spirit rule in Kansas

2026For example, in Frierson, the court explained that the spirit of the rule set forth in Hall was met when • "everyone involved at the time knew that sentencing had not yet been completed"; • "the judge explicitly held open jurisdiction"; • "the parties agreed on a 30–day extension"; and • "the order was signed by defense counsel and entered within the planned time frame." Frierson, 298 Kan. at 1021 .

1989The court concluded: “It is well established that a violation of an employer’s rule is not per se misconduct such as to disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. [Simmons v. Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 292 , 581 P.2d 336 (1978).] Rather, there must be a deliberate and intentional violation of the spirit of the rule by the claimant. [ 99 Idaho at 292 ; Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 902 , 556 P.2d 859 (1976).] In Wroble , this Court said ‘We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) . . . [was] to require that any v

1989The court concluded: “It is well established that a violation of an employer’s rule is not per se misconduct such as to disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. [Simmons v. Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 292 , 581 P.2d 336 (1978).] Rather, there must be a deliberate and intentional violation of the spirit of the rule by the claimant. [ 99 Idaho at 292 ; Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 902 , 556 P.2d 859 (1976).] In Wroble , this Court said ‘We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) . . . [was] to require that any v

1989The court concluded: “It is well established that a violation of an employer’s rule is not per se misconduct such as to disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. [Simmons v. Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 292 , 581 P.2d 336 (1978).] Rather, there must be a deliberate and intentional violation of the spirit of the rule by the claimant. [ 99 Idaho at 292 ; Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 902 , 556 P.2d 859 (1976).] In Wroble , this Court said ‘We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) . . . [was] to require that any v

1989The court concluded: “It is well established that a violation of an employer’s rule is not per se misconduct such as to disqualify a claimant from receiving unemployment benefits. [Simmons v. Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 292 , 581 P.2d 336 (1978).] Rather, there must be a deliberate and intentional violation of the spirit of the rule by the claimant. [ 99 Idaho at 292 ; Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 902 , 556 P.2d 859 (1976).] In Wroble , this Court said ‘We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) . . . [was] to require that any v

1984See Cansler v. Harrington, 231 Kan. 66, 68 , 643 P.2d 110 (1982); Westamerica Securities, Inc. v. Cornelius, 214 Kan. 301, 306 , 520 P.2d 1262 (1974).

1984See Cansler v. Harrington, 231 Kan. 66, 68 , 643 P.2d 110 (1982); Westamerica Securities, Inc. v. Cornelius, 214 Kan. 301, 306 , 520 P.2d 1262 (1974).

1981An excerpt from the Arkansas case of Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430 , approves the reasoning behind this position: “It has been demonstrated in some detail that the policy underlying the rule against perpetuities presents no obstacle to the creation of a nonparticipating royalty, for the device actually tends to promote rather than to inhibit the leasing of the minerals.

1981An excerpt from the Arkansas case of Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430 , approves the reasoning behind this position: *725 "It has been demonstrated in some detail that the policy underlying the rule against perpetuities presents no obstacle to the creation of a nonparticipating royalty, for the device actually tends to promote rather than to inhibit the leasing of the minerals.

1969This, we believe, brings the case within the spirit of the rule stated in Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P. 2d 23 : “Where an oral promise is made contemporaneously with the execution of a written contract, to the promisee’s knowledge directly at variance with the written contract, the oral promise is merged in the written contract, and the promisee cannot invoke the rule that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made without the intention of performance.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Broadly stated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements

1969This, we believe, brings the case within the spirit of the rule stated in Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P. 2d 23 : “Where an oral promise is made contemporaneously with the execution of a written contract, to the promisee’s knowledge directly at variance with the written contract, the oral promise is merged in the written contract, and the promisee cannot invoke the rule that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made without the intention of performance.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Broadly stated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements

1902(See Riddle & Parker v. Roll et al., 24 Ohio St. 572 ; The Rome Land, Company v. Eastman et al., 80 Ga. 683 , 6 S. E. 586 ; Bachelor v. Korb, 58 Neb. 122 , 78 N. W. 485 , 76 Am.

1902(See Riddle & Parker v. Roll et al., 24 Ohio St. 572 ; The Rome Land, Company v. Eastman et al., 80 Ga. 683 , 6 S. E. 586 ; Bachelor v. Korb, 58 Neb. 122 , 78 N. W. 485 , 76 Am.

1902(See Riddle & Parker v. Roll et al., 24 Ohio St. 572 ; The Rome Land, Company v. Eastman et al., 80 Ga. 683 , 6 S. E. 586 ; Bachelor v. Korb, 58 Neb. 122 , 78 N. W. 485 , 76 Am.

1902(See Riddle & Parker v. Roll et al., 24 Ohio St. 572 ; The Rome Land, Company v. Eastman et al., 80 Ga. 683 , 6 S. E. 586 ; Bachelor v. Korb, 58 Neb. 122 , 78 N. W. 485 , 76 Am.

1901The case falls clearly within the spirit of the principle which excludes the husband himself.” See, also, Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns.

1900In Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433 , this court held that a note otherwise negotiable was not rendered nonnegotiable by a stipulation to pay costs of collection, including reasonable attorney’s fees.