148 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1987–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re CHgreen2 sentences2009Id.; see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 , 27 (Tex. 2003). "[S]ome of the listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases, while other factors not listed may also be considered when appropriate." In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . 2009Id.; see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 , 27 (Tex. 2003). "[S]ome of the listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases, while other factors not listed may also be considered when appropriate." In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . | 17 | 35 |
Holley v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2014Several, but not all, of the listed factors correspond with those set out by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 2006Holley at 371-72 (internal citations omitted) (factors set out in list form); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . “[S]ome of the listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases, while other factors not listed may also be considered when appropriate.” In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.); see C.H. at 27. | 14 | 29 |
Leal v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Servicesgreen2 sentences2006See Leal v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Services, 25 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (noting that a finder of fact is not required to consider all of the listed factors). 2004See Leal v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Services, 25 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (noting that a finder of fact is not required to consider all of the listed factors). | 7 | 14 |
United States v. Arvizugreen2 sentences2024See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591 (“[W]aiver must be decided on a case-by-case basis” and “courts should look to the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (in Fourth Amendment context, court of appeals’ “evaluation and rejection . . . of the listed factors in isolation from each other [did] not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” and constituted a “divide-and-conquer analysis” precluded by Terry);13 see also City of Dallas v. Siaw-Afriyie, No. 05-19- 00244-CV, 2020 WL 5834335 , at *11 n.13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2020, no pet 2015See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“The court’s evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ as our cases have understood that phrase.”). | 6 | 6 |
In Re CLCgreen2 sentences2026See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors.”). 2026See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors.”). | 5 | 5 |
Garza v. Blantongreen2 sentences2023However, the listed factors in section 154.131 do not bind the trial court but are “merely intended to guide the trial court in determining the amount of retroactive child support.” In re J.H., 264 S.W.3d at 924 (citing Garza v. Blanton, 55 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 2001, no pet.)); see also In re Sanders, 159 S.W.3d 797 , 800–01 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (stating that compliance with guidelines is not mandatory when deciding amount of retroactive child support). 2015B.R., 327 S.W.3d at 212; Garza v. Blanton, 55 S.W.3d 708, 709 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). | 5 | 5 |
Meier Infiniti Co. v. Motor Vehicle Boardgreen2 sentences2004See Meier Infiniti Co. v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 918 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied). “[T]he logical force of the findings of underlying fact must be such that the reviewing court can fairly and reasonably say that the underlying findings support the statutorily required criteria.” Id. 2004See Meier Infiniti Co. v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 918 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, writ denied). “[T]he logical force of the findings of underlying fact must be such that the reviewing court can fairly and reasonably say that the underlying findings support the statutorily required criteria.” Id. | 5 | 5 |
In Re SAPgreen2 sentences2009Id.; see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 , 27 (Tex. 2003). "[S]ome of the listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases, while other factors not listed may also be considered when appropriate." In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . 2008Id.; see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 , 27 (Tex. 2003). "[S]ome of the listed factors may be inapplicable to some cases, while other factors not listed may also be considered when appropriate." In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 707 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.); see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . | 4 | 4 |
Perry Homes v. Cullgreen2 sentences2024See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591 (“[W]aiver must be decided on a case-by-case basis” and “courts should look to the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (in Fourth Amendment context, court of appeals’ “evaluation and rejection . . . of the listed factors in isolation from each other [did] not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” and constituted a “divide-and-conquer analysis” precluded by Terry);13 see also City of Dallas v. Siaw-Afriyie, No. 05-19- 00244-CV, 2020 WL 5834335 , at *11 n.13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2020, no pet 2014Most of the listed factors were gleaned by the Perry Homes court from federal cases; the court also stressed “the importance of keeping federal and state arbitration law consistent.” 258 S.W.3d at 591, 594 . . | 3 | 3 |
In Re General Electric Capital Corporationgreen2 sentences2009Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (examining conspicuousness); In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 (examining several of the listed factors); RDO Fin. 2009Capital Corp ., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (examining conspicuousness); In re Prudential , 148 S.W.3d at 134 (examining several of the listed factors); RDO Fin. | 3 | 3 |
In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2009Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (examining conspicuousness); In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 (examining several of the listed factors); RDO Fin. 2009Capital Corp ., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (examining conspicuousness); In re Prudential , 148 S.W.3d at 134 (examining several of the listed factors); RDO Fin. | 3 | 3 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Hall v. State, 86 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd). 2008Hall v. State, 86 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). | 3 | 3 |
Klare v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Indeed, the majority did not cite Arvizu at all, and the dissent noted that the majority’s piecemeal approach had been rejected by Arvizu. 76 S.W.3d at 78 (Brister, J., dissenting). 2007Indeed, the majority did not cite Arvizu at all, and the dissent noted that the majority's piecemeal approach had been rejected by Arvizu . 76 S.W.3d at 78 (Brister, J., dissenting). | 3 | 3 |
Evans v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 . 2014See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 ; Lopez, 267 S.W.3d at 92 . 6 Appellant’s physical appearance at the time he was stopped showed that he had glossy eyes, that a vein in his neck was “pulsating,” and that he appeared nervous. | 2 | 5 |
In the interest of C.H.green2 sentences2002See C.H., 2002 Tex. LEXIS 113, at *27-28 . 8 In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence to the contrary. 2002See C.H. , 2002 Tex. LEXIS 113, at *27-28 . | 2 | 2 |
In the Interest of Valadezgreen2 sentences2001Code Ann. § 154.131 (Vernon 1996); see Valadez, 980 S.W.2d at 913 . 2001Code Ann. § 154.131 (Vernon 1996); see Valadez, 980 S.W.2d at 913 . | 2 | 2 |
