identification exception in District of Columbia

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015See Brown, supra, 840 A. 2d at 88 (―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖); Sparks, supra, 755 A.2d at 399 (―[A] prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖).

2011“The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.” (Larry) Brown, supra, 840 A.2d at 88 (citing Morris v. United States, 398 A.2d 333, 336 (D.C.1978); Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App.

2003The government argues that the notation of the telephone number is admissible under the identification exception to the hearsay rule. 15 See Morris v. United States, 398 A.2d 333, 338 (D.C.1978).

2007“The exclusion of prior consistent statements is intended to avoid the prejudice of unfairly bolstering the witness’ credibility.” Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 410 (D.C.2003) (citations omitted).

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

2000D.C. 27, 408 F.2d 1230 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969); Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984)). 7 However, “testimony recounting details of the complainant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception.” Battle, 630 A.2d at 215 .

1995See Morris v. United States, 389 A.2d 1346, 1349-51 (D.C.1978).

1993See Morris v. United States, 389 A.2d 1346, 1351 (D.C.1978).

2000D.C. 27, 408 F.2d 1230 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969); Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984)). 7 However, “testimony recounting details of the complainant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception.” Battle, 630 A.2d at 215 .

1984In Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 27 , 408 F.2d 1230 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 , 89 S.Ct. *1156 1318, 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969), this jurisdiction adopted the prior identification exception permitting introduction of an out-of-court identification made by a witness who testified at trial.

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

2003(Evidence that the child complainant said that the defendant was the person with whom she was having sex is admissible under the identification exception.); see also Battle, 630 A.2d at 215 .

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

2004See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 386-387 (D.C.2000) (victim’s statements identifying defendant as the person who sexually abused her, but including no details of the sexual incidents, were admissible under Morris).

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

1986Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 837 (D.C.1981); Morris v. United States, 398 A.2d 333, 337-338 (D.C.1978); Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 40 , 408 F.2d 1230, 1243 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 964 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969).

1996See, e.g., Paris v. United States, 515 A.2d 199, 204-05 (D.C.1986).

1994See Paris v. United States, 515 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1986). 14 .

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2005As to the extent to which description of the crime may be admitted as part of a statement of identification, compare Williams v. United States, 756 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.2000) (quoting Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 215 (D.C.1993) ("|T]estimony • recounting the details of the [declarant’s descriptions of the offense would not be admissible under the prior identification exception”)), Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 660 (D.C.1984) (noting that the declarant's statements made while identifying a suspect from a photo array lay outside the prior identification exception to the hearsay

2004The prior identification exception originated in case law and is now also codified in D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3) (2001). 15 Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1195 (D.C.1999); see Johnson v. United States, 820 A.2d 551, 557-559 (D.C. 2003).

2015Moreover, ―[t]he preponderance of evidence standard . . . is traditionally used in deciding 19 preliminary fact questions.‖ Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C. 1997); United States v. Woodfolk, 656 A.2d 1145 , 1150 n.14 (D.C. 1995) (―[P]reponderance of the evidence is the most commonly accepted standard of proof for determining the admissibility of evidence.‖). ―To conclude that an error is harmless, we must find it highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.‖ Odemns, supra, 901 A.2d at 782 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (q

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Furthermore, even assuming the trial court committed error in admitting Ms. Jackson‘s statements regarding Bradley‘s identification of Mr. Foreman, we are satisfied on this record that the error would be harmless because ―it is ‗highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.‘‖ Headspeth v. United States, 86 A.3d 559, 567 (D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 844 (D.C. 2006) (en banc)).

2015Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (citing United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988)). ―Section 14-102 (b)(3) plainly states that a prior statement regarding an identification of a person made after perceiving the person constitutes substantive evidence.‖ Id. ―The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made.‖ Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C. 2004). ―[H]earsay declarants must have personal knowl

2015Furthermore, even assuming the trial court committed error in admitting Ms. Jackson‘s statements regarding Bradley‘s identification of Mr. Foreman, we are satisfied on this record that the error would be harmless because ―it is ‗highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.‘‖ Headspeth v. United States, 86 A.3d 559, 567 (D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 844 (D.C. 2006) (en banc)).

2015Moreover, ―[t]he preponderance of evidence standard . . . is traditionally used in deciding 19 preliminary fact questions.‖ Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165, 169 (D.C. 1997); United States v. Woodfolk, 656 A.2d 1145 , 1150 n.14 (D.C. 1995) (―[P]reponderance of the evidence is the most commonly accepted standard of proof for determining the admissibility of evidence.‖). ―To conclude that an error is harmless, we must find it highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.‖ Odemns, supra, 901 A.2d at 782 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (q

2011See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (holding that a “witness’ assertion of memory loss” does not render him unavailable to cross-examination for the purposes of the prior identification exception); Blunt v. United States, 959 A.2d 721, 732 (D.C.2008).

2011See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 , 108 S.Ct. 838 , 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (holding that a “witness’ assertion of memory loss” does not render him unavailable to cross-examination for the purposes of the prior identification exception); Blunt v. United States, 959 A.2d 721, 732 (D.C.2008).

2011See, e.g., Malloy v. United States, 797 A.2d 687, 690 (D.C.2002) (describing the admission of an excited utterance); (Lany) Brown, supra, 840 A.2d at 88 ("The prior identification exception to the hearsay rule allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification *1165 was made.”) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). 7 .See D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(2) (2001) ("A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement

2011(Henry) Brown, supra, 881 A.2d at 600 (“Although [appellant] argues that it was improper to use the consistency of [prior] descriptions to bolster [a witness’s] in-court testimony in the absence of a prior attack on that testimony, we see nothing inherently wrong with using prior statements of identification in this way.”) Here, the statement fits the exception, and was properly admitted as a prior statement of identification.

2004The prior identification exception originated in case law and is now also codified in D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3) (2001). 15 Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1195 (D.C.1999); see Johnson v. United States, 820 A.2d 551, 557-559 (D.C. 2003).

1993With respect to counsel’s failure to request an identification instruction, the government argues that if the applicable “redbook” instruction had been given, the jury’s attention would have been directed to a number of issues, most of which would have redounded significantly to the advantage of the prosecution. 11 Finally, the government argues that the judge did not abuse his discretion, see Sykes v. United States, 585 A.2d 1335, 1340 (D.C.1991), in declining to hold a hearing, because it was evident from the trial record that Webster did not suffer prejudice in the Strickland sense.