Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2025As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Camacho,"[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has emphasized that 'most constitutional errors can be harmless,' and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal." 218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). 2024As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Camacho,"[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has emphasized that 'most constitutional errors can be harmless,' and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal." 218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). | 7 | 7 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025For example, the State cites to State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 546 (2001), noting in that case, despite holding that NERA required a jury determination that a defendant committed a "violent crime" before the sentencing court could impose the statute's eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility,14 our Supreme Court concluded there was no need to disturb the defendant's sentence "because the facts adduced at trial establish that the jury made that finding [that the defendant committed a violent crime] beyond a reasonable doubt." 14 NERA has since been amended. 2024For example, the State cites to State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 546 (2001), noting in that case, despite holding that NERA required a jury determination that a defendant committed a "violent" crime before the sentencing court could impose the statute's eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, 14 our Supreme Court concluded there was no need to disturb the defendant's sentence "because the facts adduced at trial establish that the jury made that finding [that the defendant committed a violent crime] beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson is distinguishable from the case before us, howev | 7 | 7 |
State v. Masigreen2 sentences2025Cf. State v. Masi, 72 N.J. 2024Cf. State v. Masi, 72 N.J. | 7 | 7 |
State v. Simongreen2 sentences2025See State v. Simon, 421 N.J. 2024See State v. Simon, 421 N.J. | 7 | 7 |
State v. Fausto Camacho (072525)green2 sentences2025As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Camacho,"[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has emphasized that 'most constitutional errors can be harmless,' and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal." 218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). 2024As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Camacho,"[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has emphasized that 'most constitutional errors can be harmless,' and are therefore not subject to automatic reversal." 218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). | 7 | 7 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences1991We must therefore determine whether the prosecutor's failure to provide the defense with the x-rays "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, namely whether there was a `reasonable possibility' that the error ... affected the result." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. at 113, 449 A. 2d 1280 . *394 We do not regard the difference between the Strickland and Carter standards as a "splitting of hairs," as the State suggests. 1991We must therefore determine whether the prosecutor's failure to provide the defense with the x-rays "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, namely whether there was a `reasonable possibility' that the error ... affected the result." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. at 113, 449 A. 2d 1280 . *394 We do not regard the difference between the Strickland and Carter standards as a "splitting of hairs," as the State suggests. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Erlinger v. United States
green
2 sentences2025We are concerned 1 We presume the Erlinger rule also applies to New Jersey's "three strikes" law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, which likewise requires a finding that the prior crimes were committed on "separate occasions." A-0532-22 4 that the essential nature of a harmless error analysis—which focuses on whether the same outcome would have been reached if the error had not occurred—runs counter to the Erlinger Court's stern admonition that "[t]here is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 602 U.S. at 842 . 2024We are concerned that the essential nature of a harmless error analysis—which focuses on 1 We presume the Erlinger rule also applies to New Jersey's "three strikes" law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, which likewise requires a finding that the prior crimes were committed on "separate occasions." A-0532-22 4 whether the same outcome would have been reached if the error had not occurred—runs counter to the Erlinger Court's stern admonition that "[t]here is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 602 U.S. at 842 . | 7 | 2024–2025 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2024Before we address the Attorney General's harmless constitutional error argument, we deem it important to point out that our persistent offender statute 9 The Court in Alleyne applied Apprendi to any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence, overruling its prior decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 570 U.S. at 103 . 2024Before we address the Attorney General's harmless constitutional error argument, we deem it important to point out that our persistent offender statute 14 The Court in Alleyne applied Apprendi to any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence, overruling its prior decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 570 U.S. at 103 . | 5 | 2024–2024 |
Harris v. United States
red
2 sentences2024Before we address the Attorney General's harmless constitutional error argument, we deem it important to point out that our persistent offender statute 9 The Court in Alleyne applied Apprendi to any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence, overruling its prior decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 570 U.S. at 103 . 2024Before we address the Attorney General's harmless constitutional error argument, we deem it important to point out that our persistent offender statute 14 The Court in Alleyne applied Apprendi to any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence, overruling its prior decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 570 U.S. at 103 . | 5 | 2024–2024 |
State v. MacOn
green
2 sentences1991While Bagley and Strickland require a "reasonable probability" that the verdict would have been different, the harmless constitutional error standard, as interpreted by our Supreme Court in State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 , 273 A. 2d 1 (1971), requires only a "real possibility" of injustice as the basis for a reversal. 1991While Bagley and Strickland require a "reasonable probability" that the verdict would have been different, the harmless constitutional error standard, as interpreted by our Supreme Court in State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 , 273 A. 2d 1 (1971), requires only a "real possibility" of injustice as the basis for a reversal. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1968In promulgating the harmless-constitutional-error rule the court indicated an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that affect the substantial rights of a party and iterated with approval (at pp. 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ) the approach it followed in Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed. 2 d 171 (1963), where it said, "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." We conclude that under the Chapman rule, in order to justify a finding that a constituti 1968In promulgating the harmless-constitutional-error rule the court indicated an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that affect the substantial rights of a party and iterated with approval (at pp. 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ) the approach it followed in Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed. 2 d 171 (1963), where it said, "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." We conclude that under the Chapman rule, in order to justify a finding that a constituti | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1968It stated that all harmless-error rules, state and federal, serve a useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of a trial, and concluded that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring an automatic reversal. (at pp. 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824 ). 1968In promulgating the harmless-constitutional-error rule the court indicated an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that affect the substantial rights of a party and iterated with approval (at pp. 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ) the approach it followed in Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed. 2 d 171 (1963), where it said, "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." We conclude that under the Chapman rule, in order to justify a finding that a constituti | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.