Neil inquiry in Florida

2015See id. at 212 (citing Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 ); Johans, 613 So.2d at 1322 (“Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (applying “proper remedy” of reversing and remanding for new trial where trial court failed to direct State to provide gender-neutral reason for striking male juror following defense’s timely objection); Marshall v. State, 640 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047,1050-51

2015See id. at 212 (citing Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 ); Johans, 613 So.2d at 1322 (“Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (applying “proper remedy” of reversing and remanding for new trial where trial court failed to direct State to provide gender-neutral reason for striking male juror following defense’s timely objection); Marshall v. State, 640 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047,1050-51

2026See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the defendant had waived his Neil 1 objection when he accepted the jury immediately prior to it being sworn without reserving his earlier objection); Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 318-19 (Fla. 2007) (“Although Joiner involved a Neil objection, district courts have applied it to jury selection issues in general, 1 State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984). including denial of cause challenges.”); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1204 (Fla. 2005) (“By not renewing the objection prior to the jury being sworn, it is pres

2023See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the defendant had waived his Neil4 objection when he accepted the jury immediately prior to its being sworn without reserving his earlier objection, leading "to the reasonable assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, his earlier objection"); see also Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 318–19, 319 n.3 ("Although Joiner involved a Neil objection, district courts have applied it to jury selection issues in general, including denial of cause challenges."); Johnson v. State, 763 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (agreeing wi

2026See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the defendant had waived his Neil 1 objection when he accepted the jury immediately prior to it being sworn without reserving his earlier objection); Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 318-19 (Fla. 2007) (“Although Joiner involved a Neil objection, district courts have applied it to jury selection issues in general, 1 State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984). including denial of cause challenges.”); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1204 (Fla. 2005) (“By not renewing the objection prior to the jury being sworn, it is pres

2007Carratelli I, 832 So.2d at 863 . [2] State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481, 486 (Fla.1984), prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race. [3] Although Joiner involved a Neil objection, district courts have applied it to jury selection issues in general, including denial of cause challenges.

2011Further, this Court stressed that “we have encouraged trial judges to err on the side of holding a Neil inquiry.” Id. (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988)).

2011Further, this Court stressed that “we have encouraged trial judges to err on the side of holding a Neil inquiry.” Id. (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988)).

1999Compare Suggs v. State, 620 So.2d 1231 (Fla.1993) (issue preserved where defense counsel found jurors acceptable other than his prior Neil objection to the striking of one juror); Mitchell v. State, 620 So.2d 1008 (Fla.1993) (issue preserved where defense counsel found jury acceptable subject to Neil objection that he had made).

1998Id. at 176 ; see also Mitchell v. State, 620 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Fla.1993) ("We held in Joiner ... that in order to preserve a Neil issue for review, it is necessary to call to the court's attention before the jury is sworn, by renewed motion or by accepting the jury subject to the earlier objection, the desire to preserve the issue.").

2015See id. at 212 (citing Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 ); Johans, 613 So.2d at 1322 (“Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (applying “proper remedy” of reversing and remanding for new trial where trial court failed to direct State to provide gender-neutral reason for striking male juror following defense’s timely objection); Marshall v. State, 640 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047,1050-51

2015See id. at 212 (citing Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 ); Johans, 613 So.2d at 1322 (“Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Sabine v. State, 58 So.3d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (applying “proper remedy” of reversing and remanding for new trial where trial court failed to direct State to provide gender-neutral reason for striking male juror following defense’s timely objection); Marshall v. State, 640 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 1047,1050-51

2009See Murray v. Haley, 833 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (rejecting appellees’ argument that appellant failed to satisfy step one because counsel never requested the trial court to make a Neil inquiry and, therefore, did not mandate further inquiry by the trial court and holding that “[although appellants never *355 actually requested that the trial court ask appellees to articulate a gender-neutral reason for their challenges, it is apparent that the trial court understood the nature of the objections.

