identification hearing in New York

1989We find unpersuasive the defendant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to give a minimal identification instruction (see, People v Whalen, 59 NY2d 273 ) warrants reversal of his conviction.

1987We find unpersuasive the defendant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to give a minimal identification instruction (see, People v Whalen, 59 NY2d 273 ) warrants reversal of the criminal sale conviction under the circumstances of this case.

1981At the identification hearing pursuant to United States v Wade ( 388 US 218 ), Nitschke testified that one robber (allegedly this defendant) had a dark complexion, was shorter than she was, namely five foot three to five foot four inches in height, and wore a blue peacoat at the robbery.

1979By order of this court, the defendant has been granted an identification hearing (United States v Wade, 388 US 218 ).

2014Finally, with regard to defendant’s claim that his sentence is harsh and excessive, as we discern no abuse of County Court’s discretion or any extraordinary circumstances, we are not compelled to reduce the sentence (see People v Wilson, 78 AD3d 1213, 1217 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 747 [2011]).

2014Finally, with regard to defendant’s claim that his sentence is harsh and excessive, as we discern no abuse of County Court’s discretion or any extraordinary circumstances, we are not compelled to reduce the sentence (see People v Wilson, 78 AD3d 1213, 1217 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 747 [2011]).

1909B. 115) has been repudiated (Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 ), it seems to me that, in a restricted sense, it does bear on the question of the defendant’s responsibility to the plaintiff, as in Waite v. North Eastern R.

1909B. 115, has been repudiated (Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 , 6 Sup. Ct. 391, 29 L.

2002However, the court did not reject market share liability in its entirety and went on to state: “That is not to say that on an adequate record this court would not recognize some relaxation of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate circumstances so as to allow recovery against a negligent defendant of that portion of a plaintiffs damages which is represented by that defendant’s contribution of DES to the market in the relevant period of time” (id., 386 Mass at 574, 437 NE2d at 190 ).

1984Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries.” Significantly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a recent comprehensive opinion responding to certified questions relating to liability issues in DES cases, indicated the possibility that on an adequate record the court would “recognize some relaxation of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate circumstances so as to allow recovery against a negligent defendant of that

1990Since the "showup” was not a police arranged confrontation for purposes of estab lishing the identity of the criminal actor (see, People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552 ), the County Court correctly ruled that there was no need to conduct an identification hearing (see, People v Medina, 111 AD2d 190 ; People v Dukes, 97 AD2d 445 ; Matter of Leo T., 87 AD2d 297 ).

1985Since this showup was not a “police-arranged [confrontation] between [the] defendant and [the complainant] * * * for the purpose of establishing the identity of the criminal actor” (People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552 ), there was no need for an identification hearing (see, People v Dukes, 97 AD2d 445 ; see also, People v Gissendanner, supra; Matter of Leo T., 87 AD2d 297 ).

1990Since the "showup” was not a police arranged confrontation for purposes of estab lishing the identity of the criminal actor (see, People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552 ), the County Court correctly ruled that there was no need to conduct an identification hearing (see, People v Medina, 111 AD2d 190 ; People v Dukes, 97 AD2d 445 ; Matter of Leo T., 87 AD2d 297 ).

1985Since this showup was not a “police-arranged [confrontation] between [the] defendant and [the complainant] * * * for the purpose of establishing the identity of the criminal actor” (People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552 ), there was no need for an identification hearing (see, People v Dukes, 97 AD2d 445 ; see also, People v Gissendanner, supra; Matter of Leo T., 87 AD2d 297 ).

1985Moreover, we also note that the showup occurred near the scene of the robbery within minutes after the robbery. “[P]rompt on-the-scene showups are generally held to be proper because, based on fresh recollections of recent events, they insure reliable identifications of perpetrators and the prompt release of innocent suspects” (People v Soto, 87 AD2d 618, 619 ; see also, People v Love, 57 NY2d 1023 ; People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703 ).

1982(See People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17, 24 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703; Russell v United States, 408 F2d 1280,1284.) Thus, in the instant case, the hospital showup was justified both as a necessary measure to identify the attacker of a person who was in danger of death (see Stovall v Denno, supra), and as a method to secure a prompt, and therefore reliable, identification of the perpetrator of a crime.

1985Moreover, we also note that the showup occurred near the scene of the robbery within minutes after the robbery. “[P]rompt on-the-scene showups are generally held to be proper because, based on fresh recollections of recent events, they insure reliable identifications of perpetrators and the prompt release of innocent suspects” (People v Soto, 87 AD2d 618, 619 ; see also, People v Love, 57 NY2d 1023 ; People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703 ).

