abstract principle in Georgia

1964Co., 107 Ga. 500 (4) ( 33 SE 644 ): “A general assignment of error upon a designated portion of the judge’s charge will be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the particular language thus complained of states a correct abstract principle of law. (a) If it does, then the investigation here must end; for in the absence of a specific assignment of error, this court will not inquire whether the words excepted to are or are not adjusted to the issues and facts of the case, (b) If an instruction, excepted to in general terms, be erroneous because it is not a correct or accurate

1964Co., 107 Ga. 500 (4) ( 33 SE 644 ): “A general assignment of error upon a designated portion of the judge’s charge will be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the particular language thus complained of states a correct abstract principle of law. (a) If it does, then the investigation here must end; for in the absence of a specific assignment of error, this court will not inquire whether the words excepted to are or are not adjusted to the issues and facts of the case, (b) If an instruction, excepted to in general terms, be erroneous because it is not a correct or accurate

1965An exception that a charge is erroneous and unsound as an abstract principle of law raises only the question as to whether the principle of law embraced in such charge is, standing alone, a sound pronouncement of law, Tucker v. State, 25 Ga. App. 196 (1) ( 102 SE 880 ), Bankers Health &c.

1961Tucker v. State, 25 Ga. App. 196 (1) ( 102 SE 880 ); Bankers Health &c.

1965An exception that a charge is erroneous and unsound as an abstract principle of law raises only the question as to whether the principle of law embraced in such charge is, standing alone, a sound pronouncement of law, Tucker v. State, 25 Ga. App. 196 (1) ( 102 SE 880 ), Bankers Health &c.

1961Tucker v. State, 25 Ga. App. 196 (1) ( 102 SE 880 ); Bankers Health &c.

1954The first case called to our attention on this question (although it did not concern reasonable doubt) is Roberts v. State, 114 Ga. 450 (1) ( 40 S. E. 297 ), wherein the court said: “In a close and doubtful case it is error for the judge to refuse to give the jury, upon an appropriate written request submitted in due time, a charge applying to the facts, as shown by the evidence for the party making the request, the law applicable thereto; and this is true although the judge in his charge states the abstract principle of law aioplicable to those facts.” The facts of the instant case to our min

1954The first case called to our attention on this question (although it did not concern reasonable doubt) is Roberts v. State, 114 Ga. 450 (1) ( 40 S. E. 297 ), wherein the court said: “In a close and doubtful case it is error for the judge to refuse to give the jury, upon an appropriate written request submitted in due time, a charge applying to the facts, as shown by the evidence for the party making the request, the law applicable thereto; and this is true although the judge in his charge states the abstract principle of law aioplicable to those facts.” The facts of the instant case to our min

1941It is also true that the judge charged generally that if the jury believed the defendant guilty of any one of the acts of negligence *622 charged in the petition they would find for the plaintiffs if they believed such act was the proximate cause of the damage; but, as was said by Judge Lumpkin in Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465, 483 , “Ordinarily, general charges, however abstractly true, are worse than useless, . . and the only instructions which are worth anything are such as enable the jury to apply the law to the precise case made by the proof.” In Slade v. Paschal, 67 Ga. 541, 545 , the Supr

1909In the case of Slade v. Paschal, 67 Ga. 541 , the Supreme Court says: “To charge an abstract principle of law is well enough, but when the request goes further and seeks a charge that applies that principle to the facts of the case, if the proof justifies its application, to refuse it is error.

1968While the italicized portion of the charge is correct as an abstract principle of law concerning an unsworn statement, and is in language substantially identical to that which has *599 met the approval of the courts of this State prior to 1962 (e.g., see Poppell v. State, 71 Ga. 276, 278 ; Murray v. State, 85 Ga. 378, 381 ( 11 SE 655 ); Teasley v. State, 105 Ga. 842 (1) ( 32 SE 335 ); Ryals v. State, 125 Ga. 266 (1) ( 54 SE 168 ); Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 774 ( 59 SE 792 ); Goolsby v. State, 133 Ga. 427 ( 66 SE 159 ); Thurmond v. State, 198 Ga. 410, 417 ( 31 SE2d 804 ); Ash v. State, 109

1968While the italicized portion of the charge is correct as an abstract principle of law concerning an unsworn statement, and is in language substantially identical to that which has *599 met the approval of the courts of this State prior to 1962 (e.g., see Poppell v. State, 71 Ga. 276, 278 ; Murray v. State, 85 Ga. 378, 381 ( 11 SE 655 ); Teasley v. State, 105 Ga. 842 (1) ( 32 SE 335 ); Ryals v. State, 125 Ga. 266 (1) ( 54 SE 168 ); Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 774 ( 59 SE 792 ); Goolsby v. State, 133 Ga. 427 ( 66 SE 159 ); Thurmond v. State, 198 Ga. 410, 417 ( 31 SE2d 804 ); Ash v. State, 109

1961West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 85 Ga. App. 385 ( 69 SE2d 577 ); Roberts v. State, 88 Ga. App. 767 ( 77 SE2d 825 ).

1961West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 85 Ga. App. 385 ( 69 SE2d 577 ); Roberts v. State, 88 Ga. App. 767 ( 77 SE2d 825 ).

