cloak immunity in New York

2000The Court noted: “Generally, the circumstances of each case will determine whether a communication by a client to an attorney should be afforded the cloak of privilege (Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 222 )” (Stroh v General Motors Corp., supra, at 268).

1995Generally, the circumstances of each case will determine whether a communication by a client to an attorney should be afforded the cloak of privilege (Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 222 ).

1997Therefore, the Court of Appeals announced the existence of "separate and independent * * * voter standing to sue on financing schemes subject to voter referendum approval” (id., at 347 [citations omitted]) and directed that, to the extent they have been read as a total ban on standing in such cases, Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y. (supra), New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v Coughlin (supra) and State Finance Law § 123-b should not be followed (see, Matter of Schulz v State of New York, supra, at 347).

1993Extension of the "taxpayer" standing limitations, to the extent urged by the State here (see , State Finance Law § 123-b; New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v Coughlin , 64 N.Y.2d 660 , supra ; Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y. , 46 N.Y.2d 394 , supra) , logically and practically confers on the Legislature and Executive the power never again to submit their long-term debt financing schemes to the voters.

1997It is well-settled law that one who is granted immunity in return for his testimony receives no license to swear falsely with impunity under the protection of that immunity (United States v Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 ; People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747).

1997It is well-settled law that one who is granted immunity in return for his testimony receives no license to swear falsely with impunity under the protection of that immunity (United States v Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 ; People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747).

1993Indeed, despite the dissent’s contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged” (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist’s privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]” (Maressa v New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct (In re Schuman, 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114 NJ,

1993Indeed, despite the dissent’s contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged” (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist’s privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]” (Maressa v New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct (In re Schuman, 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114 NJ,

1993Indeed, despite the dissent’s contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged” (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist’s privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]” (Maressa v New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct (In re Schuman, 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114 NJ,

1993Indeed, despite the dissent's contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged" (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist's privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]" ( Maressa v New Jersey Monthly , 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct ( In re Schuman , 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114

1993Extension of the "taxpayer" standing limitations, to the extent urged by the State here (see , State Finance Law § 123-b; New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v Coughlin , 64 N.Y.2d 660 , supra ; Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y. , 46 N.Y.2d 394 , supra) , logically and practically confers on the Legislature and Executive the power never again to submit their long-term debt financing schemes to the voters.

1993Extension of the "taxpayer” standing limitations, to the extent urged by the State here (see, State Finance Law § 123-b; New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v Coughlin, 64 NY2d 660 , supra; Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y., 46 NY2d 394 , supra), logically and practically confers on the Legislature and Executive the power never again to submit their long-term debt financing schemes to the voters.

1993Indeed, despite the dissent’s contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged” (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist’s privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]” (Maressa v New Jersey Monthly, 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct (In re Schuman, 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114 NJ,

1993Indeed, despite the dissent's contention that the material in issue is "facially protected as privileged" (dissenting opn, at 535), there remains much to be settled under the law of New Jersey, which holds that the journalist's privilege on which respondent here relies is subject to "countervailing constitutional right[s]" ( Maressa v New Jersey Monthly , 89 NJ 176, 187, 445 A2d 376, 382 , cert denied 459 US 907 ) and waiver by conduct ( In re Schuman , 114 NJ 14, 552 A2d 602, 608 ) and, in fact, may be accorded less weight in the Grand Jury setting than in cases involving trial subpoenas (114

1986Acts performed in excess of jurisdiction, however, are subject to the privilege; it is only those acts performed in the clear absence of any jurisdiction over the subject matter that fall outside the cloak of immunity (see, Sassower v Finnerty, 96 AD2d 585, 586 , appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 756 ; see also, La Pier v Deyo, 100 AD2d 710 ).

1986Acts performed in excess of jurisdiction, however, are subject to the privilege; it is only those acts performed in the clear absence of any jurisdiction over the subject matter that fall outside the cloak of immunity (see, Sassower v Finnerty, 96 AD2d 585, 586 , appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 756 ; see also, La Pier v Deyo, 100 AD2d 710 ).

1983Unlike municipal defendants, which are not liable for negligence absent a “special relationship” with the plaintiff, a private corporation, such as Con Ed, is not entitled to a cloak of immunity in a case such as this (see O'Connor v City of New York, 58 NY2d 184, 187 ; see, also, Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233 ).

1981(James v Board of Educ., 42 NY2d 357.) The State has a legitimate interest in attempting to insure the value of its diplomas and to improve upon the quality of education provided.

1980(See Klein v McGauley, 29 AD2d 418, 420 .) Thus, the critical issue is whether the March 24, 1980 letter which was sent by the attorney for the wife, a potential litigant in the later commenced matrimonial action, may be construed to be within the cloak of the immunity provided by the rule of absolute privilege.

1976Co. v Scrugham, 197 NY 377, 380 .) However, this cloak of immunity does not cover Bernard Shwidock in this case.

1972(See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N. Y. 498 ; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443 ; and Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361 , where municipalities were held liable for the negligence of the public police department.) I can discern no compelling public policy reasons to extend by implication this broad cloak of immunity to the private police force set up by the Housing Authority.

1972(See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo , 303 N.Y. 498 ; Koeppe v. City of Hudson , 276 App. Div. 443 ; and Bernardine v. City of New York , 294 N.Y. 361 , where municipalities were held liable for the negligence of the public police department.) I can discern no compelling public policy reasons to extend by implication this broad cloak of immunity to the private police force set up by the Housing Authority.

1972(See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N. Y. 498 ; Koeppe v. City of Hudson, 276 App. Div. 443 ; and Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361 , where municipalities were held liable for the negligence of the public police department.) I can discern no compelling public policy reasons to extend by implication this broad cloak of immunity to the private police force set up by the Housing Authority.

1972(See Dunham v. Village of Canisteo , 303 N.Y. 498 ; Koeppe v. City of Hudson , 276 App. Div. 443 ; and Bernardine v. City of New York , 294 N.Y. 361 , where municipalities were held liable for the negligence of the public police department.) I can discern no compelling public policy reasons to extend by implication this broad cloak of immunity to the private police force set up by the Housing Authority.

1972The statute is invoked “ ‘ to supply a cloak of immunity to hedging litigants lacking integrity ’ ” (Cohon & Co. v. Russell, 23 N Y 2d 569, 574). “ The danger of fraud and perjury, generally attendant upon the admission of parol evidence, is at a minimum in a ease such as this” (Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N. Y. 48, 55 ).

1957In the circumstances, it follows that, if the defendant persists in his refusal to answer relevant questions or produce relevant books and papers, his testimony on direct examination must be stricken (People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508, 513 ; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 92 App. Div. 138,139 ); “for no testimony under any conditions can be received without liability to a substantially full cross-examination” (8 Wigmore, on Evidence, § 2276, p. 453).

1957In the circumstances, it follows that, if the defendant persists in his refusal to answer relevant questions or produce relevant books and papers, his testimony on direct examination must be stricken (People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508, 513 ; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 92 App. Div. 138,139 ); “for no testimony under any conditions can be received without liability to a substantially full cross-examination” (8 Wigmore, on Evidence, § 2276, p. 453).

1957Moreover, the waiver is not partial, but complete. “ Having cast aside the cloak of immunity, the party may not resume it at will ” (Brown v. United States, supra, p. 146); for, if the rule were otherwise, “ a preference would be accorded to falsehood rather than to truth” (State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234, 243 , quoted with approval in volume 8 of Wigmore on Evidence, § 2276, p. 445), and would make a ‘1 mockery ’ ’ of justice (Brown v. United States, supra, p. 146).