alcohol concentration test in Maryland

2024See Dove, 413 Md. at 95 , 991 A.2d 79–80 (“[Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2)] does not require probable cause when an officer requests an alcohol concentration test . . . .

2024See Dove, 413 Md. at 95 , 991 A.2d 79–80 (“[Transp. § 16-205.1(a)(2)] does not require probable cause when an officer requests an alcohol concentration test . . . .

2024As in Gonce, “‘unless the context requires otherwise’ . . . does not affect [the] conclusion that the word ‘test’ may be taken to mean both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test[.]” Id. at 125, 130 A.3d at 451 (emphasis added). 16 Requesting an alcohol test initially as part of a particular law enforcement entity’s procedure has no bearing on the language of Transp. § 16-205.1.

2024As in Gonce, “‘unless the context requires otherwise’ . . . does not affect [the] conclusion that the word ‘test’ may be taken to mean both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test[.]” Id. at 125, 130 A.3d at 451 (emphasis added). 16 Requesting an alcohol test initially as part of a particular law enforcement entity’s procedure has no bearing on the language of Transp. § 16-205.1.

2018Evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver In addressing the voluntariness of any consent to testing, this Court has stated, "a person detained for drunk driving must be capable of making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test." Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration , 332 Md. 201 , 218, 630 A.2d 753 , 762 (1993).

2018Evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver In addressing the voluntariness of any consent to testing, this Court has stated, "a person detained for drunk driving must be capable of making a knowing and voluntary decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test." Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration , 332 Md. 201 , 218, 630 A.2d 753 , 762 (1993).

2012The driver may, however, request an administrative hearing under TA Section 16-205.1(f), where he or she will have an opportunity “to show cause why his driver’s license or privilege should not be suspended for refusal to take an alcohol concentration test as requested.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 276 , 666 A.2d 511, 514 (1995).

2012The driver may, however, request an administrative hearing under TA Section 16-205.1(f), where he or she will have an opportunity “to show cause why his driver’s license or privilege should not be suspended for refusal to take an alcohol concentration test as requested.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Karwacki, 340 Md. 271, 276 , 666 A.2d 511, 514 (1995).

2002See Lowry v. State, 363 Md. 357 , 369 n. 18, 768 A.2d 688 (2001) (law "specifies circumstances where an individual is required to take an alcohol concentration test").

2002See Lowry v. State, 363 Md. 357 , 369 n. 18, 768 A.2d 688 (2001) (law "specifies circumstances where an individual is required to take an alcohol concentration test").

2010“A refusal of [an alcohol concentration test] ‘is complete at the moment it is communicated to the officer.’ ” Atterbeary, 368 Md. at 497 , 796 A.2d at 85 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 348 , 643 A.2d 442, 445 (1994)); see also Vermeersch, 331 Md. at 193 , 626 A.2d at 975 .

2010“A refusal of [an alcohol concentration test] ‘is complete at the moment it is communicated to the officer.’ ” Atterbeary, 368 Md. at 497 , 796 A.2d at 85 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 348 , 643 A.2d 442, 445 (1994)); see also Vermeersch, 331 Md. at 193 , 626 A.2d at 975 .

2016Cf. Hare, 326 Md. at 297-99 , 604 A.2d at 914-15 (At an administrative hearing, a driver testified that he probably would have consented to take an alcohol concentration test had he known that he would be ineligible for a modification of a suspension or a restrictive license if he refused to take an alcohol concentration test.).

2016Cf. Hare, 326 Md. at 297-99 , 604 A.2d at 914-15 (At an administrative hearing, a driver testified that he probably would have consented to take an alcohol concentration test had he known that he would be ineligible for a modification of a suspension or a restrictive license if he refused to take an alcohol concentration test.).

2016Nonetheless, “even when we believe that the language of [a] statute renders [the General Assembly’s] intent clear, [we may] examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 160 , 46 A.3d 443, 462 (2012) (citation omitted).

2016Nonetheless, “even when we believe that the language of [a] statute renders [the General Assembly’s] intent clear, [we may] examine the legislative history as a confirmatory process.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 160 , 46 A.3d 443, 462 (2012) (citation omitted).

2016This Court’s opinion in Hill, where we held that the Advice of Rights form did not mislead a driver that the disqualification of his CDL could be modified through participation in the ignition interlock program, is instructive. 415 Md. at 248, 999 A.2d at 1028 .

