Neil test in Ohio

2009"Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself." Manson , 432 U.S. at 114 . {¶ 158} The Neil factors strongly support a conclusion that the photo identification was unreliable.

2009"Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself." Manson , 432 U.S. at 114 . {¶ 158} The Neil factors strongly support a conclusion that the photo identification was unreliable.

2008On balance, we find no ‘very substantial’ likelihood of misidentification.” Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d at 440 , 588 N.E.2d 819 . {¶ 27} Here, even if the voice recording was unnecessarily suggestive, it was not so suggestive as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

2008On balance, we find no ‘very substantial’ likelihood of misidentification.” Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d at 440 , 588 N.E.2d 819 . {¶ 27} Here, even if the voice recording was unnecessarily suggestive, it was not so suggestive as to create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

2005Therefore, we will discuss each standard separately. {¶ 25} In State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the role of an appellate court when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence argument: An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2005Therefore, we will discuss each standard separately. {¶ 25} In State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the role of an appellate court when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence argument: An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2005Because Collins testified he only saw one person at the time of the shooting, there was no way Collins could identify two people even if Detective Rankin had told him to identify only one person. {¶ 22} Accordingly, Collins' identification clearly meets the Neil standard because the identification was neither suggestive nor unreliable, and defendant's first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 23} By his second assignment of error, defendant contends his convictions for kidnapping and attempted murder were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidenc

2005Because Collins testified he only saw one person at the time of the shooting, there was no way Collins could identify two people even if Detective Rankin had told him to identify only one person. {¶ 22} Accordingly, Collins' identification clearly meets the Neil standard because the identification was neither suggestive nor unreliable, and defendant's first assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 23} By his second assignment of error, defendant contends his convictions for kidnapping and attempted murder were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidenc

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

2004In this case, Kahn viewed appellant's face for approximately 30 seconds when appellant pointed a gun toward her head; the area where the robbery occurred was sufficiently lit so that Kahn had a very good look at appellant; only a short period of time elapsed, approximately 10 to 15 minutes, between the robbery and Kahn's initial confrontation with appellant; and a relatively short period of time elapsed after the robbery, approximately 30 to 45 minutes, whereupon Kahn positively and with certainty identified appellant as the person who held a gun toward her head and robbed her. {¶ 47} Furtherm

1992The question is whether, under all the circumstances, the identification was reliable, i.e., whether suggestive procedures created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 , quoted in Neil, 409 U.S. at 198 , 93 S.Ct. at 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 410 .

1992The question is whether, under all the circumstances, the identification was reliable, i.e., whether suggestive procedures created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 , quoted in Neil, 409 U.S. at 198 , 93 S.Ct. at 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 410 .

1992The question is whether, under all the circumstances, the identification was reliable, i.e., whether suggestive procedures created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 , quoted in Neil, 409 U.S. at 198 , 93 S.Ct. at 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 410 .

1992The question is whether, under all the circumstances, the identification was reliable, i.e., whether suggestive procedures created “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 , quoted in Neil, 409 U.S. at 198 , 93 S.Ct. at 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 410 .