identification error in Connecticut

2018The court in Lawson emphasized that an unnecessarily suggestive procedure was not a prerequisite for the exclusion of the identification under this test. 30 See *142 id., at 746-47 , 291 P.3d 673 .

2018The court in Lawson emphasized that an unnecessarily suggestive procedure was not a prerequisite for the exclusion of the identification under this test. 30 See *142 id., at 746-47 , 291 P.3d 673 .

2013The state relied on State v. Manson, 118 Conn. App. 538, 547, 549 , 984 A.2d 1099 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 902 , 988 A.2d 878 (2010), for the proposition that, where the victim knows the perpetrator, expert testimony is irrelevant, and cases stating that the identification factors were well known to the average person and that it is common knowledge that many of the identification factors about which Pernod would testify affect reliability. 19 In addition, the state argued that the hat and eyeglasses the robber was wearing were not a disguise and that none of the men in the photographic

2013The state relied on State v. Manson, 118 Conn. App. 538, 547, 549 , 984 A.2d 1099 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 902 , 988 A.2d 878 (2010), for the proposition that, where the victim knows the perpetrator, expert testimony is irrelevant, and cases stating that the identification factors were well known to the average person and that it is common knowledge that many of the identification factors about which Pernod would testify affect reliability. 19 In addition, the state argued that the hat and eyeglasses the robber was wearing were not a disguise and that none of the men in the photographic

2002C First Identification The defendant claims that Robinson's identification as the defendant was being led out of 300 Winthrop Avenue "was the product of an impermissible show-up identification procedure. . . ." (Defendant's Motion, p. 1.) Specifically, the defendant contends that once the police laid their hands upon him, they committed an impermissible state action that violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. "[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under

2002C First Identification The defendant claims that Robinson's identification as the defendant was being led out of 300 Winthrop Avenue "was the product of an impermissible show-up identification procedure. . . ." (Defendant's Motion, p. 1.) Specifically, the defendant contends that once the police laid their hands upon him, they committed an impermissible state action that violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. "[I]t is well established that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate to a challenge under

2002"If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not CT Page 12999 arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated." State v. Jones , 59 Conn. App. 762 , 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied , 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001).

2002"If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not CT Page 12999 arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated." State v. Jones , 59 Conn. App. 762 , 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied , 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001).

2002"If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not CT Page 12999 arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated." State v. Jones , 59 Conn. App. 762 , 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied , 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001).

2002"If an identification of a defendant is done spontaneously and is not CT Page 12999 arranged by the police, the identification is not tainted by state action and due process rights are not violated." State v. Jones , 59 Conn. App. 762 , 766 , 757 A.2d 689 (2000), cert. denied , 255 Conn. 924 , 767 A.2d 99 (2001).

1998The test "does little towards delineating the specific `kinds' of practices or consumer injuries which it encompasses," American Financial Services v. FTC , 767 F.2d 957 , 971 (C.A.D.C., 1985), commentators have made similar observations in referring to the 1980 modification of the "cigarette rule" which our court adopted in A-G Foods Inc .: "Without a more explicit economic focus, however, this modification still allows the FTC and the courts to roam freely in applying the unfairness doctrine," "Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S H and the Unfairness Doctrine", 1983 Duke L.J. 903 , 957; the test pro

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1992Cir. 1972); State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Davis, 198 Conn. 680 , 504 A.2d 1372 (1986); State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564 , 469 A.2d 397 (1983); supports the defendant’s argument that an identification instruction is constitutionally required.

1983We do not agree. “ ‘In determining whether identification procedures violate a defendant’s due process rights, the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on examination of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d 432 (1980); see State v. Ledbetter, 185 Conn. 607, 611 , 441 A.2d 595

1983We do not agree. “ ‘In determining whether identification procedures violate a defendant’s due process rights, the required inquiry is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on examination of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 371-72 , 438 A.2d 432 (1980); see State v. Ledbetter, 185 Conn. 607, 611 , 441 A.2d 595