listed factors in Utah

2024As a result, the recent additions reinforce the discretionary nature of this decision. 20220765-CA 22 2024 UT App 159 Peterson v. State The things that Carrell is pointing to—the legal complexity of an ineffective assistance claim, the procedural hurdles posed by the PCRA, [and] the litigation advantages enjoyed by the State . . . —all exist in virtually every postconviction case.

2015Id. 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 84 Opinion of the Court ¶35 In the trial proceedings leading to the visitation order in this case, the parties and the court focused on these statutory fac- tors.11 The grandparents presented evidence under several of the factors, and the district court‘s findings were guided by them.

2013We reach that conclusion under the presumption of independent meaning (and/or its converse, the presumption against surplusage), which, as applied here, assigns significance to the qualifying phrase "by itself." See VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18 , 293 P.3d 290 (rejecting an argument because it ran "afoul of the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all statutory provisions"). 125 In context, that phrase implies that the listed factors are at least relevant (if not sufficient) to establishing a lack of indepen-denee.

2013We reach that conclusion under the presumption of independent meaning (and/or its converse, the presumption against surplusage), which, as applied here, assigns significance to the qualifying phrase "by itself." See VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18 , 293 P.3d 290 (rejecting an argument because it ran "afoul of the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all statutory provisions"). 125 In context, that phrase implies that the listed factors are at least relevant (if not sufficient) to establishing a lack of indepen-denee.

2009In reaching its conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed, the Ninth Circuit "categorized [seven of the ten] factors relied upon by the District Court as simply out of bounds in deciding whether there was `reasonable suspicion' for the stop." Id. ¶ 18 The United States Supreme Court, acting unanimously, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and stated, "The court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the `totality of the circumstances,' as our cases have understood that phrase." Id. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 .

2009In reaching its conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed, the Ninth Circuit "categorized [seven of the ten] factors relied upon by the District Court as simply out of bounds in deciding whether there was `reasonable suspicion' for the stop." Id. ¶ 18 The United States Supreme Court, acting unanimously, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and stated, "The court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the `totality of the circumstances,' as our cases have understood that phrase." Id. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 .

2009The Supreme Court further explained that the Ninth Circuit appeared to believe that each observation by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to "no weight." Terry[ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.

2009The Supreme Court further explained that the Ninth Circuit appeared to believe that each observation by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to "no weight." Terry[ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.

2008"In order to find that the accused was in possession of [the incriminating item] found in an *1016 automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference." Id. 1 23 In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct.App.1991), a case addressing whether a defendant had constructive possession of drugs found in a crack in the backseat cushion of an automobile, see id. at 1887-88, this court listed factors that "link[ed] or tend{ed] to link" a defendant to drugs, "includ[ing] incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminat

2008"In order to find that the accused was in possession of [the incriminating item] found in an *1016 automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference." Id. 1 23 In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct.App.1991), a case addressing whether a defendant had constructive possession of drugs found in a crack in the backseat cushion of an automobile, see id. at 1887-88, this court listed factors that "link[ed] or tend{ed] to link" a defendant to drugs, "includ[ing] incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminat