Cumis doctrine in California

2013Specifically, where, as here, the interests of the insurer and the insured no longer align, the insured is entitled under Civil Code section 2860 (section 2860) to independent counsel at the insurer‟s expense. (§ 2860 [codifying and clarifying the Cumis doctrine]; e.g., Gafcon, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1421-1422.) Although independent counsel owes certain limited duties to the insurer under these circumstances (mainly related to sharing nonprivileged information), independent counsel represents the insured alone. (§ 2860, subds. (d), (f).) Otherwise stated, “there is no attorney-client rel

2013Specifically, where, as here, the interests of the insurer and the insured no longer align, the insured is entitled under Civil Code section 2860 (section 2860) to independent counsel at the insurer‟s expense. (§ 2860 [codifying and clarifying the Cumis doctrine]; e.g., Gafcon, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1421-1422.) Although independent counsel owes certain limited duties to the insurer under these circumstances (mainly related to sharing nonprivileged information), independent counsel represents the insured alone. (§ 2860, subds. (d), (f).) Otherwise stated, “there is no attorney-client rel

2008K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1018 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 804 P.2d 689 ] [“purpose of requiring Cumis counsel is to protect an insured’s interest”]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 372 ] [“Cumis rule requires complete independence of counsel . . . .”].) 8 Although an insurer’s agreement to provide a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights may give rise to a conflict of interest requiring appointment of independent or Cumis counsel, it is not inevitable. 9 Section 2860, subdivision (b), provides, “For purposes of this section, a co

2008K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1018 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 804 P.2d 689 ] [“purpose of requiring Cumis counsel is to protect an insured’s interest”]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 372 ] [“Cumis rule requires complete independence of counsel . . . .”].) 8 Although an insurer’s agreement to provide a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights may give rise to a conflict of interest requiring appointment of independent or Cumis counsel, it is not inevitable. 9 Section 2860, subdivision (b), provides, “For purposes of this section, a co

2008K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1018 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 804 P.2d 689 ] [“purpose of requiring Cumis counsel is to protect an insured’s interest”]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 372 ] [“Cumis rule requires complete independence of counsel . . . .”].) 8 Although an insurer’s agreement to provide a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights may give rise to a conflict of interest requiring appointment of independent or Cumis counsel, it is not inevitable. 9 Section 2860, subdivision (b), provides, “For purposes of this section, a co

2008K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1018 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 804 P.2d 689 ] [“purpose of requiring Cumis counsel is to protect an insured’s interest”]; State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 372 ] [“Cumis rule requires complete independence of counsel . . . .”].) 8 Although an insurer’s agreement to provide a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights may give rise to a conflict of interest requiring appointment of independent or Cumis counsel, it is not inevitable. 9 Section 2860, subdivision (b), provides, “For purposes of this section, a co

2023As codified in Civil Code section 2680, “[i]f the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the insured.” (Civil Code, § 2680, subd. (a); see also Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1543 [“The Cumis doctrine requires ‘complete independence of counsel,’ who represents ‘solely the insured.’”].) As such, respondents cannot be held liable for the 11 Appell

2023As codified in Civil Code section 2680, “[i]f the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the insured.” (Civil Code, § 2680, subd. (a); see also Kroll & Tract v. Paris & Paris (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1543 [“The Cumis doctrine requires ‘complete independence of counsel,’ who represents ‘solely the insured.’”].) As such, respondents cannot be held liable for the 11 Appell

2004Underwriters (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 799, 810 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 347 ] [decided before Cumis decision and enactment of section 2860]), we do not believe the Legislature intended parties to arbitrate disputes involving Cumis defense expenses.

2004Underwriters (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 799, 810 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 347 ] [decided before Cumis decision and enactment of section 2860]), we do not believe the Legislature intended parties to arbitrate disputes involving Cumis defense expenses.

1993Code, § 2860, subd. (b); Blanchard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 345, 349 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 ]; McGee v. Superior Court, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 .) The insurer owes no duty to provide independent counsel in these situations because the Cumis rule is not based on insurance law but on the ethical duty of an attorney to avoid representing conflicting interests.

1993Code, § 2860, subd. (b); Blanchard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 345, 349 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 ]; McGee v. Superior Court, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 .) The insurer owes no duty to provide independent counsel in these situations because the Cumis rule is not based on insurance law but on the ethical duty of an attorney to avoid representing conflicting interests.

2015Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103, fn. 3 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 ] [holding, in inadequate defense suit by insured against insurer, that insurer’s right to control non-Cumis defense “necessarily encompasses the right to determine what measures are cost effective”].) Squire Sanders insists that Cumis counsel’s independence, zeal, and undivided loyalty to the insureds would be unduly compromised if, while conducting their clients’ defense, counsel faced the chilling prospect of the insurer’s lawsuit challenging, in hindsight, the reasonableness of counsel’s efforts.

