direction hearing in New York

1953Schauwecher v. Green ( 96 App. Div. 249 ).

1953Schauwecher v. Green ( 96 App. Div. 249 ).

1953Petitioners argue that the direction by the hearing officer to testify was unlawful and they cite Martin v. O’Keefe ( 195 App. Div. 814 ) and People ex rel.

1953Petitioners argue that the direction by the hearing officer to testify was unlawful and they cite Martin v. O’Keefe ( 195 App. Div. 814 ) and People ex rel.

1874Co., 11 Cush., 102 ; see White v. Ashton, 51 N. Y., 280 .) But if the direction and instruction, as it is called, was imperative upon the defendant, it added a specific agreement to this general obligation; and provided that it might relieve itself of responsibility by delivery to another carrier—only in case that carrier was one by rail—and not otherwise.

1874Co., 11 Cush., 102 ; see White v. Ashton, 51 N.Y., 280 .) But if the direction and instruction, as it is called, was imperative upon the defendant, it added a specific agreement to this general obligation, and provided that it might relieve itself of responsibility by delivery to another carrier — only in case that carrier was one by rail — and not otherwise.

2021Realty Assoc. v Lichtenstein , 21 AD3d at 797 ).

2021Realty Assoc. v Lichtenstein ( 21 AD3d 793 ), determining in each case that the direction to hold a hearing to determine the validity of service of process was rendered academic by a posthearing determination that personal jurisdiction was lacking ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Gore , 162 AD3d at 437; B.N.

2002(Cf., Fiorentino v Wenger, supra, 19 NY2d 407 .) There are, however, significant issues as to the adequacy of OLM’s review, prior to Dr. Chiuten’s appointment, of his credentials, as to when he was last certified for staff privileges, as to whether there was an inquiry at that time into the status of his malpractice insurance and, if so, the outcome of that inquiry, and as to whether there were any procedures for denying recertification to physicians who were not in compliance with the requirement that physicians with staff privileges carry malpractice insurance.

2002(Cf., Fiorentino v Wenger, supra, 19 NY2d 407 .) There are, however, significant issues as to the adequacy of OLM’s review, prior to Dr. Chiuten’s appointment, of his credentials, as to when he was last certified for staff privileges, as to whether there was an inquiry at that time into the status of his malpractice insurance and, if so, the outcome of that inquiry, and as to whether there were any procedures for denying recertification to physicians who were not in compliance with the requirement that physicians with staff privileges carry malpractice insurance.

1996Similarly, in State v Yates (111 Wash 2d 793, 796, 765 P2d 291, 293 , supra), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent that its "order encompassed the pretrial disclosure of statements, signed or unsigned, recorded or written, given by potential prosecution witnesses during interviews with defense counsel or their investigator” (see also, State v Culkin, 791 SW2d 803, 811 [Mo] [court directed, after an in camera inspection, defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution all notes of his interview of the victim]; People v

1996Similarly, in State v Yates (111 Wash 2d 793, 796, 765 P2d 291, 293 , supra), the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent that its "order encompassed the pretrial disclosure of statements, signed or unsigned, recorded or written, given by potential prosecution witnesses during interviews with defense counsel or their investigator” (see also, State v Culkin, 791 SW2d 803, 811 [Mo] [court directed, after an in camera inspection, defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution all notes of his interview of the victim]; People v

1996Clearly, "[t]he defendant’s due process rights [are] not violated by the production of the [tapes]. 'Trial by ambush, or the old fox-and-hounds approach to litigation, does not promote accuracy or efficiency in the search for truth.’ [Citations omitted.] Criminal discovery is not a one-way street flowing in the direction of the defense. [Citations omitted.]” (People v Small, 631 P2d 148, 158 , supra.) Thus, for example, in State v Strandy (49 Wash App 537, 745 P2d 43 , supra) the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court could not require him to disclos

1996Clearly, "[t]he defendant’s due process rights [are] not violated by the production of the [tapes]. 'Trial by ambush, or the old fox-and-hounds approach to litigation, does not promote accuracy or efficiency in the search for truth.’ [Citations omitted.] Criminal discovery is not a one-way street flowing in the direction of the defense. [Citations omitted.]” (People v Small, 631 P2d 148, 158 , supra.) Thus, for example, in State v Strandy (49 Wash App 537, 745 P2d 43 , supra) the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court could not require him to disclos

1995The court’s direction to defense counsel to read the four questions and answers of a witness’ prior testimony that followed the one question referred to by counsel, " 'encourage[d] clarity rather than obscurity in the development of proof ” and was otherwise a proper exercise of discretion (People v Brown, 199 AD2d 11, 12 , lv denied 83 NY2d 849 ).

1994In that case, the issue on appeal dealt with the adequacy of defendant’s allegations and pleadings in moving to suppress, the very same issue addressed by the Court of Appeals in its most recent determination in People v Mendoza (supra).

1994The recent determination by the Appellate Division, First Department, in People v Vasquez ( 200 AD2d 344 ), does not require a different result here, nor the direction of a hearing on the motion to suppress.

1992In Careccia v Enstrom ( 174 AD2d 48 ),* ** 4 the Third Department held that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proving the elements necessary to compel disclosure of surveillance videotapes obtained at the direction of defense counsel.

1985We are persuaded that the determination of this appeal should be controlled by our decision announced simultaneously herewith in Burns v Board of Elections ( 112 AD2d 69 ).

1981Levy v Dalsheim, 66 AD2d 827 , affd 48 NY2d 1019 ).

1981Levy v Dalsheim, 66 AD2d 827 , affd 48 NY2d 1019 ).

1978The issue involves only application of the principles most recently expressed by this court in Matter of Nehra v Uhlar ( 43 NY2d 242 ).

1977By decision of this court handed down January 22, 1976 (People v Kornegay, 51 AD2d 630 ), the final determination of this appeal was withheld and the matter remitted to the trial court with a direction to hold a hearing on the question of the denial of a speedy trial.

1976By a decision of this court handed down December 18, 1975 (People v Ranellucci, 50 AD2d 105 ) the final determination of this appeal was withheld and the matter remitted to the trial court with a direction to hold a hearing on the question of the denial of a speedy trial.

1976A direction for a hearing on the issue of alleged lack of good faith was not necessary; a proper disposition may be made on the assumption of the truth of the allegations of respondent’s affidavits (Botwin v Central Structural Steel Co., supra).

1973Defendant cites various cases in which convictions were reversed, but all are distinguishable on the ground that at the time of trial, the wiretap of attorney-client conversations was not known by the court or the defense (e.g., O’Brien v. United States, 386 U. S. 345 , supra; Black v. United States, 385 U. S. 26 , supra).

1973Defendant cites various cases in which convictions were reversed, but all are distinguishable on the ground that at the time of trial, the wiretap of attorney-client conversations was not known by the court or the defense (e.g., O’Brien v. United States, 386 U. S. 345 , supra; Black v. United States, 385 U. S. 26 , supra).

1917A recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States (Terminal Taxicab Co. Inc., v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252 ) leans strongly in the direction of the rule which I think must govern this case.

1903The cases of Mitchell v. Bartlett, supra, and Peck v. Knickerbocker Ice Company, supra, are controlling on this point.

1903For the purposes of this appeal it must be assumed that the judgment of foreclosure and sale was in the usual form (Cowdrey v. Coit, 44 N. Y. 382 ), and, therefore, that it contained the direction required by rule 61 of the General Rules of Practice; that is, “ that the purchaser at such sale be let into possession of the premises on production of the deed.” We are not informed that this provision was ever complied with, and so must conclude that no title paramount to his lessor’s was at any time properly asserted against the defendant.