1982(See People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17, 24 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703; Russell v United States, 408 F2d 1280,1284.) Thus, in the instant case, the hospital showup was justified both as a necessary measure to identify the attacker of a person who was in danger of death (see Stovall v Denno, supra), and as a method to secure a prompt, and therefore reliable, identification of the perpetrator of a crime.

1985Moreover, we also note that the showup occurred near the scene of the robbery within minutes after the robbery. “[P]rompt on-the-scene showups are generally held to be proper because, based on fresh recollections of recent events, they insure reliable identifications of perpetrators and the prompt release of innocent suspects” (People v Soto, 87 AD2d 618, 619 ; see also, People v Love, 57 NY2d 1023 ; People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703 ).

1982(See People v Brnja, 70 AD2d 17, 24 , affd 50 NY2d 366 ; People v Digiosaffatte, 63 AD2d 703; Russell v United States, 408 F2d 1280,1284.) Thus, in the instant case, the hospital showup was justified both as a necessary measure to identify the attacker of a person who was in danger of death (see Stovall v Denno, supra), and as a method to secure a prompt, and therefore reliable, identification of the perpetrator of a crime.

2017The United States Supreme Court noted in Landano that the character of the crime being investigated may constitute a "generic circumstance[ ]" from which "an implied assurance of confidentiality [to witnesses] fairly can be inferred" ( 508 U.S. at 179 , 113 S.Ct. 2014 ).

2017The United States Supreme Court noted in Landano that the character of the crime being investigated may constitute a "generic circumstance[ ]" from which "an implied assurance of confidentiality [to witnesses] fairly can be inferred" ( 508 U.S. at 179 , 113 S.Ct. 2014 ).

2017Dept., — NY3d —, 2017 NY Slip Op 07209 at *6 [Oct. 17, 2017]; Lesher, 19 NY3d at 64 ). - 5 - - 6 - No. 56 proceedings involving sensitive matters such as alleged sexual offenses committed against children.

2011Indeed, the Restoration Act had among its explicit purposes the rejection and overruling of the doctrine in McGrath v Toys “R” Us, Inc. ( 3 NY3d 421, 433-434 [2004]), which indicated that the City Council would need to amend the City HRL to specifically depart from a federal doctrine if it wanted to do so (see Williams, 61 AD3d at 73-74 ). 1 In any event, for us to create an exemption from the sweep of the Restoration Act for the most basic provision of the City HRL — that it is unlawful “to discriminate”— would impermissibly invade the legislative province. 2 And walling off from examination

2011IL As a preliminary matter, the identification of the framework for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in discrimination cases does not in any way constitute an exception to the section 8-130 rule that all aspects of the City HRL must be interpreted so as to accomplish the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the law (see Williams, 61 AD3d at 67 and n 4, 68, 74).

2006Plaintiffs contend that this identification requirement exceeds the Commissioner’s authority and violates the State Administrative Procedure Act because it effectively restricts the issuance of licenses to persons who are legally present in the United States, whereas the Vehicle and Traffic Law contains no requirement that an applicant establish legal presence in order to receive a license (citing Villegas v Silverman, 832 NE2d 598 [Ind App 2005]).

2001Defendants thus met their initial burden with respect to those causes of action by establishing that plaintiffs could not satisfy the identification requirement (see, Healey v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 87 NY2d 596, 601-603 ; Gifaldi v Dumont Co., 172 AD2d 1025, 1025-1026 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Brown v Elm Plumbing Supply, 271 AD2d 469 ; Escarria v American Gage & Mfg.

2001Co., 261 AD2d 434 ; Monaco v Camie-Campbell, Inc., 256 AD2d 1214, 1215 , lv dismissed in part and denied in part 93 NY2d 887 ).

2001Defendants thus met their initial burden with respect to those causes of action by establishing that plaintiffs could not satisfy the identification requirement (see, Healey v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 87 NY2d 596, 601-603 ; Gifaldi v Dumont Co., 172 AD2d 1025, 1025-1026 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Brown v Elm Plumbing Supply, 271 AD2d 469 ; Escarria v American Gage & Mfg.

2001Co., 261 AD2d 434 ; Monaco v Camie-Campbell, Inc., 256 AD2d 1214, 1215 , lv dismissed in part and denied in part 93 NY2d 887 ).

2001Co., 261 AD2d 434 ; Monaco v Camie-Campbell, Inc., 256 AD2d 1214, 1215 , lv dismissed in part and denied in part 93 NY2d 887 ).

2001Defendants thus met their initial burden with respect to those causes of action by establishing that plaintiffs could not satisfy the identification requirement (see, Healey v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 87 NY2d 596, 601-603 ; Gifaldi v Dumont Co., 172 AD2d 1025, 1025-1026 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Brown v Elm Plumbing Supply, 271 AD2d 469 ; Escarria v American Gage & Mfg.