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24 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2014A. Standard of Review We review the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of a criminal offense under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). 2014A. Standard of Review We review the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the elements of a criminal offense under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); see also Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. | 13 | 15 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2016We review all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the elements of a criminal offense under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). 2016We review all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the elements of a criminal offense under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). | 3 | 3 |
Montana v. Egelhoffgreen2 sentences2012Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). 2012Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). | 2 | 4 |
Patterson v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2012Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). 2012Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 , 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). | 2 | 4 |
Medellin v. Texasgreen2 sentences2008JUDICIAL REMEDY. (a) Civil Action. — Any person whose rights are infringed by a violation by any nonfor-eign governmental authority of Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief. (b) Nature of Relief.. — Appropriate relief for the purposes of this section means— (1) any declaratory or equitable relief necessaiy to secure the rights; and (2) in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a criminal offense where the violation occurs during and in relation to the investigation or prosecution of the offense, any relief required to re 2008JUDICIAL REMEDY. (a) CIVIL ACTION. — Any person whose rights are infringed by a violation by any nonforeign governmental authority of Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief. (b) NATURE OF RELIEF. — Appropriate relief for the purposes of this section means — (1) any declaratory or equitable relief necessary to secure the rights; and (2) in any case where the plaintiff is convicted of a criminal offense where the violation occurs during and in relation to the investigation or prosecution of the offense, any relief required to rem | 1 | 2 |
Ervin v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st] 2010, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Davisgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., id. at 1357, 1367 ("Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not binding domestic law. * * * In sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions.”). .Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), citing Ex 2008See, e.g., id. at 1357, 1367 ("Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not binding domestic law. * * * In sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions."). [14] Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. Crim.App.1998), citi | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Smithgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., id. at 1357, 1367 ("Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not binding domestic law. * * * In sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions.”). .Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), citing Ex 2008See, e.g., id. at 1357, 1367 ("Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not binding domestic law. * * * In sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions."). [14] Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. Crim.App.1998), citi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2005Appellant cites Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) to argue that the Texas Legislature erroneously determined that sudden passion arising from adequate cause is “a mere sentencing factor” and contends that, instead, the State should be required to negate its existence. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2005Appellant cites Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) to argue that the Texas Legislature erroneously determined that sudden passion arising from adequate cause is “a mere sentencing factor” and contends that, instead, the State should be required to negate its existence. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ex Parte Englutt
green
1 sentence1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Halper
red
2 sentences1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied 1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ex Parte Brown
green
1 sentence1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ex Parte Allison
green
2 sentences1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied 1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ex Parte Looper
green
2 sentences1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied 1990The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether a conviction for criminal contempt is the “same offense” as conviction for another statutorily defined crime based on the same acts. 5 That Court has also never directly addressed whether a judgment obtained in a civil suit between private parties can invoke the protection of the double jeopardy clause, although dicta in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), indicates it cannot. 6 In Ex parte Looper, 61 Tex.Crim. 129 , 134 S.W. 345 (App.1910), this Court relied | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.