2015Exchange (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103, fn. 3 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 ] [holding, in inadequate defense suit by insured against insurer, that insurer’s right to control non-Cumis defense “necessarily encompasses the right to determine what measures are cost effective”].) Squire Sanders insists that Cumis counsel’s independence, zeal, and undivided loyalty to the insureds would be unduly compromised if, while conducting their clients’ defense, counsel faced the chilling prospect of the insurer’s lawsuit challenging, in hindsight, the reasonableness of counsel’s efforts.

2015We have long recognized that “ ‘[t]he Cumis doctrine requires “complete independence of counsel” [citation], who represents “solely the insured” ....’” (Musser v. Provencher (2002) 28 Cal.4th 274, 283 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 48 P.3d 408 ].) In other words, “Cumis counsel represents the insured independently of the insurer,” and its attorney-client relationship exists with the insured, not the insurer.

2015We have long recognized that “ ‘[t]he Cumis doctrine requires “complete independence of counsel” [citation], who represents “solely the insured” ....’” (Musser v. Provencher (2002) 28 Cal.4th 274, 283 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 48 P.3d 408 ].) In other words, “Cumis counsel represents the insured independently of the insurer,” and its attorney-client relationship exists with the insured, not the insurer.

1993Underwriters (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 799, 809 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 375 ; McGee v. Superior Court (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].) In 1987 the Legislature enacted section 2860 of the Civil Code, which codified the Cumis rule.

1993Underwriters (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 799, 809 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 347 ]; Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 375 ; McGee v. Superior Court (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 221, 226 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 421 ].) In 1987 the Legislature enacted section 2860 of the Civil Code, which codified the Cumis rule.

2021Dual representation by counsel is beneficial since the shared goal of minimizing or eliminating liability to a third party is the same.’ ” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388 , 1419-1420 (Gafcon).) However, “an attorney having such dual agency status is subject to the rule that a ‘ “[c]onflict of interest between jointly represented clients occurs whenever their common lawyer’s representation of the one is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of the other.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1420.) 13 Hence, the Cumis rule and section 2860 spring from “the ethical du

2021Dual representation by counsel is beneficial since the shared goal of minimizing or eliminating liability to a third party is the same.’ ” (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388 , 1419-1420 (Gafcon).) However, “an attorney having such dual agency status is subject to the rule that a ‘ “[c]onflict of interest between jointly represented clients occurs whenever their common lawyer’s representation of the one is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of the other.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1420.) 13 Hence, the Cumis rule and section 2860 spring from “the ethical du

1995(Cu mis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 364-367; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 613 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; Seeno, supra, 692 F.Supp. at pp. 1154-1158.) As explained in Seeno, the Cumis doctrine “intended to eliminate the ethical dilemmas and temptations that arise along with conflict in joint representations . . . through mandating the insured’s right to Cumis counsel that represents] only the insured.” ( 692 F.Supp. at p. 1158 .) An important corollary of the Cumis doctrine is that if the insured is entitled to Cumis counsel, the insured is entitled to control the d

1995K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1018 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 804 P.2d 689 ], italics in original.) Another court has noted that “[t]he Cumis rule requires complete independence of counsel when an insurance company interposes a reservation of rights, the basis of which creates a conflict of interest.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1226 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 372 ], italics added.) This view has been most forcefully stated in Seeno: “Cumis counsel represents] solely the insured . . . .” ( 692 F.Supp. at p. 1157 .) The basic premise for this view is well establishe

2015(See id. at p. 87 [“An important corollary of the Cumis doctrine is that if the insured is entitled to Cumis counsel, the insured is entitled to control the defense of the case.”]; Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 369.) More generally, we understand the client’s right of control in terms of agency.

2015(See id. at p. 87 [“An important corollary of the Cumis doctrine is that if the insured is entitled to Cumis counsel, the insured is entitled to control the defense of the case.”]; Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 369.) More generally, we understand the client’s right of control in terms of agency.

2004Exchange v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] and Handy v. First Interstate Bank (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 , footnote 3 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ], the courts in these cases were not called upon to determine the propriety of arbitrating defense costs; it is well-settled that parties may broaden the scope of arbitration by agreement.

2004Exchange v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] and Handy v. First Interstate Bank (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 , footnote 3 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ], the courts in these cases were not called upon to determine the propriety of arbitrating defense costs; it is well-settled that parties may broaden the scope of arbitration by agreement.

