spirit rule (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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spirit rule in Illinois

23 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Brown & Kerr v. American Stores Propertiesgreen
illappct · 1999 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000We note here that in a case subsequent to Bachmann, Brown & Kerr, 306 Ill.App.3d at 1030, 240 Ill.Dec. 117 , 715 N.E.2d at 810, we allowed the attorney to cure a defective signature on a notice of *610 rejection where there was no evidence of an intent to violate the spirit of the rule.

2000App. 3d at 1030 , 715 N.E.2d at 810 , we allowed the attorney to cure a defective signature on a notice of rejection where there was no evidence of an intent to violate the spirit of the rule.

13
People v. Villarrealgreen
ill · 2001 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023For this reason, “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). ¶ 37 Here, although defendant did not ask the trial court not to file a written order in Brown III, and thus the invited-error rule is not on all fours here, the spirit of the rule is implicated.

11
Hyatt Corp. v. Sweetgreen
illappct · 1992 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021Hyatt Corp. v. Sweet, 230 Ill.

11
People v. Amosgreen
illappct · 1985 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
1 sentence

1986See People v. Amos (1985), 140 Ill.

11
Village of Park Forest v. Fagangreen
illappct · 1975 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
1 sentence

1976(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan, 35 Ill.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (2)

CaseNegativeCited
Deckard v. Joinergreen
ill · 1970 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1979–1980
2 sentences

1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill.

1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill.

12
Fultz v. Haugangreen
ill · 1971 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
2 sentences

1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill.

1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill.

11

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
The PEOPLE v. Hogue green
illappct · 1971
2 sentences

1976(People v. Hogue, 1 Ill.App.3d 881 , 275 N.E.2d 193 .) From our review of the record, we believe the trial court did consider the nature of the offense as well as defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and that there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence here.

1976(People v. Hogue, 1 Ill.App.3d 881 , 275 N.E.2d 193 .) From our review of the record, we believe the trial court did consider the nature of the offense as well as defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and that there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence here.

31975–1976
Department of Transportation Ex Rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp. green
illappct · 2002
2 sentences

2004It further held that the Owners had suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged defects in the pleadings and that to allow them to challenge the sufficiency of the petitions would violate “the spirit of the waiver rule.” 333 Ill.

2004It further held that the Owners had suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged defects in the pleadings and that to allow them to challenge the sufficiency of the petitions would violate “the spirit of the waiver rule.” 333 Ill.

22004–2004
People v. Garth neutral
illappct · 1975
2 sentences

1976(People v. Garth, 31 Ill.App.3d 716 , 334 N.E.2d 359 .) For us to modify it,, the sentence must clearly depart from the spirit and requirement of the Illinois Constitution that the punishment imposed reflect both the nature of the offense and the possibilities of rehabilitation.

1976(People v. Garth, 31 Ill.App.3d 716 , 334 N.E.2d 359 .) For us to modify it,, the sentence must clearly depart from the spirit and requirement of the Illinois Constitution that the punishment imposed reflect both the nature of the offense and the possibilities of rehabilitation.

21975–1976
People v. Harvey green
ill · 2004
1 sentence

2023For this reason, “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). ¶ 37 Here, although defendant did not ask the trial court not to file a written order in Brown III, and thus the invited-error rule is not on all fours here, the spirit of the rule is implicated.

12023–2023
People v. Hood green
illappct · 2003
2 sentences

2003The majority's argument that the doctor's testimony, the doctor's calculations, should have been disclosed "under the spirit of the rule" (Op. 279 Ill.Dec. at 177 , 799 N.E.2d at 980 ) is not persuasive.

2003The majority's argument that the doctor's testimony, the doctor's calculations, should have been disclosed "under the spirit of the rule" (Op. 279 Ill.Dec. at 177 , 799 N.E.2d at 980 ) is not persuasive.

12003–2003
Currie v. Lao green
ill · 1992
2 sentences

1994(Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159 .) Our supreme court has recognized that such an analysis best reflects the spirit of the doctrine which, the court stressed, is not a "blanket” grant of immunity for all State employees.

1994Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159 .

