imposition standard in Washington

2019In light of this Court's decision in State of Washington v. David Angel Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732 , 426 P.3d 714 (2018), and the 2018 amendment to the legal financial obligations statutes, this case is remanded to the trial court to reconsider the imposition of the requirement to pay the $ 200 criminal filing fee.

2019In light of this Court's decision in State of Washington v. David Angel Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732 , 426 P.3d 714 (2018), and the 2018 amendment to the legal financial obligations statutes, this case is remanded to the trial court to reconsider the imposition of the requirement to pay the $ 200 criminal filing fee.

2019The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, “civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”7 This includes a sentencing hearing.8 ~ Ch. 9.94 RCW. ~ RCW 9.94A.585(1). ~ State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 6 U.S. CONST. amend.

2018The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."6 This includes a sentencing hearing.7 2 Ch. 9.94 RCW. 3 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 4 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 5 U.S. CONST. amend.

2019The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, “civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”7 This includes a sentencing hearing.8 ~ Ch. 9.94 RCW. ~ RCW 9.94A.585(1). ~ State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 6 U.S. CONST. amend.

2018The Fifth Amendment prevents a person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."5 A defendant may assert the right against self- incrimination in any proceeding, "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."6 This includes a sentencing hearing.7 2 Ch. 9.94 RCW. 3 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 4 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 5 U.S. CONST. amend.

2011Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d at 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 . ¶ 78 The Baldwin court stated that "the due process considerations that underlie the void-for-vagueness doctrine" did not apply to these sentencing guideline statutes because these statutes did not (1) define conduct, (2) allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution, (3) inform the public of penalties attached to criminal conduct, or (4) vary the legislatively imposed maximum and minimum penalties for any crime. 150 Wash.2d at 459 , 78 P.3d 1005 .

2011Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d at 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 . ¶ 78 The Baldwin court stated that "the due process considerations that underlie the void-for-vagueness doctrine" did not apply to these sentencing guideline statutes because these statutes did not (1) define conduct, (2) allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution, (3) inform the public of penalties attached to criminal conduct, or (4) vary the legislatively imposed maximum and minimum penalties for any crime. 150 Wash.2d at 459 , 78 P.3d 1005 .

2005“This inquiry is automatically satisfied whenever ‘the defendant’s high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in “free” crimes — crimes for which there is no additional penalty.’ ” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 56 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting Stephens, 116 Wn.2d at 243 ). ¶31 Under the “free crimes” doctrine, then, a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence where a defendant’s current crimes would go unpunished through the imposition of a standard range sentence.

2005"This inquiry is automatically satisfied whenever `the defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in `free' crimes — crimes for which there is no additional penalty.'" State v. Smith, 123 Wash.2d 51, 56 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting Stephens, 116 Wash.2d at 243 , 803 P.2d 319 ). ¶ 31 Under the "free crimes" doctrine, then, a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence where a defendant's current crimes would go unpunished through the imposition of a standard range sentence.

2005Both with regard to this juvenile as well as with others who would more likely be solicited to be the mules in the transportation of large amounts since the consequences, were the court not allowed to impose a sentence outside the range for large amounts of marijuana, as in this case, likely others would be solicited in the future and it would be more likely that other juveniles would be involved and introduced to crime which is a clear and serious danger to society.[ 3 ] Tai contends the court’s reasons are both factually and legally deficient and therefore cannot support a manifest injustice

2005Both with regard to this juvenile as well as with others who would more likely be solicited to be the mules in the transportation of large amounts since the consequences, were the court not allowed to impose a sentence outside the range for large amounts of marijuana, as in this case, likely others would be solicited in the future and it would be more likely that other juveniles would be involved and introduced to crime which is a clear and serious danger to society. [3] Tai contends the court's reasons are both factually and legally deficient and therefore cannot support a manifest injustice

2005“This inquiry is automatically satisfied whenever ‘the defendant’s high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in “free” crimes — crimes for which there is no additional penalty.’ ” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 56 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting Stephens, 116 Wn.2d at 243 ). ¶31 Under the “free crimes” doctrine, then, a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence where a defendant’s current crimes would go unpunished through the imposition of a standard range sentence.

2005“This inquiry is automatically satisfied whenever ‘the defendant’s high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in “free” crimes — crimes for which there is no additional penalty.’ ” State v. Smith, 123 Wn.2d 51, 56 , 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting Stephens, 116 Wn.2d at 243 ). ¶31 Under the “free crimes” doctrine, then, a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence where a defendant’s current crimes would go unpunished through the imposition of a standard range sentence.

2005Van Burén, 123 Wn.

2005Van Buren, 123 Wash.App. at 653 , 98 P.3d 1235 . ¶ 32 Here, on the first degree rape conviction, Brundage's prior offenses resulted in 8 offender score points.

