imposition requirement in Florida

2011The imposition of that requirement is thus likely to "deprive the child of a legal basis for regularizing the child's immigration status." L.T., 48 So.3d at 931 . [9] In pertinent part section 39.01(24) and (70) provide: (24) "Diligent search" means the efforts of a social service agency to locate a parent or prospective parent whose identity or location is unknown. ... . . . . (70) "Social service agency" means the department, a licensed child-caring agency, or a licensed child-placing agency. § 39.01(24), (70), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added).

2011The imposition of that requirement is thus likely to "deprive the child of a legal basis for regularizing the child's immigration status.” L.T., 48 So.3d at 931 .

2010The Retzler court, in finding that 49 U.S.C. § 44112 did not preempt lessor liability, mistakenly focused on the general savings clause in the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40120 (c), which provides that “a remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) Retzler relied on Abdullah v. American Airlines, 181 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir.1999), for the proposition that state remedies are foreclosed “where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or where the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrat

2010The Retzler court, in finding that 49 U.S.C. § 44112 did not preempt lessor liability, mistakenly focused on the general savings clause in the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40120 (c), which provides that “a remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) Retzler relied on Abdullah v. American Airlines, 181 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir.1999), for the proposition that state remedies are foreclosed “where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or where the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrat

2009Co. v. Krawzak, 675 So.2d 115 (Fla.1996); see also Arrieta, 343 So.2d at 918 ; Winner v. Ratzlaff, 211 Kan. 59, 63 , 505 P.2d 606, 609-10 (1973) (“Policy declarations not here pertinent aside, reasons advanced in the foregoing cases include the fact the language of the statutes in question, or of the policies, contains no justification for requiring that the claimant must sue and recover judgment against the uninsured motorist and, further, the imposition of such a requirement would essentially transfer this coverage into its own antecedent-unsatisfied judgment insurance (see Widiss, A Guide T

2008Markland v. State, 971 So.2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

2004Sept.16, 2002) (the filing of a privilege log six months late would not constitute a waiver of the work-product claim, where defendant had already given plaintiff notice of the privilege claim, defendant produced a privilege log before the hearing on plaintiff's motion to compel, and there was no evidence that the delay prejudiced the plaintiff); Anderson v. Hale, 202 F.R.D. 548 (N.D.Ill.2001) (previous notice of the work-product doctrine claim precluded the imposition of the waiver sanction).

2002Butterfield, 784 P.2d at 155-56 .

1995Principal among the cases cited by Mrs. Steltenkamp in support of this argument is Buttermore v. Meyer, 559 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

1983In discussing these factors, our court noted that the first four factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs while the final two factors weighed in favor of the defendant; however, though phosphate mining is not an inappropriate activity to the Peace River area and though the industry has significant value to the state and to the nation, our court concluded that: [T]he rights of adjoining landowners and the interests of the public in our environment require the imposition of a doctrine which places the burden upon the parties whose activity made it possible for the damages to occur. 312 So.2d a

1974The rationale implicitly underlying the Biswell decision is stated in Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 72 (1970): In contrast to such broad delegation of inspection authority [as that involved in See, supra], the statutory grants of inspection power here under review [ 26 U.S.C. ss. 5146 (b) and 7606(a)] are carefully defined and narrowed to the point where they grant little, if any, more authority than that which would be extended in a warrant issued by a magistrate after review. . . . * * * * * . . . the imposition of a requirement that a

1974The rationale implicitly underlying the Biswell decision is stated in Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 410 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 72 (1970): In contrast to such broad delegation of inspection authority [as that involved in See, supra], the statutory grants of inspection power here under review [ 26 U.S.C. ss. 5146 (b) and 7606(a)] are carefully defined and narrowed to the point where they grant little, if any, more authority than that which would be extended in a warrant issued by a magistrate after review. . . . * * * * * . . . the imposition of a requirement that a