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13 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( 2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B.green1 sentence2015Like Idaho, many states have adopted some version of an implied consent statute that imposes penalties for refusal to submit to alcohol concentration testing at the reasonable request of an officer, but my research has revealed no other jurisdiction where, at least after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the fictitious implied consent was held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a blood draw. 1 The 1 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013); People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060, 1065-66 (Colo. 2014); Flonnor | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schaufelegreen1 sentence2015Like Idaho, many states have adopted some version of an implied consent statute that imposes penalties for refusal to submit to alcohol concentration testing at the reasonable request of an officer, but my research has revealed no other jurisdiction where, at least after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the fictitious implied consent was held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a blood draw. 1 The 1 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013); People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060, 1065-66 (Colo. 2014); Flonnor | 1 | 1 |
State v. Padleygreen2 sentences2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( 2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gaedegreen1 sentence2015Like Idaho, many states have adopted some version of an implied consent statute that imposes penalties for refusal to submit to alcohol concentration testing at the reasonable request of an officer, but my research has revealed no other jurisdiction where, at least after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the fictitious implied consent was held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a blood draw. 1 The 1 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013); People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060, 1065-66 (Colo. 2014); Flonnor | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edmondsongreen2 sentences2015Edmondson, 125 Idaho at 135 , 867 P.2d at 1009 (citation omitted). 2015Edmondson, 125 Idaho at 135 , 867 P.2d at 1009 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( 2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Declerckgreen2 sentences2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( 2015See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, —, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1566-67 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 712-14 (2013) (discussing statutory implied consent schemes that impose administrative penalties for refusal of an alcohol concentration test and that allow admission of a defendant’s refusal into evidence); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 917-18 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753 (1983) (holding that implied consent schemes that allow the State to admit a refusal to submit to testing into evidence do not violate the Fifth Amendment); State v. Declerck, 49 Kan.App.2d 908 , 317 P.3d 794, 803 (2014) ( | 1 | 1 |
Flonnory v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Like Idaho, many states have adopted some version of an implied consent statute that imposes penalties for refusal to submit to alcohol concentration testing at the reasonable request of an officer, but my research has revealed no other jurisdiction where, at least after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the fictitious implied consent was held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a blood draw. 1 The 1 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013); People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060, 1065-66 (Colo. 2014); Flonnor | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sutliffgreen2 sentences2013Although Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not impose a timeframe in which the alcohol concentration test must be taken, the Supreme Court has noted that any " 'lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results...."’ State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 , 106 P.3d 436, 439 (2005) (quoting State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). 4 . 2013Although Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not impose a timeframe in which the alcohol concentration test must be taken, the Supreme Court has noted that any " 'lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results...."’ State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 , 106 P.3d 436, 439 (2005) (quoting State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinettgreen2 sentences2013Although Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not impose a timeframe in which the alcohol concentration test must be taken, the Supreme Court has noted that any " 'lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results...."’ State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 , 106 P.3d 436, 439 (2005) (quoting State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). 4 . 2013Although Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not impose a timeframe in which the alcohol concentration test must be taken, the Supreme Court has noted that any " 'lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results...."’ State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 , 106 P.3d 436, 439 (2005) (quoting State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harmongreen2 sentences2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCormackgreen2 sentences2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nickersongreen2 sentences2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 2008See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1014 , 793 P.2d 682, 687 (1990) ("Although under I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level.”); Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410 , 973 P.2d at 762 (whether defendant's physical cooperation was coerced was superfluous, for defendant had no right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent); State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85 , 952 P.2d 402 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wooleryred2 sentences1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). 1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tategreen2 sentences1994See State v. Tate, 122 Idaho 366 , 834 P.2d 883 (Ct.App.1992). 1994See State v. Tate, 122 Idaho 366 , 834 P.2d 883 (Ct.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Mason v. State, Dept. of Law Enforcementgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Mason v. State, Dept. of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748 , 653 P.2d 803 (Ct.App.1982). 1993See, e.g., Mason v. State, Dept. of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748 , 653 P.2d 803 (Ct.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Beem
green
2 sentences2021Beem, 119 Idaho at 290 , 805 P.2d at 496 . 2021Beem, 119 Idaho at 290 , 805 P.2d at 496 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Matter of Smith
green
1 sentence2014Id. (citing State v. Clark, 425 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1988)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Clark
green
1 sentence2014Id. (citing State v. Clark, 425 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1988)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Schmoll
green
2 sentences2013Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804 , 172 P.3d at 559 (citing I.C. § 18-8004(2), (3)). 2013Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804 , 172 P.3d at 559 (citing I.C. § 18-8004(2), (3)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Carr
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 184-85 , 911 P.2d at 777-78 . 2010Id. at 184-85 , 911 P.2d at 777-78 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Alford
green
2 sentences2007Alford, 139 Idaho at 597 , 83 P.3d at 141 . 2007Alford, 139 Idaho at 597 , 83 P.3d at 141 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). 1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Curtis
green
2 sentences1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). 1999Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370 , 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 , 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App. 1984). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Knoll
green
2 sentences1994As we have previously noted, evidence of impairment is not probative for the purpose of challenging an alcohol concentration test “unless an adequate foundation [is] laid to show a correlation between the alleged blood-alcohol level and the likely manifestation of specific symptoms.” Knoll, 110 Idaho at 682 n. 3, 718 P.2d at 593 n. 3. 1994As we have previously noted, evidence of impairment is not probative for the purpose of challenging an alcohol concentration test “unless an adequate foundation [is] laid to show a correlation between the alleged blood-alcohol level and the likely manifestation of specific symptoms.” Knoll, 110 Idaho at 682 n. 3, 718 P.2d at 593 n. 3. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Andrus
green
2 sentences1992Andrus, 118 Idaho at 714 , 800 P.2d at 110 . 2 Applying Andrus , we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Tate’s proffered expert testimony about his BAC and any opinion based thereon. 1992Andrus, 118 Idaho at 714 , 800 P.2d at 110 . 2 Applying Andrus , we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Tate’s proffered expert testimony about his BAC and any opinion based thereon. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Matter of Griffiths
green
2 sentences1991The district court held that the magistrate had no discretion to suspend a driver’s license for less than 180 days, and, relying on In re Griffith’s License, 113 Idaho 364 , 744 P.2d 92 (1987), ruled that Beem’s refusal to take the alcohol concentration test could not serve as a basis for suspending his license because the officer did not first correctly advise Beem of his rights and duties under I.C. § 18-8002(3). 1991The district court held that the magistrate had no discretion to suspend a driver’s license for less than 180 days, and, relying on In re Griffith’s License, 113 Idaho 364 , 744 P.2d 92 (1987), ruled that Beem’s refusal to take the alcohol concentration test could not serve as a basis for suspending his license because the officer did not first correctly advise Beem of his rights and duties under I.C. § 18-8002(3). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.