2016See Hill, 415 Md. at 236-37 , 999 A.2d at 1022 (“[The Advice of Rights form] was designed by the MVA to explain to persons detained under [TR §] 16-205.1 that they have the right to refuse an alcohol concentration test, as well as to explain the potential sanctions that could arise from either taking and ‘failing’ the test (i.e., showing a systemic alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater) or refusing to take the test at all”).

2016This Court summarized its holding as follows: “[The driver]’s due process rights were not violated during his traffic stop because the information [that was] conveyed to him in the [Advice of Rights] form was not misleading, and did not obstruct his ability to make an informed decision about whether to refuse an alcohol concentration test.” Id. at 248, 999 A.2d at 1028 . 13 As-Applied Challenges and Facial Challenges Here, as a preliminary matter, we observe that it is unclear from the proceedings before the ALJ whether Seenath raised an as-applied or a facial constitutional challenge to the A

2016Cf. Hill, 415 Md. at 242 , 999 A.2d at 1025 (A driver asserted that the Advice of Rights form prejudiced him because he would have consented to taking an alcohol concentration test in the hopes that his alcohol concentration was less than 0.08 had the Advice of Rights form stated that, if the driver refused to take an alcohol concentration test, the MVA would disqualify him from driving a commercial motor vehicle for 1 year, regardless of whether the driver participated in the Ignition Interlock System Program.).

2016Specifically, the question in this case is whether the Advice of Rights form is misleading as to a commercial driver’s license holder’s eligibility for a restrictive license where the commercial driver’s license holder drives a non-commercial motor vehicle and fails an alcohol concentration test. 15 See Hill, 415 Md. at 248 , 999 A.2d at 1028 (“[The driver’s due process rights were not violated during his traffic stop because the information conveyed to him in the [Advice of Rights] form was not misleading, and did not obstruct his ability to make an informed decision about whether to refuse a

2016Gonce’s interpretation is inconsistent with the rule that, “[w]henever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered ... nugatory.” Lark, 414 Md. at 224 , 994 A.2d at 973 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). *126 As a final matter, we dispose of Gonce’s contention that, assuming that we agree with the MVA (as we do), our interpretation of TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3) is unconstitution al — i.e., inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Search and Seizure) and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Right

2016Gonce’s interpretation is inconsistent with the rule that, “[w]henever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered ... nugatory.” Lark, 414 Md. at 224 , 994 A.2d at 973 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). *126 As a final matter, we dispose of Gonce’s contention that, assuming that we agree with the MVA (as we do), our interpretation of TR § 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3) is unconstitution al — i.e., inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Search and Seizure) and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Right

2010“A refusal of [an alcohol concentration test] ‘is complete at the moment it is communicated to the officer.’ ” Atterbeary, 368 Md. at 497 , 796 A.2d at 85 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 348 , 643 A.2d 442, 445 (1994)); see also Vermeersch, 331 Md. at 193 , 626 A.2d at 975 .

2010“A refusal of [an alcohol concentration test] ‘is complete at the moment it is communicated to the officer.’ ” Atterbeary, 368 Md. at 497 , 796 A.2d at 85 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 348 , 643 A.2d 442, 445 (1994)); see also Vermeersch, 331 Md. at 193 , 626 A.2d at 975 .

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010Because there are “no disputes of fact in the case at bar, our review is limited to determining ... if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 196 , 991 A.2d 1251, 1254 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). *240 The Statutory Framework Before we consider the substance of Hill’s claims, it is worthwhile to set forth clearly the sanctions under the Transportation Article applicable to a driver who either refuses to take or fails an alcohol concentration test.

2010Because there are “no disputes of fact in the case at bar, our review is limited to determining ... if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jaigobin, 413 Md. 191, 196 , 991 A.2d 1251, 1254 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). *240 The Statutory Framework Before we consider the substance of Hill’s claims, it is worthwhile to set forth clearly the sanctions under the Transportation Article applicable to a driver who either refuses to take or fails an alcohol concentration test.

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2010See, e.g., Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep’t of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 569 (Colo.1986) (due process requirements for advisement satisfied by publication of relevant statutes); Chancellor v. Dozier, 283 Ga. 259 , 658 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2008) (due process does not require advisement of all possible consequences of refusing test); Commonwealth v. Crowell, 403 Mass. 381 , 529 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (1988) (officer need not advise that suspension will result from failing test); Jones v. Dir. of Revenue, 237 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (officer did not have to advise driver that CDL suspension would

2008See Meanor v. State, 364 Md. 511, 531 , 774 A.2d 394, 405 (2001).

2008See Meanor v. State, 364 Md. 511, 531 , 774 A.2d 394, 405 (2001).