2009See Murray v. Haley, 833 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (rejecting appellees’ argument that appellant failed to satisfy step one because counsel never requested the trial court to make a Neil inquiry and, therefore, did not mandate further inquiry by the trial court and holding that “[although appellants never *355 actually requested that the trial court ask appellees to articulate a gender-neutral reason for their challenges, it is apparent that the trial court understood the nature of the objections.

1994See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (once the objecting party establishes a prima facie showing that the challenging party has utilized peremptories in a racial discriminatory manner, the trial court must make the latter articulate reasons for the strikes), cert. den., 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991) (trial court should have conducted “Neil inquiry” where state exercised peremptory challenge of only black venireperson); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), we held that, once the Neil test is met, the burden is on the state to rebut the inference of discrimination by a clear and reasonably specific racially neutral explanation of legitimate reasons for the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges.

1994See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (once the objecting party establishes a prima facie showing that the challenging party has utilized peremptories in a racial discriminatory manner, the trial court must make the latter articulate reasons for the strikes), cert. den., 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991) (trial court should have conducted “Neil inquiry” where state exercised peremptory challenge of only black venireperson); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), we held that, once the Neil test is met, the burden is on the state to rebut the inference of discrimination by a clear and reasonably specific racially neutral explanation of legitimate reasons for the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges.

1994See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (once the objecting party establishes a prima facie showing that the challenging party has utilized peremptories in a racial discriminatory manner, the trial court must make the latter articulate reasons for the strikes), cert. den., 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991) (trial court should have conducted “Neil inquiry” where state exercised peremptory challenge of only black venireperson); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).

1991In State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), we held that, once the Neil test is met, the burden is on the state to rebut the inference of discrimination by a clear and reasonably specific racially neutral explanation of legitimate reasons for the state's exercise of its peremptory challenges.

2009It would elevate form over substance to conclude that, even though the trial court understood the nature of the objections, those objections were insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review”); Alsopp, 855 So.2d at 697 (holding that “where it is clear that the challenged juror is a member of a racial or ethnic group and the court is aware of the fact, a general objection is sufficient to trigger an inquiry”); Foxx v. State, 680 So.2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (finding the State’s comment that “we would ask for a Neil inquiry” sufficient where it was clear from the record that th

2009It would elevate form over substance to conclude that, even though the trial court understood the nature of the objections, those objections were insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review”); Alsopp, 855 So.2d at 697 (holding that “where it is clear that the challenged juror is a member of a racial or ethnic group and the court is aware of the fact, a general objection is sufficient to trigger an inquiry”); Foxx v. State, 680 So.2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (finding the State’s comment that “we would ask for a Neil inquiry” sufficient where it was clear from the record that th

1996Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla.1993) (The State’s explanation that “I would like to constitute the jury with some people down the line I prefer more....” was an inadequate reason for exercising a peremptory challenge and did not satisfy a Neil inquiry.); Kibler v. State, 546 So.2d 710, 714 (Fla.1989) (The prosecutor’s reason that he preferred other jurors was insufficient to rebut the defendant’s assertion that the exercise of the peremptory challenge was racially motivated.); Suggs v. State, 624 So.2d 833, 836 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (A “bad feeling” about a prospective juror is not suf

1996Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 175 (Fla.1993) (The State’s explanation that “I would like to constitute the jury with some people down the line I prefer more....” was an inadequate reason for exercising a peremptory challenge and did not satisfy a Neil inquiry.); Kibler v. State, 546 So.2d 710, 714 (Fla.1989) (The prosecutor’s reason that he preferred other jurors was insufficient to rebut the defendant’s assertion that the exercise of the peremptory challenge was racially motivated.); Suggs v. State, 624 So.2d 833, 836 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (A “bad feeling” about a prospective juror is not suf

2002Id. at 1229-30; see also State v. Fox, 587 So.2d 464 (Fla.1991).

1992The failure of a party to object specifically to the lack of questioning of a juror should waive the Neil objection to that peremptory challenge. *713 See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2912 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1991), and State v. Fox, 587 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1991).

