harmless constitutional error in West Virginia

1987Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975).” We have adopted the harmless constitutional error rule set in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

1987Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975).” We have adopted the harmless constitutional error rule set in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

1979More importantly when Hankerson was decided by a unanimous Court, no suggestion was made that the constitutionally defective instruction could be treated as harmless constitutional error. 2 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to fit the condemned Mullaney-Pendry instruction into the doctrine of harmless constitutional error, since such an instruction has been found as a matter of law in Hankerson to substantially impair the truth-finding function of the jury and raise “serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.” [Emphasis in original] [432 U S. at 243, 53 L.E

1979More importantly when Hankerson was decided by a unanimous Court, no suggestion was made that the constitutionally defective instruction could be treated as harmless constitutional error. 2 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to fit the condemned Mullaney-Pendry instruction into the doctrine of harmless constitutional error, since such an instruction has been found as a matter of law in Hankerson to substantially impair the truth-finding function of the jury and raise “serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.” [Emphasis in original] [432 U S. at 243, 53 L.E

1978It is of considerable interest that in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), which was the progenitor of the rule that we today hold is retroactive, the two concurring Justices urged consideration of the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.

1978It is of considerable interest that in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), which was the progenitor of the rule that we today hold is retroactive, the two concurring Justices urged consideration of the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.

1979The alleged underlying constitutional error was the giving of an instruction presuming first degree murder from the use of a deadly weapon. 1 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, *796 421 U.S. 684 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975), this type of instruction was held to be unconstitutional since it shifted the burden of proof of a key element of the crime from the state to the defendant, a position which this Court followed in State v. Pendry, _ W.Va. _, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976).

1979The alleged underlying constitutional error was the giving of an instruction presuming first degree murder from the use of a deadly weapon. 1 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, *796 421 U.S. 684 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975), this type of instruction was held to be unconstitutional since it shifted the burden of proof of a key element of the crime from the state to the defendant, a position which this Court followed in State v. Pendry, _ W.Va. _, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976).

2013In syllabus point twenty of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640 , 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), this Court held that "[e]rrors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the violation contributed to the conviction.” 19 .

2013In syllabus point twenty of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640 , 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), this Court held that "[e]rrors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the violation contributed to the conviction.” 19 .

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1979We know of no case where a court has applied the Mullaney principle to overturn a conviction of a lesser crime than murder on the theory that the unconstitutional instruction, shifting from the state the burden of proving lack of provocation for murder, rendered such verdict defective. [2] The doctrine of harmless constitutional error finds its modern genesis in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963).

1979We know of no case where a court has applied the Mullaney principle to overturn a conviction of a lesser crime than murder on the theory that the unconstitutional instruction, shifting from the state the burden of proving lack of provocation for murder, rendered such verdict defective. [2] The doctrine of harmless constitutional error finds its modern genesis in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963).

2014In Angel, the circuit court had provided a jury instruction which shifted the burden of proof of an essential element of the crime to the defendant, permitting 6 Similarly, in State v. Flippo, 212 W.Va. 560 , 575 S.E.2d 170 (2002), this Court conducted an analysis to determine whether the circuit court’s error in admitting certain photographs was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2014In Angel, the circuit court had provided a jury instruction which shifted the burden of proof of an essential element of the crime to the defendant, permitting 6 Similarly, in State v. Flippo, 212 W.Va. 560 , 575 S.E.2d 170 (2002), this Court conducted an analysis to determine whether the circuit court’s error in admitting certain photographs was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2013Likewise, in Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986), this Court stated that "[u]nder the harmless constitutional error doctrine, the State's burden is to show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ” 177 W.Va. at 301, 352 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2013Likewise, in Morrison v. Holland, 177 W.Va. 297 , 352 S.E.2d 46 (1986), this Court stated that "[u]nder the harmless constitutional error doctrine, the State's burden is to show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ” 177 W.Va. at 301, 352 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

1994Yates began its analysis by recognizing the harmless constitutional error test developed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), that it may be deemed harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” 500 U.S. at 403 , 111 S.Ct. at 1892 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 448 .

1994Yates began its analysis by recognizing the harmless constitutional error test developed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), that it may be deemed harmless if “it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” 500 U.S. at 403 , 111 S.Ct. at 1892 , 114 L.Ed.2d at 448 .

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1994Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647 , 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975): “Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Syllabus Point 2, State v. Gibson, 186 W.Va. 465 , 413 S.E.2d 120 (1991); Syllabus Point 7, Marano v. Holland, 179 W.Va. 156 , 366 S.E.2d 117 (1988); Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sheppard, 172 W.Va. 656 , 310 S.E.2d 173 (1983).

1992On a related issue of the propriety of trying a defendant in restrains, in Syllabus Point 3, State v. Brewster, 164 W.Va. 173 , 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979), we held that “[a] criminal defendant has the right, absent some necessity relating to courtroom security or order, to be tried free of physical restraints.” However in State v. Linkous, 177 W.Va. 621 , 355 S.E.2d 410 (1987) we refused to find a reversible error because the jury may have seen the defendant in handcuffs for a brief period before the trial. .

1992On a related issue of the propriety of trying a defendant in restrains, in Syllabus Point 3, State v. Brewster, 164 W.Va. 173 , 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979), we held that “[a] criminal defendant has the right, absent some necessity relating to courtroom security or order, to be tried free of physical restraints.” However in State v. Linkous, 177 W.Va. 621 , 355 S.E.2d 410 (1987) we refused to find a reversible error because the jury may have seen the defendant in handcuffs for a brief period before the trial. .

