given arbitration clause in Texas

2022And as the Supreme Court and this Court have explained, courts—and not arbitrators—must decide whether the parties “in fact delegated the arbitrability question to the arbitrator,” id. at 531 , “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002), and “whether the parties made a valid and presently enforceable agreement to arbitrate,” G.T.

2020See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (citations omitted) (“[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”); see also Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining that courts decide “gateway matters regarding ‘whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration’”).

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2009Co., 352 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that "where a party attacks the very existence of an agreement, as opposed to its continued validity or enforcement, the courts must first resolve that dispute").

2009Co., 352 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that “where a party attacks the very existence of an agreement, as opposed to its continued validity or enforcement, the courts must first resolve that dispute”).

2015See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (“[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”); First Options, 514 U.S. at 946 (holding that question about whether party is required to arbitrate dispute is subject to independent review by courts).

2015However, in Saxa, the parties to Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (“[A] gateway dispute about whether the arbitration agreement, DFD Architecture, Inc. and Saxa, the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises Inc., did not dispute that they both entered into a written a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”); First arbitration agreement; instead, at issue was whether that Options, 514 U.S. at 946 (holding that question about whether arbitration agreement bound third parties, who sought to party is required to arbitrate dispute is subject to independent join an arbitration proce

2025Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 521 (Tex. 2015) (“[C]ourts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide what we have called disputes about ‘arbitrability.’ These include questions such as ‘whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause.’” (quoting BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 34 (2014))).

2015Page 9 of 25 134 S. Ct. 1198, *1206 ; 188 L. Ed. 2d 220, **228 ; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1785 , ***17 HN3 LEdHN[3] [3] On the one hand, courts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide what we have called disputes about “arbitrability.” These include questions such as “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,” or “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 84 , 123 S. Ct. 588 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002); accord, Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters,

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2025Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 521 (Tex. 2015) (“[C]ourts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide what we have called disputes about ‘arbitrability.’ These include questions such as ‘whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause.’” (quoting BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 34 (2014))).

2022Leach 28 Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 519 (Tex. 2015) (emphasis added).

2022Ed. 2d 491 (2002) (citations omitted) ("[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a 'question of arbitrability' for a court to decide."); see also Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining that courts decide "gateway matters regarding 'whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration'").

2020See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (citations omitted) (“[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”); see also Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 589 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining that courts decide “gateway matters regarding ‘whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration’”).

2009AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); Valero Energy Corp. v. Teco Pipeline Co., 2 S.W.3d 576, 589-90 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2009AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am. , 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); Valero Energy Corp. v. Teco Pipeline Co. , 2 S.W.3d 576, 589-90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2009Workers Int’l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2008) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 582 , 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). “[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of ar-bitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 , 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002); see also AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 , 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 , 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 535 ; Will

2020Similarly, a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court.”); First Options, 514 U.S. at 943–44; Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that, in a motion to compel arbitration, when one party challenges the ripeness of the dispute, the court must first “‘look through’ the petition to compel arbitration in order to determine whether the underlying dispute presents a sufficiently ripe controversy to establish federal jurisdiction”). 59 See, e

2020Similarly, a disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy is for the court.”); First Options, 514 U.S. at 943–44; Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that, in a motion to compel arbitration, when one party challenges the ripeness of the dispute, the court must first “‘look through’ the petition to compel arbitration in order to determine whether the underlying dispute presents a sufficiently ripe controversy to establish federal jurisdiction”). 59 See, e

2019In re Weekley Homes, LP, 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (“[A] gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court to decide.”).

2019What might seem like a chicken-and-egg problem is resolved by application of the presumption favoring a judicial determination.”); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (“Under the FAA, whether an arbitration agreement binds a nonsignatory is a gateway matter to be determined by courts rather than arbitrators unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”). 73 Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 2014) (in determining whether an issue is a gateway or procedural matter “[t]he crucial consideration is the expectation of th

2019Concluding that the threshold issue here is a gateway matter also aligns, at least by analogy, with our view that whether a nonsignatory is bound to an arbitration agreement is a gateway matter for judicial determination.72 Because individual class members may have individual defenses to arbitration—here for example, the limited warranty allows homeowners with VA or FHA financing to elect a judicial remedy—the availability of class arbitration relates to “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause” and implicates “whose claims an arbitrator may decide.”73 Thus under either of

2019What might seem like a chicken-and-egg problem is resolved by application of the presumption favoring a judicial determination.”); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (“Under the FAA, whether an arbitration agreement binds a nonsignatory is a gateway matter to be determined by courts rather than arbitrators unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”). 73 Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 2014) (in determining whether an issue is a gateway or procedural matter “[t]he crucial consideration is the expectation of th

2019Concluding that the threshold issue here is a gateway matter also aligns, at least by analogy, with our view that whether a nonsignatory is bound to an arbitration agreement is a gateway matter for judicial determination.72 Because individual class members may have individual defenses to arbitration—here for example, the limited warranty allows homeowners with VA or FHA financing to elect a judicial remedy—the availability of class arbitration relates to “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause” and implicates “whose claims an arbitrator may decide.”73 Thus under either of

2019What might seem like a chicken-and-egg problem is resolved by application of the presumption favoring a judicial determination.”); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (“Under the FAA, whether an arbitration agreement binds a nonsignatory is a gateway matter to be determined by courts rather than arbitrators unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.”). 73 Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 331-32 (3rd Cir. 2014) (in determining whether an issue is a gateway or procedural matter “[t]he crucial consideration is the expectation of th

2019Concluding that the threshold issue here is a gateway matter also aligns, at least by analogy, with our view that whether a nonsignatory is bound to an arbitration agreement is a gateway matter for judicial determination.72 Because individual class members may have individual defenses to arbitration—here for example, the limited warranty allows homeowners with VA or FHA financing to elect a judicial remedy—the availability of class arbitration relates to “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause” and implicates “whose claims an arbitrator may decide.”73 Thus under either of

2015Page 9 of 25 134 S. Ct. 1198, *1206 ; 188 L. Ed. 2d 220, **228 ; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1785 , ***17 HN3 LEdHN[3] [3] On the one hand, courts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide what we have called disputes about “arbitrability.” These include questions such as “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,” or “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 84 , 123 S. Ct. 588 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002); accord, Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters,

2015Page 9 of 25 134 S. Ct. 1198, *1206 ; 188 L. Ed. 2d 220, **228 ; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1785 , ***17 HN3 LEdHN[3] [3] On the one hand, courts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide what we have called disputes about “arbitrability.” These include questions such as “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,” or “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U. S. 79, 84 , 123 S. Ct. 588 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002); accord, Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters,

2015See First Options, supra, at 941, 943-947 , 115 S. Ct. 1920 , 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (court should decide whether an arbitration clause applied to a party who “had not personally signed” the document containing it); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 651 , 106 S. Ct. 1415 , 89 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986) (court should decide whether a particular labor-management layoff dispute fell within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining contract); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 546-548 , 84 S. Ct. 909 , 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964) [***18] (court should de

2015See First Options, supra, at 941, 943-947 , 115 S. Ct. 1920 , 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (court should decide whether an arbitration clause applied to a party who “had not personally signed” the document containing it); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 651 , 106 S. Ct. 1415 , 89 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986) (court should decide whether a particular labor-management layoff dispute fell within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining contract); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 546-548 , 84 S. Ct. 909 , 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964) [***18] (court should de

2012Servs, LLC, 301 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.).