1989The court further held that waiting to conduct the hearing on the defendant's objections until well after the trial concluded was untimely, emphasizing, "When a Neil objection is properly raised, as it was in this instance, the time for the hearing has come"; the "requirements established by Slappy cannot possibly be met unless the hearing is conducted during the voir dire process" because "only at this time does the court have the ability to observe and place on the record relevant matters about juror responses or behavior that may be pertinent to a Neil inquiry." Ibid.

1989The court further held that waiting to conduct the hearing on the defendant's objections until well after the trial concluded was untimely, emphasizing, "When a Neil objection is properly raised, as it was in this instance, the time for the hearing has come"; the "requirements established by Slappy cannot possibly be met unless the hearing is conducted during the voir dire process" because "only at this time does the court have the ability to observe and place on the record relevant matters about juror responses or behavior that may be pertinent to a Neil inquiry." Ibid.

2008Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987, 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing because trial court failed to conduct a Neil inquiry and require the striking party to offer a race-neutral reason for the strike); Stephens v. State, 884 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (same); Alsopp v. State, 855 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (same); Murray v. Haley, 833 So.2d 877, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing because trial court failed to conduct a Neil inquiry and require the striking party to offer a gender-neutral reason for the strike); Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Inc. v. de Kalafe, 723 So.2d 838, 841-

2008Pickett v. State, 922 So.2d 987, 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing because trial court failed to conduct a Neil inquiry and require the striking party to offer a race-neutral reason for the strike); Stephens v. State, 884 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (same); Alsopp v. State, 855 So.2d 695, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (same); Murray v. Haley, 833 So.2d 877, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (reversing because trial court failed to conduct a Neil inquiry and require the striking party to offer a gender-neutral reason for the strike); Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Inc. v. de Kalafe, 723 So.2d 838, 841-

1994See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (once the objecting party establishes a prima facie showing that the challenging party has utilized peremptories in a racial discriminatory manner, the trial court must make the latter articulate reasons for the strikes), cert. den., 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991) (trial court should have conducted “Neil inquiry” where state exercised peremptory challenge of only black venireperson); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).

1993The district court noted conflict based upon this Court's approval in Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 1991), of Parrish v. State, 540 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1989) and Pearson v. State, 514 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), review dismissed, 525 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1988).

1997See Johans, 613 So.2d at 1321 ( Neil inquiry required when objection raised that peremptory challenge is being used" in a racially discriminatory manner"); Portu, 651 So.2d at 791 . 650 So.2d at 1023 (footnotes omitted).

1995This result is required both because (a) the prosecutor’s simple declaration that the “state is requesting a neutral reason” after the strike was attempted was, without more, 1 insufficient to trigger a Neil inquiry, see Windom v. State, 656 So.2d 432 (Fla.1995), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 571 , — L.Ed.2d — (U.S. Case no. 95-6232, Dec. 4, 1995); State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993); Portu v. State, 651 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 658 So.2d 992 (Fla.1995); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995); compare Cruz

2011The Court further noted that “there was never any contention made to the trial court that prospective juror Diaz was not a member of a cognizable minority or that there should not be a Neil inquiry.” Id. (footnote omitted).

2011The Court further noted that “there was never any contention made to the trial court that prospective juror Diaz was not a member of a cognizable minority or that there should not be a Neil inquiry.” Id. (footnote omitted).

2007See also Whitby v. State, 933 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(recognizing that a Neil inquiry is required when counsel simply objects to a peremptory challenge, identifies that the juror is a member of a distinct racial or ethnic group, and requests an inquiry).

2007See also Whitby v. State, 933 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(recognizing that a Neil inquiry is required when counsel simply objects to a peremptory challenge, identifies that the juror is a member of a distinct racial or ethnic group, and requests an inquiry).

2006We followed this statement in Johans by requiring a Neil inquiry when an objection is raised that a peremptory challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory manner. *561 Windom, 656 So.2d at 437 (emphasis added).

2006We followed this statement in Johans by requiring a Neil inquiry when an objection is raised that a peremptory challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory manner. *561 Windom, 656 So.2d at 437 (emphasis added).

