parens patriae doctrine in California

2025(See e.g., Prince v. Massachusett [1944], supra, 321 U.S. 158 at p. 166 .) State officials may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child’s health, educational development and emotional well-being.” (In re Phillip B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 796, 801 ; see, In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1171 .) In the present case, Mother initiated the involvement of the Department by urging first Dr. Lamb, and later Dr. Dobson, to make referrals to the Department and contacting law enforcement to conduct welfare checks on the child while at Father’s residence.

1979(See e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. 158 at p. 166 [ 88 L.Ed. 645 at pp. 652-653 ].) State officials may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child’s health, educational development and emotional well-being.

2023(See In re William T. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 790, 797 [“when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time.”].) We cannot predict the outcome of the new dependency petitions, including whether any superseding exit orders will be issued and made a part of the family law file, or even whether the children will be declared dependents of the juvenile court at all.

1991As stated in In re William T, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at page 797 , “when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time.”

2025(See e.g., Prince v. Massachusett [1944], supra, 321 U.S. 158 at p. 166 .) State officials may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child’s health, educational development and emotional well-being.” (In re Phillip B. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 796, 801 ; see, In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1171 .) In the present case, Mother initiated the involvement of the Department by urging first Dr. Lamb, and later Dr. Dobson, to make referrals to the Department and contacting law enforcement to conduct welfare checks on the child while at Father’s residence.

2012The state has long been viewed as possessing extraordinary power over the lives of children under the doctrine of parens patriae, which “refers to the traditional role and obligation of the state to act as guardian of children, and other incompetents.” (Quigley v. First Church of Christ, Scientist (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1034 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 792 ], italics omitted.) The state has no similar obligation—and we would not lightly hold it vested with similar power—where competent adults are concerned.

2012The state has long been viewed as possessing extraordinary power over the lives of children under the doctrine of parens patriae, which “refers to the traditional role and obligation of the state to act as guardian of children, and other incompetents.” (Quigley v. First Church of Christ, Scientist (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1034 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 792 ], italics omitted.) The state has no similar obligation—and we would not lightly hold it vested with similar power—where competent adults are concerned.

2012Rather, when a child turns 18 in our society, it becomes her “right and responsibility to make her own decisions.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1415 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 ].) Survivors of child sexual abuse, like other adults, become their own guardians, and are expected to look out for their own welfare, emotional and otherwise.

2012Rather, when a child turns 18 in our society, it becomes her “right and responsibility to make her own decisions.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1415 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 ].) Survivors of child sexual abuse, like other adults, become their own guardians, and are expected to look out for their own welfare, emotional and otherwise.

2005However, the majority in People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 335 , footnote 5, noted this particular issue was left undecided by Sanders when it declined to reach this issue observing that: “Because this case does not involve a juvenile, we need not, and do not, decide this issue.” As Justice Kennard (who dissented in Tyrell J.) wrote separately in Sanders , “Left open by the majority here is the continuing vitality of the majority opinion in Tyrell J. . . .” (Sanders, at p. 337 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Because the high court itself dismantled the foundation and cornerstones of T

2005However, the majority in People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 335 , footnote 5, noted this particular issue was left undecided by Sanders when it declined to reach this issue observing that: “Because this case does not involve a juvenile, we need not, and do not, decide this issue.” As Justice Kennard (who dissented in Tyrell J.) wrote separately in Sanders , “Left open by the majority here is the continuing vitality of the majority opinion in Tyrell J. . . .” (Sanders, at p. 337 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Because the high court itself dismantled the foundation and cornerstones of T

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985(Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time. “[W]hen a juvenile court has adjudged an infant to be its ward then the orders of that court concerning the physical custody, control and care of its ward supersede for so long as necessary any existing orders of other courts made in custodial matters which conflict therewith and that this situation also makes void cu

1985(Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time. “[W]hen a juvenile court has adjudged an infant to be its ward then the orders of that court concerning the physical custody, control and care of its ward supersede for so long as necessary any existing orders of other courts made in custodial matters which conflict therewith and that this situation also makes void cu

1985(Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time. “[W]hen a juvenile court has adjudged an infant to be its ward then the orders of that court concerning the physical custody, control and care of its ward supersede for so long as necessary any existing orders of other courts made in custodial matters which conflict therewith and that this situation also makes void cu

1985(Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of parens patriae, acquires jurisdiction and properly assumes custody of the minor, its jurisdiction is paramount even if acquired later in time. “[W]hen a juvenile court has adjudged an infant to be its ward then the orders of that court concerning the physical custody, control and care of its ward supersede for so long as necessary any existing orders of other courts made in custodial matters which conflict therewith and that this situation also makes void cu

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985The appellate *798 court held the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction insofar as conflicting orders of the adoption court interfered with that jurisdiction. ( Id., at p. 532.) Similarly, in In re Syson (1960) 184 Cal. App.2d 111, 117 [ 7 Cal. Rptr. 298 ], the court held: "While the juvenile court, on adequate facts, retains jurisdiction and stays within the bounds of its legal power, no other court has the right to interfere with its supervision, for the state, of the children involved." (See also People v. Sanchez (1942) 21 Cal.2d 466, 471 [ 132 P.2d 810 ]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917

1985One reason for the rule is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation." ( Scott v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 76, 81-82 [ 293 P.2d 18 ].) This general rule applies to conflicts in jurisdiction involving custody questions. ( Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of pare

1985One reason for the rule is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation." ( Scott v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 76, 81-82 [ 293 P.2d 18 ].) This general rule applies to conflicts in jurisdiction involving custody questions. ( Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307, 310-312 [ 231 P.2d 821 ].) However, when the juvenile court, acting under the doctrine of pare