2004RCW 9.94A.650(2); State v. Johnson, 97 Wash.App. 679, 682 , 988 P.2d 460 (1999).

2004RCW 9.94A.650(2); State v. Johnson, 97 Wash.App. 679, 682 , 988 P.2d 460 (1999).

2023We will only reverse a decision of the sentencing court that constitutes “a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.” State v. Porter, 133 Wn.2d 177, 181 , 942 P.2d 974 (1997).

2023However, this court may review the imposition of a standard range sentence for the “correction of legal errors or abuses of discretion in the determination of what sentence applies.” Id. at 147 .

2023We will only reverse a decision of the sentencing court that constitutes “a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.” State v. Porter, 133 Wn.2d 177, 181 , 942 P.2d 974 (1997).

2020State v. Brundage, 126 Wn.

2016Thus, Ho has not demonstrated that the trial court refused to exercise its discretion or misconstrued its authority. 13183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 14 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333 , 341 -42, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 15 O'Dell, 183Wn.2d685. 16 Id at 697-98. 17 Id at 685-86. 18 Id. at 696-97. 6 No. 72497-5-1/7 Comment on Right to Silence Ho contends that the testimony of one of the State's witnesses amounted to an impermissible opinion on guilt and a comment on his right to remain silent.19 We decline to review these claims because Ho fails to establish a manifest error affecting a const

2016Thus, Ho has not demonstrated that the trial court refused to exercise its discretion or misconstrued its authority. 13183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 14 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333 , 341 -42, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 15 O'Dell, 183Wn.2d685. 16 Id at 697-98. 17 Id at 685-86. 18 Id. at 696-97. 6 No. 72497-5-1/7 Comment on Right to Silence Ho contends that the testimony of one of the State's witnesses amounted to an impermissible opinion on guilt and a comment on his right to remain silent.19 We decline to review these claims because Ho fails to establish a manifest error affecting a const

2016Thus, Ho has not demonstrated that the trial court refused to exercise its discretion or misconstrued its authority. 13183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015). 14 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333 , 341 -42, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 15 O'Dell, 183Wn.2d685. 16 Id at 697-98. 17 Id at 685-86. 18 Id. at 696-97. 6 No. 72497-5-1/7 Comment on Right to Silence Ho contends that the testimony of one of the State's witnesses amounted to an impermissible opinion on guilt and a comment on his right to remain silent.19 We decline to review these claims because Ho fails to establish a manifest error affecting a const

2015Strict construction of RCW 26.44.020 demands the imposition of a standard higher than negligence. ¶56 Two Washington decisions address RCW 26.44-.020(16) and further support this court’s strict application of the definition of “negligent treatment.” In Marcum v. Department of Social & Health Services, 172 Wn.

2015App. 546 , 290 P.3d 1045 (2012), this court vacated a finding of neglect DSHS entered against Melinda Marcum, a day care provider who mistakenly left a child alone for ten minutes.

2014State v. Nava, 177 Wn.

2011Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d at 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 . ¶ 78 The Baldwin court stated that "the due process considerations that underlie the void-for-vagueness doctrine" did not apply to these sentencing guideline statutes because these statutes did not (1) define conduct, (2) allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution, (3) inform the public of penalties attached to criminal conduct, or (4) vary the legislatively imposed maximum and minimum penalties for any crime. 150 Wash.2d at 459 , 78 P.3d 1005 .

2011Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d at 458-59 , 78 P.3d 1005 . ¶ 78 The Baldwin court stated that "the due process considerations that underlie the void-for-vagueness doctrine" did not apply to these sentencing guideline statutes because these statutes did not (1) define conduct, (2) allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution, (3) inform the public of penalties attached to criminal conduct, or (4) vary the legislatively imposed maximum and minimum penalties for any crime. 150 Wash.2d at 459 , 78 P.3d 1005 .

2005Van Buren, 123 Wash.App. at 653 , 98 P.3d 1235 . ¶ 32 Here, on the first degree rape conviction, Brundage's prior offenses resulted in 8 offender score points.

1999RCW 13.40.0357, 13.40.160(2). “ ‘Manifest injustice’ means a disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juve nile or would impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977.” State v. M.L., 134 Wn.2d 657, 660 , 952 P.2d 187 (1998).

1999RCW 13.40.0357, 13.40.160(2). “ ‘Manifest injustice’ means a disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juve nile or would impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977.” State v. M.L., 134 Wn.2d 657, 660 , 952 P.2d 187 (1998).

1980The test for the imposition of the doctrine was carefully spelled out in Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wn.2d 887 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976).

1980The test for the imposition of the doctrine was carefully spelled out in Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wn.2d 887 , 558 P.2d 215 (1976).

1939Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 , 79 L.

1939Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 , 79 L.