cloak immunity in New Jersey

2024The Court further explained: we adopted [the] substantial certainty test for intentional wrong, a test encompassing acts that the employer knows are substantially certain to produce injury even though, strictly speaking, the employer does not will that result. . . . [I]n order for an employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more

2024The Laidlow Court succinctly summarized the holding in Millison by noting, A-1925-21 14 in order for an employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize. [ 170 N.J. at 617 (discussing Milli

2024The Court reasoned: [I]n order for an employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize. [Id. at 617.] Relying on Laidlow, we held that the C5 exclusion without the "substantially certain" l

2019Id. at 523-24 . [U]nder Millison, in order for an employe[e]'s act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A. 34:15–8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employe[e] must know that his actions are substantially certain to result A-2035-17T1 9 in injury or death to the employee, and (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the [WCA] to immunize. [Laidlow v. Hariton Mach.

2019Finally, the bar to establish "substantial certainty" is high, with the Court A-0883-18T3 12 determining that "[a] probability or knowledge that such injury or death 'could' result, is insufficient," Van Dunk, 210 N.J. at 470 , and this court concluding "[e]ven an injury 'caused by either gross negligence or an abysmal lack of concern for the safety of employees' is insufficient to satisfy the 'intentional wrong' exception," Kaczorowska v. Nat'l Envelope Corp., 342 N.J.

2005Otherwise, a person could file defamatory statements in a judicial proceeding with impunity "and then proceed to republish [them] at will under the cloak of immunity." Ibid.; DeVivo, 228 N.J.Super. at 461-62 , 550 A. 2d 163 .

2005Otherwise, a person could file defamatory statements in a judicial proceeding with impunity "and then proceed to republish [them] at will under the cloak of immunity." Ibid.; DeVivo, 228 N.J.Super. at 461-62 , 550 A. 2d 163 .

2002IV Subsequently, in Mabee, supra, 316 N.J.Super. 218 , 720 A.2d 342 , the Appellate Division applied the Millison standard to reverse the grant of a motion for summary judgment by an employer in a safety device removal case.

2002IV Subsequently, in Mabee, supra, 316 N.J.Super. 218 , 720 A.2d 342 , the Appellate Division applied the Millison standard to reverse the grant of a motion for summary judgment by an employer in a safety device removal case.

1991As we stated clearly in Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 576 , 510 A.2d 4 , willful and wanton misconduct is an appropriate exception to most general rules of immunity.

1991As we stated clearly in Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., supra, 102 N.J. at 576 , 510 A.2d 4 , willful and wanton misconduct is an appropriate exception to most general rules of immunity.

1987Such a prospect led the New York Court of Appeals to hold in Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y. 2d 592 , 298 N.Y.S. 2d 473 , 246 *199 N.E. 2d 333 (Ct.App. 1969), that a complaint, charging defendant with procuring the filing of a defamatory complaint and distributing copies in the business community, stated a cause of action.

1987Such a prospect led the New York Court of Appeals to hold in Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y. 2d 592 , 298 N.Y.S. 2d 473 , 246 *199 N.E. 2d 333 (Ct.App. 1969), that a complaint, charging defendant with procuring the filing of a defamatory complaint and distributing copies in the business community, stated a cause of action.

1976In Raffel the .Supreme Court held that a defendant’s testimony at a retrial could be impeached by cross-examination which disclosed that defendant, in the face of similar prosecution testimony, had chosen not to testify at his first trial, saying that “[h]is waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity he may not resume it at will.” 271 U. S. at 497 , 46 S. Ct. at 568 , 70 L.

1976In Raffel the .Supreme Court held that a defendant’s testimony at a retrial could be impeached by cross-examination which disclosed that defendant, in the face of similar prosecution testimony, had chosen not to testify at his first trial, saying that “[h]is waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity he may not resume it at will.” 271 U. S. at 497 , 46 S. Ct. at 568 , 70 L.

1976It perceived the problem as a question of the probative value of such evidence, as was the basis of its later decision in Hale. 353 U.S. at 419-23 , 77 S.Ct. 981 -83, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 951-54 . [8] The common law privilege against self-incrimination began to emerge in response to the abuses of the Star Chamber in Stuart England, and eventually it became well-entrenched in the criminal law of England.

1976It perceived the problem as a question of the probative value of such evidence, as was the basis of its later decision in Hale. 353 U.S. at 419-23 , 77 S.Ct. 981 -83, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 951-54 . [8] The common law privilege against self-incrimination began to emerge in response to the abuses of the Star Chamber in Stuart England, and eventually it became well-entrenched in the criminal law of England.

1956Abelson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 *309 N.J. 412 (1950); Interstate Milk Handlers v. Hoffman, 34 N.J.