2004Exchange v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] and Handy v. First Interstate Bank (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 , footnote 3 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ], the courts in these cases were not called upon to determine the propriety of arbitrating defense costs; it is well-settled that parties may broaden the scope of arbitration by agreement.

2004Exchange v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 985, 990 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] and Handy v. First Interstate Bank (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 , footnote 3 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ], the courts in these cases were not called upon to determine the propriety of arbitrating defense costs; it is well-settled that parties may broaden the scope of arbitration by agreement.

2000The court held (1) an insurer "in an action involving covered and uncovered claims" is not "automatically obliged to provide independent counsel pursuant to Civil Code section 2860" and (2) an insurer does not breach its duty to defend "when it assigns competent outside counsel pending a further analysis of the Cumis issue[.]" ( 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) As the court explained: "A mere possibility of an unspecified conflict does not require independent counsel.

2000The court held (1) an insurer "in an action involving covered and uncovered claims" is not "automatically obliged to provide independent counsel pursuant to Civil Code section 2860" and (2) an insurer does not breach its duty to defend "when it assigns competent outside counsel pending a further analysis of the Cumis issue[.]" ( 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 , 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 .) As the court explained: "A mere possibility of an unspecified conflict does not require independent counsel.

2026(Hartford Casualty, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 994, fn. 4 ; Simonyan, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 [“ ‘section 2860 … “ ‘clarifies and limits’ ” the rights and responsibilities of insurer and insured as set forth in Cumis’ ”].) The statute provides that “[i]f the provisions of a policy of 13 insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the insured unless, at the time the insured is informed that a possib

2026(Hartford Casualty, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 994, fn. 4 ; Simonyan, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 896 [“ ‘section 2860 … “ ‘clarifies and limits’ ” the rights and responsibilities of insurer and insured as set forth in Cumis’ ”].) The statute provides that “[i]f the provisions of a policy of 13 insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide independent counsel to represent the insured unless, at the time the insured is informed that a possib

2026Co. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1121 , 1133 (Nede Mgmt.).) The Legislature codified (with clarifications) the Cumis rule in 1987 by enacting section 2860.

2026Co. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1121 , 1133 (Nede Mgmt.).) The Legislature codified (with clarifications) the Cumis rule in 1987 by enacting section 2860.

2015(E.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1595 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 ]; California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ].) They urge, on various grounds, that to allow a “breaching insurer” such as Hartford to assert a direct right of action against its insureds’ independent counsel would contravene the purposes of the Cumis rule and section 2860.

2015(E.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1595 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 ]; California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ].) They urge, on various grounds, that to allow a “breaching insurer” such as Hartford to assert a direct right of action against its insureds’ independent counsel would contravene the purposes of the Cumis rule and section 2860.

2015The attorney acts as the agent of his or her client, and “the client as principal is bound by the attorney’s acts within the scope of the attorney’s actual (express or implied) or apparent or ostensible authority, or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attorneys, § 235, p. 309; see Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 626, 633-634 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 734 , 82 S.Ct. 1386 ].) This is so even though some insureds are “not sophisticated, frequent litigators accustomed to monitoring their counsel’s day-to-day litigation decisions.” (Maj. opn., ante,

2015The attorney acts as the agent of his or her client, and “the client as principal is bound by the attorney’s acts within the scope of the attorney’s actual (express or implied) or apparent or ostensible authority, or by unauthorized acts ratified by the client.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attorneys, § 235, p. 309; see Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 626, 633-634 [ 8 L.Ed.2d 734 , 82 S.Ct. 1386 ].) This is so even though some insureds are “not sophisticated, frequent litigators accustomed to monitoring their counsel’s day-to-day litigation decisions.” (Maj. opn., ante,

2015(E.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1595 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 ]; California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ].) They urge, on various grounds, that to allow a “breaching insurer” such as Hartford to assert a direct right of action against its insureds’ independent counsel would contravene the purposes of the Cumis rule and section 2860.

2015(E.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1595 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 ]; California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 583 ].) They urge, on various grounds, that to allow a “breaching insurer” such as Hartford to assert a direct right of action against its insureds’ independent counsel would contravene the purposes of the Cumis rule and section 2860.

2008(Gray Cary, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 [concluding that Cumis defense expenses are not equivalent to Cumis attorney’s fees for the purposes of § 2860’s arbitration requirement].) When read in context, it is clear that the “reasonable expenses” clause is an additional policy provision that is not directed at attorney’s fees, but at other costs incurred by an insured in defending against covered claims.

