruction in a murder prosecution has the effect of `relieving] the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the crime of murder' [citation], to wit, malice aforethought." ( People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p

2025(See Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111 [rejecting argument (similar to the one defendant makes here) that jury instruction misstated the law because it omitted a requirement that defendant commit the act with a “high probability that death will result”]; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 157 .) But even were we to assume the trial court committed instructional error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury in the manner defendant suggests for the first time on appeal, no prejudice appears.

2025(See Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111 [rejecting argument (similar to the one defendant makes here) that jury instruction misstated the law because it omitted a requirement that defendant commit the act with a “high probability that death will result”]; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 157 .) But even were we to assume the trial court committed instructional error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury in the manner defendant suggests for the first time on appeal, no prejudice appears.

2025Because defendant had the burden of showing prejudice and has not done so, he “has forfeited any claim that the trial court’s application of an erroneous burden of proof was prejudicial.” (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 717.) Moreover, and in any event, the above contentions lack merit, as defendant was not convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice; the implied malice instruction did not incorporate the natural and probable consequences doctrine or otherwise permit the jury to impute malice to defendant based on his mere

2025But defendant does not address the merits of the eligibility question in the context of the People’s harmless error argument. 18 Nor does defendant renew any of the contentions defense counsel raised at the resentencing hearing below—e.g., that (1) defendant was convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or some other theory of imputed malice; (2) the jury was given an instruction for implied malice under CALCRIM no. 520 that incorporated the invalidated natural and probable consequences doctrine or otherwise permitted the jury to impute malice to defendant merely

2023(People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854 , 864.) Here, the jury was given no instruction on felony murder or any theory of vicarious liability.

2023A conviction under 136.1(b)(2) requires proof of a specific intent. ( Velazquez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 229-230.) To further emphasize the need for fully instructing on element 3, in a bench note regarding a trial court’s “instructional duty,” we find the comment that because section 136.1 “always requires specific intent, the committee has included the knowledge requirement with the specific intent requirement in element 3,” (italics added), citing People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 [failure to instruct on specific intent in a 136.1(c) case was reversible error] and People v

2023A conviction under 136.1(b)(2) requires proof of a specific intent. ( Velazquez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 229-230.) To further emphasize the need for fully instructing on element 3, in a bench note regarding a trial court’s “instructional duty,” we find the comment that because section 136.1 “always requires specific intent, the committee has included the knowledge requirement with the specific intent requirement in element 3,” (italics added), citing People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 [failure to instruct on specific intent in a 136.1(c) case was reversible error] and People v

2021Code, § 12926, subds. (i)(1), (i)(1)(B) & (l) (Stats. 2003, ch. 164, § 1) (now subds. (j)(1), (j)(1)(B) & (n).) Dependency is not required. 12 based on judge’s observations of defendant].) And the instruction did not suggest that the jury could ignore other factors regarding Doe’s credibility. “‘“[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”’” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 943 .) The jury was given standard instructions on assessing the credibility

2015(People v. Valladares (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1400 .) The People also argue that the error was harmless.

2015We cannot presume that the jury followed legal principles that were articulated only by counsel, and not by the court.” (In re Hansen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 906, 922-923 .) The jury was given the standard instruction, “If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) We must presume that the jurors followed this instruction.

2013Specifically, during closing argument, the prosecutor contended each of the three individuals who took part in the severe beating of Moises and then discussed what they would do with the victim was as guilty as the triggerman for Moises's murder because "practically and legally speaking . . . it doesn't matter whose finger is on that trigger, because each and every one of them helped pull it." And, as noted ante, the jury was given the standard instruction for conspiracy to commit murder, CALCRIM No. 563. 13 We say "begrudgingly" because although defense counsel agreed the law allowed the Peop

2006(See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 432 .) 11 At this point, defense counsel objected to the argument as misconduct; her objection was immediately overruled.

