identification requirement in California

2012“There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. ‘Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.’ [Citation.]” (Talley v. California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 559, 563 , 80 S.Ct. 536 ] [invalidating ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafleting].) RMC section 6.36.100 prohibits illegal handbills, including those that are “offensive to public morals or decency or contain[]

2012“There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. ‘Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.’ [Citation.]” (Talley v. California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64 [ 4 L.Ed.2d 559, 563 , 80 S.Ct. 536 ] [invalidating ordinance prohibiting all anonymous leafleting].) RMC section 6.36.100 prohibits illegal handbills, including those that are “offensive to public morals or decency or contain[]

2025(Id. at pp. 837–839; see also Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 716 , fn. 9 his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the various alleged sentencing errors in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No. A172654.

2025(Id. at pp. 837–839; see also Wade, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 716 , fn. 9 his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the various alleged sentencing errors in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No. A172654.

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2025(See, e.g., id., at pp. 829, 867–869 [where “EIR’s disclosures about the mitigation measures were inadequate,” subsequent “adoption of a statement of overriding considerations did not render harmless” lead agency’s failure to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure requirements].) While the foregoing deficiencies are substantial, our deeper concern lies with Metro’s rejection of an additional measure that was suggested to supplement mitigation measure NOI-A. As we have discussed, the identification and analysis of mitigation measures is critical to informing decisionmakers and the public of

2023(Fonseca v. City of Gilroy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182 (Fonseca).) In broad terms, the mandatory components of a housing element include “an identification and analysis of existing and projected housing needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified objectives, financial resources, and scheduled programs for the preservation, improvement, and development of housing.” (§ 65583.) Three specific mandatory components relevant to this appeal are the assessment of housing needs, the inventory of resources and constraints relevant to meeting those needs, and the program of the scheduled a

2007The Housing Element Declaring affordable housing “a priority of the highest order” and one not merely a local concern but a matter of. “vital statewide importance,” the Legislature in 1980 enacted legislation to require each local government to adopt a “housing element” as a component of its general plan. (§§ 65580, subd. (a), 65581, subd. (b), 65582, subd. (d).) According to the Housing Element Law, a public locality’s general plan “must include a housing element consisting of several mandatory components.” (Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 978 [ 28 C

2007The Housing Element Declaring affordable housing “a priority of the highest order” and one not merely a local concern but a matter of. “vital statewide importance,” the Legislature in 1980 enacted legislation to require each local government to adopt a “housing element” as a component of its general plan. (§§ 65580, subd. (a), 65581, subd. (b), 65582, subd. (d).) According to the Housing Element Law, a public locality’s general plan “must include a housing element consisting of several mandatory components.” (Black Property Owners Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 978 [ 28 C

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority's grant of "wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 255, 41 P.3d at p. 75 .) "Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement." ( Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 .) With this in mind, I would adopt an "objective reasonableness" standard that requires t

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority's grant of "wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 255, 41 P.3d at p. 75 .) "Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement." ( Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 .) With this in mind, I would adopt an "objective reasonableness" standard that requires t

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority's grant of "wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 255, 41 P.3d at p. 75 .) "Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement." ( Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 .) With this in mind, I would adopt an "objective reasonableness" standard that requires t

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority’s grant of “wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 624.) “Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement.” (Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 [ 103 S.Ct. at p. 1860 ].) With this in mind, I would adopt an “objective reasonableness” standard that requires the arresting officer to articulate

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority's grant of "wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 255, 41 P.3d at p. 75 .) "Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement." ( Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 .) With this in mind, I would adopt an "objective reasonableness" standard that requires t

2002(Cf. Monroe, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 267 .) Therefore, Kolender is problematic to the majority's grant of "wide discretion to the officer to determine what evidence is satisfactory." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 255, 41 P.3d at p. 75 .) "Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement." ( Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 361 , 103 S.Ct. 1855 .) With this in mind, I would adopt an "objective reasonableness" standard that requires t

1993(See People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 287-290 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 753 P.2d 1052 ].) The trial court correctly ruled that Sems’s photo identification of defendant was admissible under the prior identification exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1238. 31 Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the alleged kidnapping did not turn upon whether the prosecution could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver of the pickup truck.

1993(See People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 287-290 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 753 P.2d 1052 ].) The trial court correctly ruled that Sems’s photo identification of defendant was admissible under the prior identification exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1238. 31 Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the alleged kidnapping did not turn upon whether the prosecution could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver of the pickup truck.

1993(See People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 287-290 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 753 P.2d 1052 ].) The trial court correctly ruled that Sems's photo identification of defendant was admissible under the prior identification exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1238. [31] Contrary to defendant's assertion, the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the alleged kidnapping did not turn upon whether the prosecution could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver of the pickup truck. ( People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 648 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 , 74

1993(See People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 287-290 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 753 P.2d 1052 ].) The trial court correctly ruled that Sems's photo identification of defendant was admissible under the prior identification exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1238. [31] Contrary to defendant's assertion, the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the alleged kidnapping did not turn upon whether the prosecution could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the driver of the pickup truck. ( People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 648 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 , 74

1991The “similar characteristics” which would signal the existence of a “special relationship” could be found in almost any “special” kind of commercial contractual relationship. 7 Rather than rushing to expand the tort, however, most courts followed the Seaman’s admonition to “proceed with caution.” (Seaman’s, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 769 .) Quigley v. Pet, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 877, 892 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 394 ] denied application of the tort remedy in a breach of contract for the hauling of walnuts, finding a lack of the elements of “public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility.”

1991The “similar characteristics” which would signal the existence of a “special relationship” could be found in almost any “special” kind of commercial contractual relationship. 7 Rather than rushing to expand the tort, however, most courts followed the Seaman’s admonition to “proceed with caution.” (Seaman’s, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 769 .) Quigley v. Pet, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 877, 892 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 394 ] denied application of the tort remedy in a breach of contract for the hauling of walnuts, finding a lack of the elements of “public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility.”