direction defense in California

2013Juror No. 26 The prosecutor explained that he had exercised a peremptory challenge as to Juror No. 26 for three reasons—(1) she avoided eye contact with the prosecutor and frequently looked in the direction of defense counsel, (2) she was a young teacher, and (3) she had not been "very forthcoming" during voir dire—each of which is a racially neutral and valid ground for exercising a peremptory challenge.6 (See Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 ["[a] prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons"]; People v.

2013Juror No. 26 The prosecutor explained that he had exercised a peremptory challenge as to Juror No. 26 for three reasons—(1) she avoided eye contact with the prosecutor and frequently looked in the direction of defense counsel, (2) she was a young teacher, and (3) she had not been "very forthcoming" during voir dire—each of which is a racially neutral and valid ground for exercising a peremptory challenge.6 (See Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 ["[a] prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons"]; People v.

2013(See People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 471 (Lewis) [" 'Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot' " [citation].) Accordingly, we review the trial court's ultimate finding that the prosecutor did not act with discriminatory intent in exercising a peremptory challenge as to Juror No. 26.

2013Juror No. 26 The prosecutor explained that he had exercised a peremptory challenge as to Juror No. 26 for three reasons—(1) she avoided eye contact with the prosecutor and frequently looked in the direction of defense counsel, (2) she was a young teacher, and (3) she had not been "very forthcoming" during voir dire—each of which is a racially neutral and valid ground for exercising a peremptory challenge.6 (See Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 ["[a] prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons"]; People v.

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009(People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ]; see also People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 ] [describing the personal nature of the right to present a defense, and to counsel].) 2 It would be inappropriate to recognize a third party’s authority to require the court to conduct a Marsden inquiry, because the defendant’s right to mount a defense in the manner that he or she, under the direction of defense counsel, deems best requires that counsel’s independence from third party influence be protected.

2009(People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ]; see also People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 ] [describing the personal nature of the right to present a defense, and to counsel].) 2 It would be inappropriate to recognize a third party’s authority to require the court to conduct a Marsden inquiry, because the defendant’s right to mount a defense in the manner that he or she, under the direction of defense counsel, deems best requires that counsel’s independence from third party influence be protected.

2009(People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ]; see also People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 ] [describing the personal nature of the right to present a defense, and to counsel].) 2 It would be inappropriate to recognize a third party’s authority to require the court to conduct a Marsden inquiry, because the defendant’s right to mount a defense in the manner that he or she, under the direction of defense counsel, deems best requires that counsel’s independence from third party influence be protected.

2009(People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343-344 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ]; see also People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 613 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 ] [describing the personal nature of the right to present a defense, and to counsel].) 2 It would be inappropriate to recognize a third party’s authority to require the court to conduct a Marsden inquiry, because the defendant’s right to mount a defense in the manner that he or she, under the direction of defense counsel, deems best requires that counsel’s independence from third party influence be protected.

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2009The court must exercise circumspection in taking actions that may interfere with an existing attorney-client relationship, and must remain “on [its] guard neither to infringe upon the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice, nor to compromise the independence of the bar.” (Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 559 [ 68 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] [“The value in issue ... is ‘the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.’ ”]; see Cannon v. Comm

2000Indeed, counsel, without objection, told the jurors they could apply “whatever moral or sympathetic value you feel appropriate,” that they could show mercy and sympathy, that for a death verdict the aggravating circumstances must “so substantially” outweigh the mitigating “that it warrants death,” and that they were not to return a death verdict unless they believed, from all the circumstances, that execution of defendant was “the proper thing to do.” In People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 979 , the court observed that under our law “[t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigat

2000Indeed, counsel, without objection, told the jurors they could apply “whatever moral or sympathetic value you feel appropriate,” that they could show mercy and sympathy, that for a death verdict the aggravating circumstances must “so substantially” outweigh the mitigating “that it warrants death,” and that they were not to return a death verdict unless they believed, from all the circumstances, that execution of defendant was “the proper thing to do.” In People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 979 , the court observed that under our law “[t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigat

2000In People v. Myers, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 276, the lead opinion stated the penalty jury’s obligation is “not simply to determine whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and then impose the death penalty as a result of that determination, but rather it is to determine, after consideration of the relevant factors, whether under all the circumstances ‘death is the appropriate penalty’ for the defendant before it.” The jury here was so instructed—they were told they must determine from all the circumstances which penalty was “justified and appropriate” (see ante, p. 637, fn. 12)

1975These findings of harmless error reflect the Supreme Court’s direction of inquiry to the “probable impact” of the inadmissible evidence “on the minds of an average jury.” (Italics added.) (Harrington v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 254 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 288 ]; cf. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970) at pp. 44-46.) With due consciousness that an abridgment of a federal constitutional right is not lightly to be declared without prejudicial consequence, we are compelled to such a conclusion in Lorraine Kramer’s case.

1975These findings of harmless error reflect the Supreme Court’s direction of inquiry to the “probable impact” of the inadmissible evidence “on the minds of an average jury.” (Italics added.) (Harrington v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 254 [ 23 L.Ed.2d at p. 288 ]; cf. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970) at pp. 44-46.) With due consciousness that an abridgment of a federal constitutional right is not lightly to be declared without prejudicial consequence, we are compelled to such a conclusion in Lorraine Kramer’s case.