access rule in California

1985The Legislature can surely accomplish indirectly that which it could do directly.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 420 .) That court then went on to approve the access rule there involved as such a regulation.

1979In Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392 , 419 et seq. [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 183 , 546 P.2d 687 ], the majority of this court held that the board’s access rule was an exception to the criminal trespass statute (Pen.

1997In each instance, the issue is "educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." ( Hazelwood School Dist . v. Kuhlmeier , supra , 484 U.S. at 271 .) 5 Having determined that we are dealing here with a nonpublic forum, rather than a traditional or designated public forum, we proceed to apply the relevant access test: "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as

1997In each instance, the issue is "educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." (Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at 271 .) Footnote No. 5 Having determined that we are dealing here with a nonpublic forum, rather than a traditional or designated public forum, we proceed to apply the relevant access test: "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity s

1997In each instance, the issue is "educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." ( Hazelwood School Dist . v. Kuhlmeier , supra , 484 U.S. at 271 .) 5 Having determined that we are dealing here with a nonpublic forum, rather than a traditional or designated public forum, we proceed to apply the relevant access test: "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as

1997In each instance, the issue is "educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." (Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at 271 .) Footnote No. 5 Having determined that we are dealing here with a nonpublic forum, rather than a traditional or designated public forum, we proceed to apply the relevant access test: "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity s

2026(Ibid.) To address that problem, the Act requires debt buyers to comply with certain documentation requirements, including the access requirement and the attachment requirement. (§§ 1788.52, 1788.54, 1788.58.) A debt buyer who violates the Act’s requirements is “liable to the consumer for … 5 ‘actual damages’ …and… ‘[s]tatutory damages.’ ” (Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1030 , 1036 (Chai); § 1788.62.) Here, Nguyen’s first cause of action alleges Velocity violated the access requirement and the attachment requirement.

2016(See Alameda Gateway, at pp. 759-760 & fn.5.) Similar is Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 384, 393, 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 , which held that a city's requirement that a property owner dedicate a portion of her property within a flood plain for a bicycle/pedestrian pathway constituted a taking because there was an inadequate nexus between the required dedication condition and the proposed development's impact. ( Id . at pp. 388-396, 114 S.Ct. 2309 .) We do not address, as it is not raised by this case, whether imposing an access requirement as a condition to development u

2016(See Alameda Gateway, at pp. 759-760 & fn.5.) Similar is Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 , 384, 393, 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 304 , which held that a city's requirement that a property owner dedicate a portion of her property within a flood plain for a bicycle/pedestrian pathway constituted a taking because there was an inadequate nexus between the required dedication condition and the proposed development's impact. ( Id . at pp. 388-396, 114 S.Ct. 2309 .) We do not address, as it is not raised by this case, whether imposing an access requirement as a condition to development u

2011Indeed, in Jenkins we stated the controlling principle: despite restrictions on the defendant’s own access to defense resources, “[w]hen the defendant has a lawyer acting as advisory counsel, his or her rights are adequately protected.” (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1040 .) 12 Although defendant alleges on appeal that he was not able to *1127 contact his appointed assistants, the record contains only defendant’s unsworn statements to the trial court complaining that restrictions on his use of the telephones made it “difficult” to communicate.

2011(Milton, supra, 161 F.2d at p. 1445 [“the state not only affirmatively failed to provide defense resources, but also materially impeded use of the minimal tools for defense preparation which the trial court tried to ensure,” and the state offered “no justification, such as cost or security exigencies, for what occurred”]; Taylor, supra, 880 F.2d at p. 1048 [a genuine issue of material fact existed when the prisoner alleged that jail personnel denied him access to court-appointed law clerks and runners, prevented a witness from testifying, and “so completely hindered [his] ability to prepare a

2011(Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1126 .) The court said: “despite restrictions on the defendant’s own access to defense resources, ‘[w]hen the defendant has a lawyer acting as advisory counsel, his or her rights are adequately protected.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The court concluded: “defendant was not denied reasonable resources necessary to present his defense under all the circumstances of this case, nor, to the extent he claims so on appeal, can we conclude his decision to accept the appointment of counsel for part of the trial was the result of any unconstitutional interference w

1991The Commission relies on Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 2 ].

1991The Commission relies on Whaler’s Village Club v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 240 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 2 ].

1988The access rule, in short, seriously hampers the competitive effectiveness of nonmember licensed brokers and salesmen.” (Id. at pp. 935-936; fn. deleted.) It will be recalled that the discussion of circuit dealing in United States v. Paramount Pictures, supra, 334 U.S. 131 , turned essentially on the question of free access to markets.

