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17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Diedegreen1 sentence2015Id. “[A] driver’s decision to agree to take a test is not coerced simply because Minnesota has attached the penalty of making it a crime to refuse the test.” Id. at 570. “[T]he ‘clearly erroneous’ standard controls [appellate] review of a district court’s finding of voluntary consent.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011). 6 The district court found that Krech’s “consent to provide the alcohol concentration test, as requested by the officer, was voluntary and not the product of improper duress or coercion.” The district court noted that the “only evidence” that Krech was coerced is | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shrinerred2 sentences2015The parties acknowledged that when Stavish’s blood was drawn, our decision in State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 548-50 (Minn.2008), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), permitted a warrantless, non-consensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had commit-, ted criminal vehicular homicide or operation. 2015See Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 549-50 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Loeffelgreen1 sentence2015Id.; see also State v. Loeffel, 749 N.W.2d 115, 116-17 (Minn. App. 2008) (holding that a DWI charge may be enhanced based on a Wisconsin revocation of a driver’s license, even if the defendant was not given the opportunity to consult with an attorney before he submitted to an alcohol-concentration test), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hicksgreen2 sentences2015State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn.2009) (holding that “an order that dismisses DWI charges, even when other charges remain, will have a critical impact on the prosecution’s case”); State v. Hicks, 301 Minn. 350, 353 , 222 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1974) (holding that a pretrial order suppressing the results of an alcohol concentration test was appealable by the State because the order prevented successful prosecution for the charged offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater, even though other charges were not affected). 2015State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn.2009) (holding that “an order that dismisses DWI charges, even when other charges remain, will have a critical impact on the prosecution’s case”); State v. Hicks, 301 Minn. 350, 353 , 222 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1974) (holding that a pretrial order suppressing the results of an alcohol concentration test was appealable by the State because the order prevented successful prosecution for the charged offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater, even though other charges were not affected). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Underdahlgreen2 sentences2015State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn. 2009) (holding that “an order that dismisses DWI charges, even when other charges remain, will have a critical impact on the prosecution’s case”); State v. Hicks, 301 Minn. 350, 353 , 222 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1974) (holding that a pretrial order suppressing the results of an alcohol concentration test was appealable by the State because the order prevented successful prosecution for the charged offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater, even though other charges were not affected). 2015State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn.2009) (holding that “an order that dismisses DWI charges, even when other charges remain, will have a critical impact on the prosecution’s case”); State v. Hicks, 301 Minn. 350, 353 , 222 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1974) (holding that a pretrial order suppressing the results of an alcohol concentration test was appealable by the State because the order prevented successful prosecution for the charged offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater, even though other charges were not affected). | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. Derek Lawrence Stavishgreen2 sentences2015State v. Stavish, 852 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn. App. 2014). 2015State v. Stavish, 852 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Minn.App.2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hardimongreen1 sentence2007Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn.App.2000); see also State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.1981) (noting that intent generally must be inferred “from [a person’s] words (if any) and actions in the light of all the surrounding circumstances”). 5 The *221 crime of test refusal punishes the decision a defendant makes freely after being warned of its consequences. | 1 | 1 |
Busch v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2007Safety, 614 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn.App.2000); see also State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.1981) (noting that intent generally must be inferred “from [a person’s] words (if any) and actions in the light of all the surrounding circumstances”). 5 The *221 crime of test refusal punishes the decision a defendant makes freely after being warned of its consequences. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 59 , 109 S.Ct. 333 . 2002See id. at 59 , 109 S.Ct. 333 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Palmergreen2 sentences2002In State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 305-07 , 191 N.W.2d 188, 190-91 (1971), a divided Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that a driver has a right under the Sixth Amendment and the corresponding provision of the Minnesota Constitution to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to provide a breath sample. 2002In State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 305-07 , 191 N.W.2d 188, 190-91 (1971), a divided Minnesota Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that a driver has a right under the Sixth Amendment and the corresponding provision of the Minnesota Constitution to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to provide a breath sample. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dillegreen1 sentence2000As the proponent of the alcohol concentration test, the state has the initial burden to “establish that the test itself is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Gabrick v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence1987Gabrick v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 393 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Shrinerred2 sentences2015The parties acknowledged that when Stavish’s blood was drawn, our decision in State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 548-50 (Minn.2008), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), permitted a warrantless, non-consensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had commit-, ted criminal vehicular homicide or operation. 2015See Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 549-50 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1799 , 188 L.Ed.2d 759 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. | 4 | 2014–2015 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2015The parties acknowledged that when Stavish’s blood was drawn, our decision in State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 548-50 (Minn.2008), abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), permitted a warrantless, non-consensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had commit-, ted criminal vehicular homicide or operation. 2014The district court considered Anastasi’s arguments that “the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), rendered Minnesota’s ‘Implied Consent Law’ unconstitutional, the alcohol concentration test was obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, the test should be suppressed, and the revocation should be rescinded.” The district court ultimately determined that “no unconstitutional condition is imposed by Minnesota’s 2 ‘Implied Consent Law’”; Anastasi’s “request to have Minnesota’s ‘Implied Consent Law’ declared unconstitutional [on substantive-due-proces | 2 | 2014–2015 |
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences1998South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564-66 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 923-24 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983); Davis v. Commissioner of Pub. 1998South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564-66 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 923-24 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983); Davis v. Commissioner of Pub. | 2 | 1994–1998 |
State v. Geyer
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Schulz v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2015“When determining whether an officer has prevented or denied an additional test, we draw a distinction between an officer’s failing to assist and an officer’s hampering an attempt to obtain such an additional test.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cabantac v. Holder
green
1 sentence2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1799 , 188 L.Ed.2d 759 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bodana v. Cagle
green
2 sentences2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 2015The district court, relying upon State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.2013), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1799 , 188 L.Ed.2d 759 (2014), filed a second pretrial order in May 2014 that granted Stavish’s motion to reconsider and suppressed the alcohol concentration test results on the ground that this court declined to resolve Brooks on the basis of a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Shifflet
green
2 sentences2010In Shifflet , the driver, who was arrested and jailed for driving under the influence of alcohol, was prevented from obtaining an independent alcohol-concentration test when officers refused to permit the driver to provide a urine sample to a third party. 556 N.W.2d at 225 . 2010Id. at 226 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Rivera
green
2 sentences2002In State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507 , 733 P.2d 1090 (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court considered an argument essentially identical to the one Krosch makes here. 2002In State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507 , 733 P.2d 1090 (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court considered an argument essentially identical to the one Krosch makes here. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1994Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 1994Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Snyder v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence1994Snyder, 496 N.W.2d at 860 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Olson
green
1 sentence1993Olson, 342 N.W.2d at 640-41 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.