1992Our holding in McMannis was based on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), which held that the State may not compel a criminal defendant to wear prison attire at his trial, because of the impact of the defendant’s appearance in prison attire on the presumption of innocence, which “is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” 425 U.S. at 503 , 96 S.Ct. at 1692 .

1992Our holding in McMannis was based on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), which held that the State may not compel a criminal defendant to wear prison attire at his trial, because of the impact of the defendant’s appearance in prison attire on the presumption of innocence, which “is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” 425 U.S. at 503 , 96 S.Ct. at 1692 .

1992On a related issue of the propriety of trying a defendant in restrains, in Syllabus Point 3, State v. Brewster, 164 W.Va. 173 , 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979), we held that “[a] criminal defendant has the right, absent some necessity relating to courtroom security or order, to be tried free of physical restraints.” However in State v. Linkous, 177 W.Va. 621 , 355 S.E.2d 410 (1987) we refused to find a reversible error because the jury may have seen the defendant in handcuffs for a brief period before the trial. .

1992On a related issue of the propriety of trying a defendant in restrains, in Syllabus Point 3, State v. Brewster, 164 W.Va. 173 , 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979), we held that “[a] criminal defendant has the right, absent some necessity relating to courtroom security or order, to be tried free of physical restraints.” However in State v. Linkous, 177 W.Va. 621 , 355 S.E.2d 410 (1987) we refused to find a reversible error because the jury may have seen the defendant in handcuffs for a brief period before the trial. .

1992Because no initial objection was made and the offense was prison connected, we refused to reverse Mr. McMannis’ conviction because the error was “not prejudicial under the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.” McMannis, id. at 135 , 254 S.E.2d at 808 .

1992Because no initial objection was made and the offense was prison connected, we refused to reverse Mr. McMannis’ conviction because the error was “not prejudicial under the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.” McMannis, id. at 135 , 254 S.E.2d at 808 .

1988It also recognized that the doctrine of harmless constitutional error would apply to "denial of face-to-face confrontation.” 487 U.S. at 1021 , 108 S.Ct. at 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 867 . 4 .

1988It also recognized that the doctrine of harmless constitutional error would apply to "denial of face-to-face confrontation.” 487 U.S. at 1021 , 108 S.Ct. at 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 867 . 4 .

1986The Supreme Court in Rose, 478 U.S. at 575-576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3104 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 466-67 , posited the issue as: “This case presents the question whether the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).” (Footnote omitted). 8 Even though the instruction in Rose 9 as well as in Sandstrom and Francis dealt with burden-shifting

1986The Supreme Court in Rose, 478 U.S. at 575-576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3104 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 466-67 , posited the issue as: “This case presents the question whether the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).” (Footnote omitted). 8 Even though the instruction in Rose 9 as well as in Sandstrom and Francis dealt with burden-shifting

1986After reviewing several recent United States Supreme Court opinions, 5 the Seventh Circuit in Greer, 789 F.2d at 444 , came to this conclusion: “Thus, the Court to date never has differentiated for harmless error standard purposes between Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment violations, or between Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)] and other constitutional trial violations, or between direct and collateral review of constitutional viola tions.” (Footnote omitted). 6 We also are brought to this conclusion by the United States Supreme Court’s failure to make

1986After reviewing several recent United States Supreme Court opinions, 5 the Seventh Circuit in Greer, 789 F.2d at 444 , came to this conclusion: “Thus, the Court to date never has differentiated for harmless error standard purposes between Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment violations, or between Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)] and other constitutional trial violations, or between direct and collateral review of constitutional viola tions.” (Footnote omitted). 6 We also are brought to this conclusion by the United States Supreme Court’s failure to make

1986After reviewing several recent United States Supreme Court opinions, 5 the Seventh Circuit in Greer, 789 F.2d at 444 , came to this conclusion: “Thus, the Court to date never has differentiated for harmless error standard purposes between Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment violations, or between Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)] and other constitutional trial violations, or between direct and collateral review of constitutional viola tions.” (Footnote omitted). 6 We also are brought to this conclusion by the United States Supreme Court’s failure to make

1986After reviewing several recent United States Supreme Court opinions, 5 the Seventh Circuit in Greer, 789 F.2d at 444 , came to this conclusion: “Thus, the Court to date never has differentiated for harmless error standard purposes between Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment violations, or between Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)] and other constitutional trial violations, or between direct and collateral review of constitutional viola tions.” (Footnote omitted). 6 We also are brought to this conclusion by the United States Supreme Court’s failure to make

1986The Supreme Court in Rose, 478 U.S. at 575-576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3104 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 466-67 , posited the issue as: “This case presents the question whether the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).” (Footnote omitted). 8 Even though the instruction in Rose 9 as well as in Sandstrom and Francis dealt with burden-shifting

1986The Supreme Court in Rose, 478 U.S. at 575-576 , 106 S.Ct. at 3104 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 466-67 , posited the issue as: “This case presents the question whether the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), applies to jury instructions that violate the principles of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).” (Footnote omitted). 8 Even though the instruction in Rose 9 as well as in Sandstrom and Francis dealt with burden-shifting