2003The record in this case adequately establishes that Campos is Hispanic, a cognizable ethnic group for the purposes of a Neil inquiry. [2] See State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993) (extending Neil to protect potential Hispanic jurors from exclusion on the basis of ethnicity).

1997That issue may have constituted reversible error under State v. Alen, 616 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993) (recognizing Hispanics as cognizable class for purposes of Neil [1] inquiry), and State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993) (requiring Neil inquiry when objection that peremptory challenge is used in racially discriminatory manner is raised), were it not waived by defense counsel's failure to object to the jury that was selected, Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174, 176 (Fla.1993).

1995This result is required both because (a) the prosecutor’s simple declaration that the “state is requesting a neutral reason” after the strike was attempted was, without more, 1 insufficient to trigger a Neil inquiry, see Windom v. State, 656 So.2d 432 (Fla.1995), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 571 , — L.Ed.2d — (U.S. Case no. 95-6232, Dec. 4, 1995); State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993); Portu v. State, 651 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 658 So.2d 992 (Fla.1995); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995); compare Cruz

1995This result is required both because (a) the prosecutor’s simple declaration that the “state is requesting a neutral reason” after the strike was attempted was, without more, 1 insufficient to trigger a Neil inquiry, see Windom v. State, 656 So.2d 432 (Fla.1995), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 571 , — L.Ed.2d — (U.S. Case no. 95-6232, Dec. 4, 1995); State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993); Portu v. State, 651 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 658 So.2d 992 (Fla.1995); Betancourt v. State, 650 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla.1995); compare Cruz

2026See Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the defendant had waived his Neil 1 objection when he accepted the jury immediately prior to it being sworn without reserving his earlier objection); Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 318-19 (Fla. 2007) (“Although Joiner involved a Neil objection, district courts have applied it to jury selection issues in general, 1 State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984). including denial of cause challenges.”); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1204 (Fla. 2005) (“By not renewing the objection prior to the jury being sworn, it is pres

2007Id. at 176 ; see also Zack v. State, 911 So.2d at 1204 (reaffirming Joiner and holding that a Neil issue "is not preserved for *319 appellate review if the party objecting to the challenge fails to renew the objection before the jury is sworn"). [3] In other words, renewing an objection before the jury is sworn gives the trial court one last chance to correct a potential error and avoid a possible reversal on appeal.

1996NOTES [1] See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), clarified by, State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1986), receded from in part, State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993). [2] The necessity, if any, for the prosecutor to have given the judge a sufficient basis to conduct a Neil inquiry was waived by virtue of the fact that the defense attorney, as soon as he was asked by the judge, immediately proffered reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge against Martin.

1996NOTES [1] See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), clarified by, State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1986), receded from in part, State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1993). [2] The necessity, if any, for the prosecutor to have given the judge a sufficient basis to conduct a Neil inquiry was waived by virtue of the fact that the defense attorney, as soon as he was asked by the judge, immediately proffered reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge against Martin.

1992We reconfirm our original holding that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding that Banks’ reasons for excluding Zachery were improper, as the basis for the challenge could not have been anything other than race. 592 So.2d at 264, 267 ; Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.), cert. den., 498 U.S. 882 , 111 S.Ct. 230 , 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990); Slappy; Files, 586 So.2d at 354-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (applying “abuse of discretion” standard in reviewing Neil inquiry).

1992In Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 230 , 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990), the action of the trial court assigned as error was the denial of a motion for mistrial following a Neil inquiry.

2008The Court in Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542, 544-45 (Fla. 1994), reiterated that: The fact that several women were seated as jurors is of no moment, for as we have previously said "number alone is not dis-positive, nor even the fact that a member of the minority in question has been seated as a juror or alternate.” State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 , 108 S.Ct. 2873 , 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988); see also Johans, 613 So.2d at 1321 ("A [gender-neutral] justification for a peremptory challenge cannot be inferred merely from circumstances such as the composition of

2007NOTES [1] Under Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1994), men are cognizable members of a gender class for the purposes of a Neil inquiry.