2004I mean motels, motels.” 5 In section EL, post, we discuss the evidence of a “willful” violation more fully, in the context of appellant’s contention that the failure of the court to instruct on the requirement that he have actual knowledge, as required by People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ], resulted in prejudicial error. 6 The jury was given an instruction that defined “residence” as “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, which one keeps and to which one intends to return, as opposed to a place where one rests or shelters during a trip, or a tr

2004I mean motels, motels.” 5 In section EL, post, we discuss the evidence of a “willful” violation more fully, in the context of appellant’s contention that the failure of the court to instruct on the requirement that he have actual knowledge, as required by People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ], resulted in prejudicial error. 6 The jury was given an instruction that defined “residence” as “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, which one keeps and to which one intends to return, as opposed to a place where one rests or shelters during a trip, or a tr

2004I mean motels, motels.” 5 In section EL, post, we discuss the evidence of a “willful” violation more fully, in the context of appellant’s contention that the failure of the court to instruct on the requirement that he have actual knowledge, as required by People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 , 23 P.3d 590 ], resulted in prejudicial error. 6 The jury was given an instruction that defined “residence” as “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, which one keeps and to which one intends to return, as opposed to a place where one rests or shelters during a trip, or a tr

2001(See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 443 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 [no error under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , where prosecutor merely pointed out lack of mitigating evidence supported his argument that balance of aggravating and mitigating factors favored sentence of death].) Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) Alth

2001(See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 443 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 [no error under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , where prosecutor merely pointed out lack of mitigating evidence supported his argument that balance of aggravating and mitigating factors favored sentence of death].) Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) Alth

2001(See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 443 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 [no error under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , where prosecutor merely pointed out lack of mitigating evidence supported his argument that balance of aggravating and mitigating factors favored sentence of death].) Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) Alth

2001(See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 443 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 [no error under Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , where prosecutor merely pointed out lack of mitigating evidence supported his argument that balance of aggravating and mitigating factors favored sentence of death].) Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) Alth

1997(People v. Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 212 .) *1485 The majority opinion did not sanction the use of the Lathus instruction. ( 7 Cal.4th at p. 221 .) It adhered to the view that it is “technically accurate” that assault requires an “ ‘intent to cause [some] injury to such other person.’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) Nonetheless, it did not find error in giving the Lathus instruction.

1997(People v. Colantuono, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 212 .) *1485 The majority opinion did not sanction the use of the Lathus instruction. ( 7 Cal.4th at p. 221 .) It adhered to the view that it is “technically accurate” that assault requires an “ ‘intent to cause [some] injury to such other person.’ ” (Id. at p. 217.) Nonetheless, it did not find error in giving the Lathus instruction.

1995(United States v. Scott, supra, 529 F.2d at p. 340 .) In the present case, however, CALJIC No. 4.21.1 did not instruct the jury that appellant had to “prove” any mental incapability to form an intent to kill.

1995Cir. 1975) 529 F.2d 338 [ 174 App.D.C. 96 ], a case in which the jury was given an instruction which stated in part, “drunkenness may be shown to prove mental incapability to form the specific intent.” (Id. at p. 340.) The court found the instruction “might well have been understood as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant” and reversed the defendant’s conviction for entering a bank with intent to rob. ( 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (a)(2)).

1992In People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ], cert. den. „ U.S. _ [ 116 L.Ed.2d 462 , 112 S.Ct. 443 ], the jury was given the standard pattern instruction *202 defining reasonable doubt.

1992In People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ], cert. den. „ U.S. _ [ 116 L.Ed.2d 462 , 112 S.Ct. 443 ], the jury was given the standard pattern instruction *202 defining reasonable doubt.

1992In People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ], cert. den. „ U.S. _ [ 116 L.Ed.2d 462 , 112 S.Ct. 443 ], the jury was given the standard pattern instruction *202 defining reasonable doubt.

1989Relying on our ruling that evidence of a nonviolent escape attempt is not admissible at the penalty phase (Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 776 ), defendant contends reversal is required because these instructions permitted and “in effect” instructed the jury to rely upon evidence of the nonviolent escape attempt as an aggravating factor in reaching its penalty verdict.

1988Ramos Error Defendant claims that the death verdict must be set aside because the jury was given the instruction condemned by this court in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ], The instruction was never given, however.

1988Ramos Error Defendant claims that the death verdict must be set aside because the jury was given the instruction condemned by this court in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ], The instruction was never given, however.