imposition requirement in Pennsylvania

2024See Gross v. Mintz, 285 A.3d 934 , 2022 WL 4242456 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming the denial of Mother’s October 2021 PFA petition), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2023); see also Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479 (Pa. Super. 2022) (affirming the grant of Father’s petition for contempt and the imposition of a requirement that Mother obtain court approval before filing PFA petitions that interfered with Father’s custodial rights), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 563 (Pa. 2023).

2024See Gross v. Mintz, 285 A.3d 934 , 2022 WL 4242456 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming the denial of Mother’s October 2021 PFA petition), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2023); see also Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479 (Pa. Super. 2022) (affirming the grant of Father’s petition for contempt and the imposition of a requirement that Mother obtain court approval before filing PFA petitions (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-A24042-23 former husband and the children’s father, Jared Zalman Mintz (“Father”), making various allegations not relevant here.

2024See Moury, supra; McNabb, supra. - 35 - J-S23040-23 Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on her challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.

2015Commonwealth v. Cruz- Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same).

2020Our conclusion is based primarily on the trial court’s imposition of standard-range sentences following its review of a PSI report. “[W]here the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a [PSI] report, we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

2020Our conclusion is based primarily on the trial court’s imposition of standard-range sentences following its review of a PSI report. “[W]here the sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a [PSI] report, we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

2015Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same).

2015Commonwealth v. Cruz- Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same).

2015Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same).

2015Commonwealth v. Cruz- Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa.Super. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super. 2010) (same).

1978See Commonwealth v. Richard, 233 Pa.S.Ct. 254, 336 A.2d 423 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175 , 228 A.2d 661 (1967). “[W]here the prosecution can establish that the challenged evidence would have come to its attention from an independent source free of taint, this is not the type of exploitation of the illegality that requires the imposition of the rule of exclusion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274 , 368 A.2d 626 (1977).

1978See Commonwealth v. Richard, 233 Pa.S.Ct. 254, 336 A.2d 423 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175 , 228 A.2d 661 (1967). “[W]here the prosecution can establish that the challenged evidence would have come to its attention from an independent source free of taint, this is not the type of exploitation of the illegality that requires the imposition of the rule of exclusion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274 , 368 A.2d 626 (1977).

2020Swope, 123 A.3d at 338-39 .

2020Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2015). -5-

1975See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)." Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 372 , 312 A.2d 597, 600 (1973). deter further continued flagrant disregard of this man-The repeated violations of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 fully justify the imposition of a doctrine of exclusion as a means to date.

1975See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)." Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 372 , 312 A.2d 597, 600 (1973). deter further continued flagrant disregard of this man-The repeated violations of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130 fully justify the imposition of a doctrine of exclusion as a means to date.

2024See Elliott, 50 A.3d at 1292 ; see also Baumann, 307 A.3d at 1234-35, 1237 (stating, in a case where the appellant was convicted of a sex offense and, as part of his probation, was to “submit to supervision by the Sexual Offender’s Unit[,]” the requirement that the appellant participate in a sex offender therapeutic treatment program was a valid condition of supervision under the Sexual Offender’s Unit).3 In support on his claim, Stewart cites Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2020).

2024See Elliott, 50 A.3d at 1292 ; see also Baumann, 307 A.3d at 1234-35, 1237 (stating, in a case where the appellant was convicted of a sex offense and, as part of his probation, was to “submit to supervision by the Sexual Offender’s Unit[,]” the requirement that the appellant participate in a sex offender therapeutic treatment program was a valid condition of supervision under the Sexual Offender’s Unit).3 In support on his claim, Stewart cites Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2020).

2024Mr. Fennel, acting as agent for 7 See Skarvelis v. Zoning Hearing Board of Dormont, 679 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 12 0016a Intervenors, was not only in possession of aletter from the prior Township Zoning Officer indicating that the Subject Property was, in fact buildable, but Mr. Fehnel also followed up with the then Zoning Officer to confirm same, prior to the Intervenors purchasing the Subject Property, 8 Intervenors established that they would not have purchased the property and expended substantial nuns absent the information from the Township that the lot was buildable.

2024See Elliott, 50 A.3d at 1292 ; see also Baumann, 307 A.3d at 1234-35, 1237 (stating, in a case where the appellant was convicted of a sex offense and, as part of his probation, was to “submit to supervision by the Sexual Offender’s Unit[,]” the requirement that the appellant participate in a sex offender therapeutic treatment program was a valid condition of supervision under the Sexual Offender’s Unit).3 In support on his claim, Stewart cites Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2020).

2023Furthermore, our “simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated[,]” has revealed no additional issues counsel failed to address.3 Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).

2022See id.

2018The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently clarified that “when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018).

2016(See id. at 20-24); cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 749 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal - 12 - J-S67040-15 denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014) (overturning judgment of sentence based partially on judicial bias where trial court imposed near-life sentence for violations of parole after repeatedly insinuating that defendant targeted Catholic institutions for her criminal activities).

2015In response to Williams I, the general assembly passed Megan’s Law II on May 10,2000, and “altered the manner in which an individual convicted of a predicate offense was adjudicated a sexually violent predator” by imposing upon the Commonwealth “the burden of proving such status by clear and convincing evidence.” Com. v. Williams, 51A Pa. 487, 495, 832 A.2d 962, 966 (2003) (“WilliamsIF).

2001See id. at 56-57 , 722 A.2d at 1039 (citing cases).

2001See id. at 56-57 , 722 A.2d at 1039 (citing cases).

1999Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 304 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996).

1999Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 304 , 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996).

1995See also: Michael v. Shiley, Inc., supra, 46 F.3d at 1323 ; National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988 , 997 (8th Cir.1994); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.1989); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 948, 953 (N.D.Cal.1994); Parenteau v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.N.H.1994); Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 717, 721 (S.D.Ind.1994); Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 633, 635-37 (S.D.Ohio 1994); Elbert v. Howmedica Inc., 841 F.Supp. 327, 331 (D.Haw.1993); Lamontagne v. E.I.

1995See also: Michael v. Shiley, Inc., supra, 46 F.3d at 1323 ; National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988 , 997 (8th Cir.1994); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.1989); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 948, 953 (N.D.Cal.1994); Parenteau v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.N.H.1994); Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 717, 721 (S.D.Ind.1994); Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 633, 635-37 (S.D.Ohio 1994); Elbert v. Howmedica Inc., 841 F.Supp. 327, 331 (D.Haw.1993); Lamontagne v. E.I.