process inquiry in California

1987When use of this information is confined to those proper purposes, its elicitation cannot be considered incriminatory.” (People v. Rucker, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 387.) In contrast, the Supreme Court has defined an interrogation as “ ‘ “a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the [defendant’s] arrest and ultimately his guilt.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 244 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) The distinction recognized by the California Supreme Court between a booking interview to gather neut

1987When use of this information is confined to those proper purposes, its elicitation cannot be considered incriminatory.” (People v. Rucker, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 387.) In contrast, the Supreme Court has defined an interrogation as “ ‘ “a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the [defendant’s] arrest and ultimately his guilt.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 244 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) The distinction recognized by the California Supreme Court between a booking interview to gather neut

1987When use of this information is confined to those proper purposes, its elicitation cannot be considered incriminatory.” (People v. Rucker, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 387.) In contrast, the Supreme Court has defined an interrogation as “ ‘ “a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the [defendant’s] arrest and ultimately his guilt.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 244 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) The distinction recognized by the California Supreme Court between a booking interview to gather neut

1980(Cf. People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 386 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 605 P.2d 843 ].) The statement which it produced had scarcely any tendency to incriminate appellant, either by rebutting his defense of diminished capacity or by showing a consciousness of guilt on his part (to find that it did either, the jury would first have to find that the other person apprehended at the store was with appellant, and that fact was more probative than appellant’s denial of it.) Even if it were error to admit appellant’s statement, we would consider the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2024If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 .) If the trial court issues an order to show cause, the final step in the process is a hearing to determine

2024If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 .) If the trial court issues an order to show cause, the final step in the process is a hearing to determine

2025Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction.”]; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 235 [“‘we follow the familiar rule stated in Cupp’”].) At closing, the prosecutor advised the jury he was proceeding on a theory Moore was the actual killer who threw the Molotov cocktail, and Harris aided and abetted the murder.

2024Analysis “Under state law, ‘ “[a] prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct. . . . ” ’ [Citation.] Prosecutorial misconduct violates the federal Constitution when it results in a fundamentally unfair trial.” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 350 .) Where, as here, “a claim of misconduct is based on remarks to the jury, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an improper fashion.” (Ibid.) In doing so, “ ‘we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least

2007The Supreme Court wrote, “[B]efore confidential customer information may be disclosed in the course of civil discovery proceedings, the bank must take reasonable steps to notify its customer of the pendency and nature of the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his interests by objecting to disclosure, by seeking an appropriate protective order, or by instituting other legal proceedings to limit the scope or nature of the matters sought to be discovered.” (Id. at p. 658; see also Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1848 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] (Lan

2007The Supreme Court wrote, “[B]efore confidential customer information may be disclosed in the course of civil discovery proceedings, the bank must take reasonable steps to notify its customer of the pendency and nature of the proceedings and to afford the customer a fair opportunity to assert his interests by objecting to disclosure, by seeking an appropriate protective order, or by instituting other legal proceedings to limit the scope or nature of the matters sought to be discovered.” (Id. at p. 658; see also Lantz v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1848 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ] (Lan

1999Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., supra, 929 F.2d at p. 363 , citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 502 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 1319-1320], italics added.) We find equally instructive Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, supra, 772 F.2d at page 1171, where the court concluded “entanglement might. . . result from a protracted legal process pitting church *1442 and state as adversaries.” 7 It explained, “Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral character, in contravention of a church’s own perception of its needs and purposes, would cons

1999Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., supra, 929 F.2d at p. 363 , citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 502 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 1319-1320], italics added.) We find equally instructive Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, supra, 772 F.2d at page 1171, where the court concluded “entanglement might. . . result from a protracted legal process pitting church *1442 and state as adversaries.” 7 It explained, “Bureaucratic suggestion in employment decisions of a pastoral character, in contravention of a church’s own perception of its needs and purposes, would cons

1992At no time during this process did defense counsel object to any of McCray's statements in whole or in part based on the Bruton-Aranda rule. (14)(See fn. 3.), (13b) Defendant has waived any objection on that ground. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1044 .) [3] Even if the objection had been timely raised, the record amply demonstrates that the admission of McCray's statements was not prejudicial to defendant. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 ].) The most telling sign of an absence of prejudice is that defendant *996 himself sought to rely on

1992At no time during this process did defense counsel object to any of McCray's statements in whole or in part based on the Bruton-Aranda rule. (14)(See fn. 3.), (13b) Defendant has waived any objection on that ground. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1044 .) [3] Even if the objection had been timely raised, the record amply demonstrates that the admission of McCray's statements was not prejudicial to defendant. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 ].) The most telling sign of an absence of prejudice is that defendant *996 himself sought to rely on

1992(See People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 109, 115-116 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 518 ], cited on this issue by Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 .) 12 From the standpoint of judges confronted with assessing whether a particular scientific technique meets legal standards, to separate the process by which a test can be done reliably from the question of whether a particular test in general is reliable for scientific purposes creates an unresolvable distinction.

1992(See People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 109, 115-116 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 518 ], cited on this issue by Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 .) 12 From the standpoint of judges confronted with assessing whether a particular scientific technique meets legal standards, to separate the process by which a test can be done reliably from the question of whether a particular test in general is reliable for scientific purposes creates an unresolvable distinction.

1980(See People v. White, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 761.) There can be no question that the interview by the probation officer constituted an interrogation.

1980(See People v. White, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 761 .) (4) There can be no question that the interview by the probation officer constituted an interrogation.

1980III Next, it is urged that compliance with the requirements of Miranda was unnecessary in this case because neither interview amounted to an "interrogation" within the meaning of that decision. (3) The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation in Miranda as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) Recently, this court reaffirmed that an interrogation is "`a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to

1980III Next, it is urged that compliance with the requirements of Miranda was unnecessary in this case because neither interview amounted to an "interrogation" within the meaning of that decision. (3) The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation in Miranda as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) Recently, this court reaffirmed that an interrogation is "`a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to

1980III Next, it is urged that compliance with the requirements of Miranda was unnecessary in this case because neither interview amounted to an "interrogation" within the meaning of that decision. (3) The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation in Miranda as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) Recently, this court reaffirmed that an interrogation is "`a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to

1980III Next, it is urged that compliance with the requirements of Miranda was unnecessary in this case because neither interview amounted to an "interrogation" within the meaning of that decision. (3) The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation in Miranda as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) Recently, this court reaffirmed that an interrogation is "`a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if not so designed, to