2002This holding was codified in Civil Code section 2860 in 1987.[¶] The Cumis doctrine requires `complete independence of counsel' [citation], who represents `solely the insured' [citation]. `Since it is almost unavoidable that, in the course of investigating and preparing the insured's defense to the third party's action, the insured's attorney will come across information relevant to a coverage or similar issue, it is quite difficult for an attorney beholden to the insurer to represent the insured where the insurer is reserving its rights regarding coverage....' [Citation.]" ( Kroll & Tract, at

2002This holding was codified in Civil Code section 2860 in 1987.[¶] The Cumis doctrine requires `complete independence of counsel' [citation], who represents `solely the insured' [citation]. `Since it is almost unavoidable that, in the course of investigating and preparing the insured's defense to the third party's action, the insured's attorney will come across information relevant to a coverage or similar issue, it is quite difficult for an attorney beholden to the insurer to represent the insured where the insurer is reserving its rights regarding coverage....' [Citation.]" ( Kroll & Tract, at

1995Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 880-882 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 511 ].) Under the Cumis doctrine, the insurer’s accountability in this regard may be even narrower because the insured is entitled to choose its own independent counsel.

1995Co. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 880-882 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 511 ].) Under the Cumis doctrine, the insurer’s accountability in this regard may be even narrower because the insured is entitled to choose its own independent counsel.

1995(Cu mis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 364-367; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 613 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; Seeno, supra, 692 F.Supp. at pp. 1154-1158.) As explained in Seeno, the Cumis doctrine “intended to eliminate the ethical dilemmas and temptations that arise along with conflict in joint representations . . . through mandating the insured’s right to Cumis counsel that represents] only the insured.” ( 692 F.Supp. at p. 1158 .) An important corollary of the Cumis doctrine is that if the insured is entitled to Cumis counsel, the insured is entitled to control the d

1995(Cu mis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 364-367; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 613 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 578 ]; Seeno, supra, 692 F.Supp. at pp. 1154-1158.) As explained in Seeno, the Cumis doctrine “intended to eliminate the ethical dilemmas and temptations that arise along with conflict in joint representations . . . through mandating the insured’s right to Cumis counsel that represents] only the insured.” ( 692 F.Supp. at p. 1158 .) An important corollary of the Cumis doctrine is that if the insured is entitled to Cumis counsel, the insured is entitled to control the d

1995(Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 369, 375; see Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 638, 648 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 731 , 394 P.2d 571 ].) It is at this juncture that ACA’s reading of the Cumis doctrine embodied in Civil Code section 2860 falls most precipitously.

1995(Cumis, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 369, 375; see Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 638, 648 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 731 , 394 P.2d 571 ].) It is at this juncture that ACA’s reading of the Cumis doctrine embodied in Civil Code section 2860 falls most precipitously.

1991In our view, this fact alone is sufficient to explain why it was error to direct a verdict in this case. 7 Indeed, a lawyer may be disciplined for representing a client in a field in which the attorney has no experience and without associating or consulting a sufficiently experienced attorney (Lewis v. State Bar (1981) 28 Cal.3d 683, 688-689 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 634 , 621 P.2d 258 ]) and may be sued for malpractice for venturing into an unfamiliar area without the assistance of a specialist (Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 414-415 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]). 8 Section 2860 of the Civil Code

1991In our view, this fact alone is sufficient to explain why it was error to direct a verdict in this case. 7 Indeed, a lawyer may be disciplined for representing a client in a field in which the attorney has no experience and without associating or consulting a sufficiently experienced attorney (Lewis v. State Bar (1981) 28 Cal.3d 683, 688-689 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 634 , 621 P.2d 258 ]) and may be sued for malpractice for venturing into an unfamiliar area without the assistance of a specialist (Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 414-415 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]). 8 Section 2860 of the Civil Code

1991In our view, this fact alone is sufficient to explain why it was error to direct a verdict in this case. 7 Indeed, a lawyer may be disciplined for representing a client in a field in which the attorney has no experience and without associating or consulting a sufficiently experienced attorney (Lewis v. State Bar (1981) 28 Cal.3d 683, 688-689 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 634 , 621 P.2d 258 ]) and may be sued for malpractice for venturing into an unfamiliar area without the assistance of a specialist (Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 414-415 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]). 8 Section 2860 of the Civil Code

1991In our view, this fact alone is sufficient to explain why it was error to direct a verdict in this case. 7 Indeed, a lawyer may be disciplined for representing a client in a field in which the attorney has no experience and without associating or consulting a sufficiently experienced attorney (Lewis v. State Bar (1981) 28 Cal.3d 683, 688-689 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 634 , 621 P.2d 258 ]) and may be sued for malpractice for venturing into an unfamiliar area without the assistance of a specialist (Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 414-415 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]). 8 Section 2860 of the Civil Code