Matter of CL, Jr.green2 sentences2007J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; C.L., 874 S.W.2d at 886 . 2007J.L.C. , 160 S.W.3d at 313-14 ; C.L. , 874 S.W.2d at 886 . | 1 | 5 |
in the Interest Of: D.W.green2 sentences2023In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). 2015Id. | 1 | 2 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2010An affirmative link customarily emerges from an orchestration of several of the listed factors and the logical force they have in combination.” Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680 , 693 n.13 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (citations omitted). 8 • Serena had also accepted money and a car from her brother George, a convicted drug- dealer; • Serena’s brother George had previously been arrested with drugs at Serena’s old apartment; and • “John Williams was so intoxicated on cocaine at the time of the offense that it took three peace officers and a taser to subdue him; clearly his own sister would rec 2010An affirmative link customarily emerges from an orchestration of several of the listed factors and the logical force they have in combination." Allen v. State , 249 S.W.3d 680 , 693 n.13 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, no pet.) (citations omitted). 11. | 1 | 2 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2025The factors, however, are not exclusive and the absence of any of the listed factors “is not evidence of appellant’s innocence to be weighed against evidence tending to connect appellant to the [contraband].” Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Systems, L.L.C.green1 sentence2024See Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 591 (“[W]aiver must be decided on a case-by-case basis” and “courts should look to the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (in Fourth Amendment context, court of appeals’ “evaluation and rejection . . . of the listed factors in isolation from each other [did] not take into account the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” and constituted a “divide-and-conquer analysis” precluded by Terry);13 see also City of Dallas v. Siaw-Afriyie, No. 05-19- 00244-CV, 2020 WL 5834335 , at *11 n.13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 1, 2020, no pet | 1 | 1 |
| Trejo v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitworth v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marbury v. Madisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilligan v. Morgangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Societygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of E.C.R., Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re JJgreen | 1 | 1 |
| the Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Richard Lynn Scholergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re B.R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Turner, Albert Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pennzoil Company v. Arnold Oil Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re JFCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re CROgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re WCBgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re ACSgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| RDO Financial Services Co. v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re JLC
green
2 sentences2012J.L.C. , 160 S.W.3d at 313-14 . 2012J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d at 313-14 . | 6 | 2005–2012 |
Ingram v. Deere
green
2 sentences2016The statute “does not require proof of all of the listed factors in order for a partnership to exist.” Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 896 . 2013Statutory Factors The TRPA sets forth the following five factors indicating the creation of a partnership: (1) receipt or right to receive a share of profits of the business; (2) expression of intent to be partners in the business; (3) participation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) sharing or agreeing to share losses and liabilities of the business; and (5) contributing or agreeing to contribute money or property to the business.25 The TRPA ―does not require proof of all the listed factors in order for a partnership to exist.‖ Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 896 . | 4 | 2011–2016 |
In Re JH
green
2 sentences2024“Section 154.131(b) does not bind the trial court to the listed factors in determining retroactive child support but is merely intended to guide the trial court in determining the amount of retroactive child support.” Bunts v. Williams, No. 01-17-00643-CV, 2019 WL 2220109 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.H., 264 S.W.3d 919 , 924–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)). 2023However, the listed factors in section 154.131 do not bind the trial court but are “merely intended to guide the trial court in determining the amount of retroactive child support.” In re J.H., 264 S.W.3d at 924 (citing Garza v. Blanton, 55 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh 2001, no pet.)); see also In re Sanders, 159 S.W.3d 797 , 800–01 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (stating that compliance with guidelines is not mandatory when deciding amount of retroactive child support). | 3 | 2019–2024 |
Wilson v. State
green
2 sentences2008Wilson, 267 S.W.3d at 219 . 2008Wilson, 267 S.W.3d at 219 . | 3 | 2008–2008 |
Gurrola v. State
green
2 sentences2015The Fort Worth Court mainly relied on this Court’s opinion in Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. 2015The Fort Worth Court mainly relied on this Court’s opinion in Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
In Re TNF
green
2 sentences2014In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ; In re T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 632 . 2013In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ; In re T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d at 632 . | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services
green
2 sentences2004Phillips, 25 S.W.3d at 356 . 2004Phillips , 25 S.W.3d at 356 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Juarez v. State
green
2 sentences1994After an extensive discussion in Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), the court listed the factors used to determine whether a confession given following an illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of a confession at trial. 1994After an extensive discussion in Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), the court listed the factors used to determine whether a confession given following an illegal arrest is sufficiently attenuated to permit the use of a confession at trial. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
in the Interest of A.C., J.Y., J.Y. Jr., L.B., and E.B., Children
green
1 sentence2025CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624 , 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018); In re C.A.G., No. 01-11-01094-CV, 2012 WL 2922544 , at *6 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 29 Much of the evidence discussed below applies to multiple factors. 35 We note that the above listed factors are not exhaustive, and DFPS need not prove all factors as a condition precedent to the termination of parental rights. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Gilbert v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Baker v. Carr green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Villarreal Lopez v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Pace v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Smith v. AmSouth Bank, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Garcia v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Murff v. Murff green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Rogers v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Whitsey v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Keeton v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| D-----F v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Matter of R-----E-----W green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.