state waives sovereign immunity in Connecticut

2017The defendants contend that, to the contrary, ‘‘[w]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute . . . a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provi- sions because [s]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 232 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); see also White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990) (‘‘[w]here there is any doubt about their meaning or intent [

2017The defendants contend that, to the contrary, ‘‘[w]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute . . . a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provi- sions because [s]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 232 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); see also White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990) (‘‘[w]here there is any doubt about their meaning or intent [

2008The state’s sovereign right not to be sued may be waived by the legislature, provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or byforce of a necessary implication.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) De pt. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999).

2008The state’s sovereign right not to be sued may be waived by the legislature, provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or byforce of a necessary implication.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) De pt. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999).

1983When the state waives sovereign immunity by statute, however, a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provisions because “[statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.” Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979), quoting Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

1983When the state waives sovereign immunity by statute, however, a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provisions because “[statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.” Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979), quoting Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2000"Sovereign immunity may be waived only through a statute." Struckman v. Burns , 205 Conn. 542 , 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987). "[W]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babes v. Bennett , 247 Conn. 256 , 262 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998).

2000"Sovereign immunity may be waived only through a statute." Struckman v. Burns , 205 Conn. 542 , 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987). "[W]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babes v. Bennett , 247 Conn. 256 , 262 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998).

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2010Moreover, “when the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 8 , 946 A.2d 1219 (2008).

2010Moreover, “when the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 8 , 946 A.2d 1219 (2008).

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

2000This absolute bar of actions against the state has been greatly modified both by statutes effectively consenting to suit in some instances as well as by judicial decisions in others." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shay v. v. Rossi , 253 Conn. 134 , 168 , ___ A.2d ___ (2000). "[W]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [s]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not

1997In other words, if a cause of action would lie against a private individual, it will also lie against the government.” [emphasis in original]); Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 486 , 622 A.2d 495 (1993) (“governmental liability may arise only if a plaintiffs cause of action is comparable to a cause of action against a private citizen . . . and his allegations, taken as true, [will] satisfy the necessary elements of that comparable state cause of action” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1997In other words, if a cause of action would lie against a private individual, it will also lie against the government.” [emphasis in original]); Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 486 , 622 A.2d 495 (1993) (“governmental liability may arise only if a plaintiffs cause of action is comparable to a cause of action against a private citizen . . . and his allegations, taken as true, [will] satisfy the necessary elements of that comparable state cause of action” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) (“recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct”); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state’s Tort Claims Act, “the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) (“The statute says that if ñ. private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) (“recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct”); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state’s Tort Claims Act, “the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) (“The statute says that if ñ. private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) (“recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct”); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state’s Tort Claims Act, “the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) (“The statute says that if ñ. private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) ("recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct"); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state's Tort Claims Act, "the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) ("The statute says that if a private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against th

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So. 2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) (“recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct”); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state’s Tort Claims Act, “the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) (“The statute says that if ñ. private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against

1997See Reddish v. Smith, 468 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla. 1985) ("recovery is to be allowed [against the state] only to the extent that such is available against a private person for the same kind of conduct"); Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794, 801 , 727 P.2d 1222 (1986) (stating that, under state's Tort Claims Act, "the state waives sovereign immunity and subjects itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person" [emphasis added]); Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 216 , 723 P.2d 755 (1986) ("The statute says that if a private person would be liable for the misconduct alleged against th

1996Prtr. 26, 7 CSCR 297 ).

1993McKinley v. Musshorn, supra, 621, 622 ; Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619 , 621 , 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 (1990).

1993McKinley v. Musshorn, supra, 621, 622 ; Rivera v. Fox, 20 Conn. App. 619 , 621 , 622 , 569 A.2d 1137 (1990).

1983When the state waives sovereign immunity by statute, however, a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provisions because “[statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.” Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979), quoting Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

1983When the state waives sovereign immunity by statute, however, a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provisions because “[statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.” Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979), quoting Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).