listed factors in California

1993(E.g., People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 691, 718 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 653 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) “[A]s is apparent from the statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are applicable or ‘relevant’ to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.) . . . .” (Miranda, supra, at p. 105 .) We therefore reject defendant’s separate arguments that his objection should have been sustained, and that the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to del

1993(E.g., People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 691, 718 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 653 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) “[A]s is apparent from the statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are applicable or ‘relevant’ to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.) . . . .” (Miranda, supra, at p. 105 .) We therefore reject defendant’s separate arguments that his objection should have been sustained, and that the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to del

1993(E.g., People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 691, 718 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 653 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) “[A]s is apparent from the statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are applicable or ‘relevant’ to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.) . . . .” (Miranda, supra, at p. 105 .) We therefore reject defendant’s separate arguments that his objection should have been sustained, and that the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to del

1993(E.g., People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 691, 718 ; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 653 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 798 P.2d 849 ]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) “[A]s is apparent from the statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are applicable or ‘relevant’ to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.) . . . .” (Miranda, supra, at p. 105 .) We therefore reject defendant’s separate arguments that his objection should have been sustained, and that the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to del

1988(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ].) We have reviewed the prosecutor’s closing statements and found a solitary fleeting statement suggesting that the absence of at least one, and possibly two, of the listed factors (former § 190.3, factors (d) [victim participant] and (e) [moral justification]) could be considered as aggravating.

1988(People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ].) We have reviewed the prosecutor’s closing statements and found a solitary fleeting statement suggesting that the absence of at least one, and possibly two, of the listed factors (former § 190.3, factors (d) [victim participant] and (e) [moral justification]) could be considered as aggravating.

1988The present instruction [CALJIC No. 8.84.1] is adequate for that purpose." ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 ; cf. People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) As Jackson explained, the provision at issue is not constitutionally infirm for failing to explain to the jury which of the listed factors are aggravating, and which are mitigating, for the nature of these various factors "should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case." ( Ibid. ) Similarly, we see no constitutional defect in placing on the

1988The present instruction [CALJIC No. 8.84.1] is adequate for that purpose.” (People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 ; cf. People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) As Jackson explained, the provision at issue is not constitutionally infirm for failing to explain to the jury which of the listed factors are aggravating, and which are mitigating, for the nature of these various factors “should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case.” (Ibid.) Similarly, we see no constitutional defect in placing on the sho

1991We have repeatedly rejected such claims, both as to the 1977 and 1978 death penalty laws. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 541 [ 268 Cal. Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 ] [1978 law]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1068 [ 251 Cal. Rptr. 757 , 761 P.2d 680 ] [same]; People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d 375, 444 [same]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [same]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-317 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ] [plur. opn.], 318-319 [conc. opn. of Newman, J.] [1977 law]; People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 176-180 [plur. opn.] [sam

1985(See People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 192 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733, 773 , fir. 37.) 6 We recognize that a textual argument can be made for the contrary result: that since nonviolent crimes are not an enumerated factor, the inclusion of a specific provision barring evidence of such crimes implies that absent a specific exclusion evidence is not limited to the listed factors. 7 Defendant did not object to the testimony of attempted escape at the time it was offered, but subsequently moved to strike that testimony and exclude it from the conside

1990Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct In Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 , we held that "the prosecution's case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of factor (k) [of section 190.3] — since that factor encompasses only extenuating circumstances and circumstances offered as a basis for a sentence less than death — while the defense may present evidence relevant to any listed factor including (k)." ( Id. at pp. 775-776; see People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 438 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 , 749 P.2d 279 ].) The prosecution may nonetheless, on rebuttal fol

1990Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct In Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 , we held that "the prosecution's case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of factor (k) [of section 190.3] — since that factor encompasses only extenuating circumstances and circumstances offered as a basis for a sentence less than death — while the defense may present evidence relevant to any listed factor including (k)." ( Id. at pp. 775-776; see People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 438 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 , 749 P.2d 279 ].) The prosecution may nonetheless, on rebuttal fol

