23 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown & Kerr v. American Stores Propertiesgreen2 sentences2000We note here that in a case subsequent to Bachmann, Brown & Kerr, 306 Ill.App.3d at 1030, 240 Ill.Dec. 117 , 715 N.E.2d at 810, we allowed the attorney to cure a defective signature on a notice of *610 rejection where there was no evidence of an intent to violate the spirit of the rule. 2000App. 3d at 1030 , 715 N.E.2d at 810 , we allowed the attorney to cure a defective signature on a notice of rejection where there was no evidence of an intent to violate the spirit of the rule. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Villarrealgreen1 sentence2023For this reason, “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). ¶ 37 Here, although defendant did not ask the trial court not to file a written order in Brown III, and thus the invited-error rule is not on all fours here, the spirit of the rule is implicated. | 1 | 1 |
Hyatt Corp. v. Sweetgreen1 sentence2021Hyatt Corp. v. Sweet, 230 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Amosgreen1 sentence1986See People v. Amos (1985), 140 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Village of Park Forest v. Fagangreen1 sentence1976(Village of Park Forest v. Fagan, 35 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Deckard v. Joinergreen2 sentences1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill. 1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Fultz v. Haugangreen2 sentences1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill. 1979But see Fultz v. Haugan (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 131 , 305 N.E.2d 873 (dicta).) The appellate court relied on the case of Deckard v. Joiner (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 412 , 255 N.E.2d 900 , where our supreme court held that to allow successive post-trial motions to stay the time for appeal would “violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, ° * ( 44 Ill. 2d 412, 418 , 255 N.E.2d 900, 903 .) The court in Czubak acknowledged that Deckard involved timely post-trial motions (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The PEOPLE v. Hogue
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Hogue, 1 Ill.App.3d 881 , 275 N.E.2d 193 .) From our review of the record, we believe the trial court did consider the nature of the offense as well as defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and that there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence here. 1976(People v. Hogue, 1 Ill.App.3d 881 , 275 N.E.2d 193 .) From our review of the record, we believe the trial court did consider the nature of the offense as well as defendant’s potential for rehabilitation and that there was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the sentence here. | 3 | 1975–1976 |
Department of Transportation Ex Rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp.
green
2 sentences2004It further held that the Owners had suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged defects in the pleadings and that to allow them to challenge the sufficiency of the petitions would violate “the spirit of the waiver rule.” 333 Ill. 2004It further held that the Owners had suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged defects in the pleadings and that to allow them to challenge the sufficiency of the petitions would violate “the spirit of the waiver rule.” 333 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Garth
neutral
2 sentences1976(People v. Garth, 31 Ill.App.3d 716 , 334 N.E.2d 359 .) For us to modify it,, the sentence must clearly depart from the spirit and requirement of the Illinois Constitution that the punishment imposed reflect both the nature of the offense and the possibilities of rehabilitation. 1976(People v. Garth, 31 Ill.App.3d 716 , 334 N.E.2d 359 .) For us to modify it,, the sentence must clearly depart from the spirit and requirement of the Illinois Constitution that the punishment imposed reflect both the nature of the offense and the possibilities of rehabilitation. | 2 | 1975–1976 |
People v. Harvey
green
1 sentence2023For this reason, “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001)). ¶ 37 Here, although defendant did not ask the trial court not to file a written order in Brown III, and thus the invited-error rule is not on all fours here, the spirit of the rule is implicated. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Hood
green
2 sentences2003The majority's argument that the doctor's testimony, the doctor's calculations, should have been disclosed "under the spirit of the rule" (Op. 279 Ill.Dec. at 177 , 799 N.E.2d at 980 ) is not persuasive. 2003The majority's argument that the doctor's testimony, the doctor's calculations, should have been disclosed "under the spirit of the rule" (Op. 279 Ill.Dec. at 177 , 799 N.E.2d at 980 ) is not persuasive. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Currie v. Lao
green
2 sentences1994(Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159 .) Our supreme court has recognized that such an analysis best reflects the spirit of the doctrine which, the court stressed, is not a "blanket” grant of immunity for all State employees. 1994Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Testin v. Dreyer Medical Clinic
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d at 889 , 605 N.E.2d at 1073 .) In agreeing with plaintiff that she did not waive the physician-patient privilege, the Testin court stated: “[although the waiver rule that plaintiffs claim exists in Ritter is not evident, we find that the spirit of that rule is implied. 1993The [Ritter] court implies that the physician-patient privilege does not apply when the medical entity wishes to communicate with the allegedly negligent physician through whom it may be vicariously liable; otherwise, the privilege applies.” (Testin, 238 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Abney
green
1 sentence1982Abney considered a similar report from a beating victim to police made within 1*2 hours to be “ ‘within the spirit ' # "of the “hot pursuit” exception.’ ” ( 81 Ill. 2d 159 , 169.) Clearly, the instant facts are encompassed within the spirit of this exception as well. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Underwood v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
1 sentence1978App. 2d 449, 451-52 , 268 N.E.2d 254 .) As stated in Deckard, at page 418: “To hold to the contrary would not only violate the spirit of our rule [Supreme Court Rule 303(a)], which contemplates the prompt and orderly prosecution of an appeal, but would render it a nullity. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Maybaum v. Maybaum
green
2 sentences1972Maybaum v. Maybaum (1952), 349 Ill.App. 80, 87 , 110 N.E.2d 78, 81 . 1972Maybaum v. Maybaum (1952), 349 Ill.App. 80, 87 , 110 N.E.2d 78, 81 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
People v. Cooke
neutral
2 sentences1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. 1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Harpole
green
1 sentence1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Dorweiler v. Gleim
neutral
1 sentence1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Turner
green
2 sentences1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. 1971(People v. Cooke (1969), 117 Ill.App.2d 296 , 254 N.E.2d 293 ; People v. Turner (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 24 , 262 N.E.2d 379 .) As aptly stated in People v. Harpole (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 28 , 289 N.E.2d 471 : “The purpose of modern day penology is the rehabfiitation of the offender. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Olds v. Cummings
green
1 sentence1930By the agreement Mrs. Zachas became the equitable owner of the premises in question, and while no deeds passed to give her a legal title to the same, equity will presume that to be done which should be done; and even if the rule in Olds v. Cummings, supra, could be applied to a case like the present one, she was the equitable owner of the property, and we think the evidence shows that the appellant, prior to the time that he purchased the notes, brought himself fairly within the spirit of that rule. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Gray v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1903Paul Railway Co. 189 Ill. 400 , where one of the conditions of the deed in question was that appellee should maintain a passenger depot at a certain place and stop thereat all its accommodation trains to take and leave passengers, it was contended by appellee that the condition, being perpetual, was illegal and void and that the appellee held the land free from such invalid condition, but this contention we refused to uphold; and we think that case decisive of the one at bar as to appellants’ objection that the condition violates the spirit of the rule of perpetuities. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.