11994–1994
Testin v. Dreyer Medical Clinic green
illappct · 1992
2 sentences

1993App. 3d at 889 , 605 N.E.2d at 1073 .) In agreeing with plaintiff that she did not waive the physician-patient privilege, the Testin court stated: “[although the waiver rule that plaintiffs claim exists in Ritter is not evident, we find that the spirit of that rule is implied.

1993The [Ritter] court implies that the physician-patient privilege does not apply when the medical entity wishes to communicate with the allegedly negligent physician through whom it may be vicariously liable; otherwise, the privilege applies.” (Testin, 238 Ill.

11993–1993
People v. Abney green
ill · 1980
1 sentence

1982Abney considered a similar report from a beating victim to police made within 1*2 hours to be “ ‘within the spirit ' # "of the “hot pursuit” exception.’ ” ( 81 Ill. 2d 159 , 169.) Clearly, the instant facts are encompassed within the spirit of this exception as well.

11982–1982
Underwood v. Yellow Cab Co. green
illappct · 1971
1 sentence

1978App. 2d 449, 451-52 , 268 N.E.2d 254 .) As stated in Deckard, at page 418: “To hold to the contrary would not only violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, but would render it a nullity.

11978–1978
Maybaum v. Maybaum green
illappct · 1953
2 sentences

1972Maybaum v. Maybaum (1952), 349 Ill.App. 80, 87 , 110 N.E.2d 78, 81 .

1972Maybaum v. Maybaum (1952), 349 Ill.App. 80, 87 , 110 N.E.2d 78, 81 .

11972–1972
People v. Cooke neutral
illappct · 1969
2 sentences

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

11971–1971
People v. Harpole green
illappct · 1968
1 sentence

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

11971–1971
Dorweiler v. Gleim neutral
illappct · 1972
1 sentence

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

11971–1971
People v. Turner green
illappct · 1970
2 sentences

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender.

11971–1971
Olds v. Cummings green
ill · 1863
1 sentence

1930By the agreement Mrs. Zachas became the equitable owner of the premises in question, and while no deeds passed to give her a legal title to the same, equity will presume that to be done which should be done; and even if the rule in Olds v. Cummings, supra, could be applied to a case like the present one, she was the equitable owner of the property, and we think the evidence shows that the appellant, prior to the time that he purchased the notes, brought himself fairly within the spirit of that rule.

11930–1930
Gray v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. neutral
· 1901
1 sentence

1903Paul Railway Co. 189 Ill. 400 , where one of the conditions of the deed in question was that appellee should maintain a passenger depot at a certain place and stop thereat all its accommodation trains to take and leave passengers, it was contended by appellee that the condition, being perpetual, was illegal and void and that the appellee held the land free from such invalid condition, but this contention we refused to uphold; and we think that case decisive of the one at bar as to appellants’ objection that the condition violates the spirit of the rule of perpetuities.

11903–1903

Where else courts name it

VT 66 (1883–2025) NY 36 (1843–2008) IL 23 (1903–2023) TX 20 (1884–2015) IN 20 (1984–2024) AL 17 (1840–2024) CA 15 (1896–2010) PA 14 (1900–2025) NJ 13 (1933–2025) FL 13 (1970–2011) AZ 12 (1965–2025) MO 11 (1884–2020) IA 10 (1862–2018) WA 9 (1901–2020) KS 8 (1900–2026) WY 8 (1906–2005) OH 8 (1837–2020) MT 8 (1982–2026) SD 8 (1892–1998) DC 7 (1884–2014) VA 7 (1833–2025) ID 7 (1978–2009) WV 7 (1966–2004) CO 7 (1895–2021) MA 7 (1845–2018) TN 6 (1896–2002) MI 6 (1890–2001) GA 6 (1901–1990) WI 5 (1936–2006) MS 5 (1873–2025) NM 5 (1929–2014) AR 5 (1898–2003) CT 5 (1969–2003) OR 4 (1904–1970) NH 4 (1826–2015) NC 4 (1887–2012) MN 4 (1893–2018) ND 3 (1910–2006) KY 2 (1978–2017) HI 2 (1953–1955) LA 2 (1964–1991) MD 2 (1967–2017) SC 2 (1908–1925) DE 2 (2020–2022) RI 2 (2012–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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