1988We acknowledged the Board’s conclusions with respect to field access, that because of “ ‘. . . the presence of employer representatives, the short time available [at the work site] during non-working time, plus the limits on the numbers of organizers who may be present under the [access] rule[,]. . .’” field access was “ ‘. . . not the ideal setting for extended or thoughtful discussion of controversial issues.’” ( Carian, supra, 36 Cal.3d 654, 667 , citing Henry Moreno (May 11, 1977) 3 ALRB No. 40.) “In light of these practical limitations, the board decided ‘to intensify employee access to i

1988We acknowledged the Board’s conclusions with respect to field access, that because of “ ‘. . . the presence of employer representatives, the short time available [at the work site] during non-working time, plus the limits on the numbers of organizers who may be present under the [access] rule[,]. . .’” field access was “ ‘. . . not the ideal setting for extended or thoughtful discussion of controversial issues.’” ( Carian, supra, 36 Cal.3d 654, 667 , citing Henry Moreno (May 11, 1977) 3 ALRB No. 40.) “In light of these practical limitations, the board decided ‘to intensify employee access to i

1985(Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 678 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 395 ]; see Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State of California (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 736, 753, 754 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 820 ].) The fact that the ownership has been divided into 135 lots should not foreclose the access requirement as a condition of development.

1985(Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 678 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 395 ]; see Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State of California (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 736, 753, 754 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 820 ].) The fact that the ownership has been divided into 135 lots should not foreclose the access requirement as a condition of development.

1982The Catalano opinion plainly states "Only lawful union activity is exempt from prosecution for trespass." ( 29 Cal.3d at p. 15 .) We do not know whether the 34 petitioners were union representatives or not, nor do we know whether they entered the celery field with criminal intent.

1982The Catalano opinion plainly states “Only lawful union activity is exempt from prosecution for trespass.” ( 29 Cal.3d at p. 15 .) We do not know whether the 34 petitioners were union representatives or not, nor do we know whether they entered the celery field with criminal intent.

1979However, distributing literature is within the activities allowed under the access rule, *587 taking into account the absence in the agricultural setting of alternative channels usually available for communicating with industrial workers (Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra 24 Cal.3d at p. 354 ).

1979However, distributing literature is within the activities allowed under the access rule, *587 taking into account the absence in the agricultural setting of alternative channels usually available for communicating with industrial workers (Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra 24 Cal.3d at p. 354 ).

1978The issue presents a factual question within the general counsel’s broad discretion (United Electrical Contractors Association v. Ordman (2d Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 776 )—not a matter of statutory construction (see Boire v. Greyhound Corp. (1964) 376 U.S. 473,481 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 849, 855 , 84 S.Ct. 849 ]).

1978The issue presents a factual question within the general counsel's broad discretion ( United Electrical Contractors Association v. Ordman (2d Cir.1966) 366 F.2d 776 ) — not a matter of statutory construction (see Boire v. Greyhound Corp. (1964) 376 U.S. 473, 481 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 849, 855 , 84 S.Ct. 849 ]). [5] Section 1152 provides in relevant part, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain

1976On the other hand, when membership in an association is a practical economic necessity, judicial review is available to examine bases for exclusion from membership. {Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists (1969) 1 Cal.3d 160, 165 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 460 P.2d 495 ], citing Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc. (1961) 34 N.J. 582 [ 170 A.2d 791, 799 , 89 A.L.R.2d 952 ].) In the case at bar, even if the access rule is eliminated, membership in the Marin County Board of Realtors must be termed a practical economic necessity for real estate salesmen.

1976On the other hand, when membership in an association is a practical economic necessity, judicial review is available to examine bases for exclusion from membership. {Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists (1969) 1 Cal.3d 160, 165 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 460 P.2d 495 ], citing Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc. (1961) 34 N.J. 582 [ 170 A.2d 791, 799 , 89 A.L.R.2d 952 ].) In the case at bar, even if the access rule is eliminated, membership in the Marin County Board of Realtors must be termed a practical economic necessity for real estate salesmen.

1976Co. v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 1, 5 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 545, 549 , 78 S.Ct. 514 ].) Among these per se violations is the concerted refusal to deal with other traders, or, as it is often called, the group boycott. {Ibid; Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores (1959) 359 U.S. 207 , 212 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 741 , 744-745, 79 S.Ct. 705 ].) Palsson asserts that the board’s access rule and its “primarily engaged” by-law constitute a group boycott.

1976Co. v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 1, 5 [ 2 L.Ed.2d 545, 549 , 78 S.Ct. 514 ].) Among these per se violations is the concerted refusal to deal with other traders, or, as it is often called, the group boycott. {Ibid; Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores (1959) 359 U.S. 207 , 212 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 741 , 744-745, 79 S.Ct. 705 ].) Palsson asserts that the board’s access rule and its “primarily engaged” by-law constitute a group boycott.