spirit rule in Missouri

1899The language of Porter, J., is very apropos this point, where he says: “In the spirit of that principle which presumes innocence until guilt be established, we infer that what is not charged in an indictment does not exist, and it is the business of the pleader to exclude, by proper averments, the conclusions to1 which the accused is thus entitled.” [Mears v. Com., 2 Grant (Pa.) 385 .] And just here it is proper to remark that although in certain circumstances pointed out in State v. Stowe, 132 Mo. 199 , and cases cited, it is permissible to allege that certain matters are unknown to the grand

1884On this point Porter, J., in Mears v. Commonwealth,, 2 Grant (Pa.) 385 , expresses his views very happily, saying: “In the spirit of that principle which presumes innocence until guilt be established, we infer that what is not charged in an indictment does not exist, and it is the-business of the pleader to exclude by proper averments,, the conclusions to which the accused is thus entitled.” In the Commonwealth v. Phillips, 16 Pick. 211 , Shaw, C.

2017In Sanders Co. Plumbing & Heating Inc. v. City of Indep. , the Western District found that "common sense" dictates that a contractor should not be penalized for doing exactly what he "was required to do under another's plans," explaining that a contractor should not be held responsible for the consequences of another's deficient plans. 694 S.W.2d 841 , 848 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985) (citing Spearin , 248 U.S. at 136-37 , 39 S.Ct. 59 ).

2017In Sanders Co. Plumbing & Heating Inc. v. City of Indep. , the Western District found that "common sense" dictates that a contractor should not be penalized for doing exactly what he "was required to do under another's plans," explaining that a contractor should not be held responsible for the consequences of another's deficient plans. 694 S.W.2d 841 , 848 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985) (citing Spearin , 248 U.S. at 136-37 , 39 S.Ct. 59 ).

1970The order and judgment in that opinion is reported in State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297 .

1914But this instruction says to the jury that even though testator was able to transact the business mentioned, all these acts went for naught in the scale of sanity, unless the jury went further and found that he “possessed a mind and memory sufficiently clear and unimpaired to take into con sideration all his property, and the persons who had a natural and reasonable claim on his bounty, if any, and the disposition he desired to make of his ■ property.” Both the letter and the spirit of this instruction are opposed to the well-settled rule of law in this State that a man may be mentally capable

1914But this instruction says to the jury that even though testator was able to transact the business mentioned, all these acts went for naught in the scale of sanity, unless the jury went further and found that he “possessed a mind and memory sufficiently clear and unimpaired to take into con sideration all his property, and the persons who had a natural and reasonable claim on his bounty, if any, and the disposition he desired to make of his ■ property.” Both the letter and the spirit of this instruction are opposed to the well-settled rule of law in this State that a man may be mentally capable

1910Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 724 , 103 S. W. 54 .] And this is highly just, for the spirit of the doctrine is that except for the carrier’s negligence someAvhere or some place, which contributed proximately to the injury, the accident Avould not have happened.

1910Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 724 , 103 S. W. 54 .] And this is highly just, for the spirit of the doctrine is that except for the carrier’s negligence someAvhere or some place, which contributed proximately to the injury, the accident Avould not have happened.

1899The language of Porter, J., is very apropos this point, where he says: “In the spirit of that principle which presumes innocence until guilt be established, we infer that what is not charged in an indictment does not exist, and it is the business of the pleader to exclude, by proper averments, the conclusions to1 which the accused is thus entitled.” [Mears v. Com., 2 Grant (Pa.) 385 .] And just here it is proper to remark that although in certain circumstances pointed out in State v. Stowe, 132 Mo. 199 , and cases cited, it is permissible to allege that certain matters are unknown to the grand

1899An omission from an indictment of what is a vitally essential element of the offense intended to be justified by such an excuse, can not be thus justified. [Com. v. Clancy, 7 Allen, 537 ; Wallace v. People, 27 Ill. 45 .] In Wallace’s case, the indictment expressly alleged “that the substance of the certificate (on which the indictment was grounded) wais known to the grand jurors.” And the indictment, was held fatally defective.

1886On this point, Porter, J., in Mears v. Commonwealth, 2 Grant [Pa.] 385, expresses his views very happily, saying: “In the spirit of that principle which presumes innocence until guilt be established, we infer that which is not charged in the indictment, does not exist, and it is the business of the pleader to exclude, by proper averments, the conclusions to which the accused is thus entitled.” See, also, State v. Hayward, 83 Mo. 299 , and cas. cit.