1990Three years after the trial in this case, this court decided People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ], in which we held that under the 1978 death penalty law, “[t]he admission of prosecution evidence irrelevant to the enumerated factors [set forth in section 190.3] would be inconsistent with the provisions in the 1978 law which expressly bar evidence of nonviolent crimes except for felony convictions.” (Id. at p. 774.) We concluded in Boyd that, “[consequently the prosecution’s case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of

1990Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct In Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 , we held that "the prosecution's case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of factor (k) [of section 190.3] — since that factor encompasses only extenuating circumstances and circumstances offered as a basis for a sentence less than death — while the defense may present evidence relevant to any listed factor including (k)." ( Id. at pp. 775-776; see People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 438 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 , 749 P.2d 279 ].) The prosecution may nonetheless, on rebuttal fol

2026(People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.) (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1303-1304 [minor’s evidence that he was elsewhere at the time of the crimes was not relevant to the determination of his fitness for treatment under the juvenile court law].) Criminal Sophistication Pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(i), the juvenile court is to consider the minor’s criminal sophistication.

2025(People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 763 [discussing identical language in former rule 416(e)], disapproved on another ground in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 313, fn. 10 .) Johnson’s two-pronged argument rests on the notion that the trial court did not acknowledge or discuss (1) the status of his mental health at the time of the crime or (2) the positive impact of the treatment he had received while in jail.

2025(People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761, 763 [discussing identical language in former rule 416(e)], disapproved on another ground in K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 313, fn. 10 .) Johnson’s two-pronged argument rests on the notion that the trial court did not acknowledge or discuss (1) the status of his mental health at the time of the crime or (2) the positive impact of the treatment he had received while in jail.

2024In Bracey, the court defined a dismissal “ ‘in furtherance of justice’ ” as requiring “consideration of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society represented by the People.” (Bracey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541 ; see Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945 .) In Andrade, the court listed factors relevant to this consideration, including the weight of the evidence indicative of guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, whether the defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial and length of incarceration, the possibility of harassment, the likelihoo

2024In Bracey, the court defined a dismissal “ ‘in furtherance of justice’ ” as requiring “consideration of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests of society represented by the People.” (Bracey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541 ; see Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 945 .) In Andrade, the court listed factors relevant to this consideration, including the weight of the evidence indicative of guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, whether the defendant is or has been incarcerated awaiting trial and length of incarceration, the possibility of harassment, the likelihoo

2021We conclude that, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the amended judgment is void and must be reversed.3 A. Section 916 Deprived the Trial Court of Jurisdiction To Amend the Judgment Section 916 provides that, unless a listed exception applies, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” “[S]e

2021We conclude that, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the amended judgment is void and must be reversed.3 A. Section 916 Deprived the Trial Court of Jurisdiction To Amend the Judgment Section 916 provides that, unless a listed exception applies, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” “[S]e

2021We conclude that, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the amended judgment is void and must be reversed.3 A. Section 916 Deprived the Trial Court of Jurisdiction To Amend the Judgment Section 916 provides that, unless a listed exception applies, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” “[S]e

2021We conclude that, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the amended judgment is void and must be reversed.3 A. Section 916 Deprived the Trial Court of Jurisdiction To Amend the Judgment Section 916 provides that, unless a listed exception applies, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” “[S]e

2021We conclude that, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction, the amended judgment is void and must be reversed.3 A. Section 916 Deprived the Trial Court of Jurisdiction To Amend the Judgment Section 916 provides that, unless a listed exception applies, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” “[S]e

2021(In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526-527 (J.C.).) Even if we were to consider the listed factors from Kimberly F., we would not be persuaded to reach a contrary conclusion. 11 2019 order, she engaged in child abuse classes, was employed fulltime, and was gaining independence by filing for divorce from Father.