1961West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 85 Ga. App. 385 ( 69 SE2d 577 ); Roberts v. State, 88 Ga. App. 767 ( 77 SE2d 825 ).

1961West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 85 Ga. App. 385 ( 69 SE2d 577 ); Roberts v. State, 88 Ga. App. 767 ( 77 SE2d 825 ).

1945In Yarborough v. State. 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S. E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: “No proposition of law can be laid down without some' implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing.” This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S. E. 895 ) : “To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial.” The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the def

1945In Yarborough v. State, 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S.E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: "No proposition of law can be laid down without some implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing." This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S.E. 895 ): "To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial." The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the defenda

1945In Yarborough v. State. 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S. E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: “No proposition of law can be laid down without some' implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing.” This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S. E. 895 ) : “To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial.” The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the def

1945In Yarborough v. State, 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S.E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: "No proposition of law can be laid down without some implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing." This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S.E. 895 ): "To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial." The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the defenda

1945In Yarborough v. State, 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S.E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: "No proposition of law can be laid down without some implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing." This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S.E. 895 ): "To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial." The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the defenda

1945In Yarborough v. State, 86 Ga. 396 ( 12 S.E. 650 ), Judge Bleckley made this statement: "No proposition of law can be laid down without some implication of a state of facts as by possibility existing." This court held in Densley v. State, 24 Ga. App. 136 (2) ( 99 S.E. 895 ): "To declare the law applicable to a given state of facts is no expression or intimation of opinion as to whether any of the facts referred to do or do not exist in the case on trial." The statement of the court herein complained of was a mere preface to the charge as to the law applicable to the evidence and to the defenda

1943Thomas v. State, supra; Loeb v. State, 6 Ga. App. 23 (1a), 30 ( 64 S. E. 338 ).

1943Thomas v. State, supra; Loeb v. State, 6 Ga. App. 23 (1a), 30 ( 64 S. E. 338 ).

1941It is also true that the judge charged generally that if the jury believed the defendant guilty of any one of the acts of negligence *622 charged in the petition they would find for the plaintiffs if they believed such act was the proximate cause of the damage; but, as was said by Judge Lumpkin in Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465, 483 , “Ordinarily, general charges, however abstractly true, are worse than useless, . . and the only instructions which are worth anything are such as enable the jury to apply the law to the precise case made by the proof.” In Slade v. Paschal, 67 Ga. 541, 545 , the Supr

1901In Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465, 483 , Judge Lumpkin said: “ I give it as the result of thirty-four years’ experience that ordinarily general charges, however abstractly true, are worse than useless — their effect being to misguide instead of directing the jury to a right finding; and the only instructions which are worth anything are such as enable the jury to apply the law to the precise case made by the proof.” In the case of Slade v. Paschal, 67 Ga. 541, 545 , Mr. Justice Speer said: “To charge an abstract principle of law is well enough, but when the request goes further and seeks-a charge

1940Co., 107 Ga. 500 (4, a, b, c), 510 ( 33 S. E. 644 ); Frank v. Adams, 144 Ga. 270 (2) ( 87 S. E. 3 ); Jefferson v. State, 131 Ga. 28 ( 61 S. E. 997 ); Central Ry.

1940Co., 107 Ga. 500 (4, a, b, c), 510 ( 33 S. E. 644 ); Frank v. Adams, 144 Ga. 270 (2) ( 87 S. E. 3 ); Jefferson v. State, 131 Ga. 28 ( 61 S. E. 997 ); Central Ry.

2025Likewise in Patterson the appellant had brought an abstract challenge to a 10 statute of general application, but”had not been charged with violation of the statute nor had there been any showing of intent by authorities to take any action pursuant to the statute.” 242 Ga. App. at 132 .

2012A court is not required to “instruct in the exact language of a request, even though the request may be correct as an abstract principle of law which is directly 19 165 Ga. App. 169, 170 (3) ( 299 SE2d 123 ) (1983). 20 Bettis v. Comfort Control, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 104 ( 153 SE2d 678 ) (1967); Bd. of Drainage Commrs. &c. v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 735 ( 131 SE 911 ) (1925). 21 (Emphasis supplied.) 12 applicable to a material issue.”22 Here, the trial court charged the jury, in pertinent part, that “[p]erformance of a contract, to be effectual, must be substantially in compliance with the spi

2012A court is not required to “instruct in the exact language of a request, even though the request may be correct as an abstract principle of law which is directly 19 165 Ga. App. 169, 170 (3) ( 299 SE2d 123 ) (1983). 20 Bettis v. Comfort Control, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 104 ( 153 SE2d 678 ) (1967); Bd. of Drainage Commrs. &c. v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 735 ( 131 SE 911 ) (1925). 21 (Emphasis supplied.) 12 applicable to a material issue.”22 Here, the trial court charged the jury, in pertinent part, that “[p]erformance of a contract, to be effectual, must be substantially in compliance with the spi

2005The trial court properly charged the jury regarding Navy’s duty of care; the trial court charged the jury that a *183 driver has a duty to yield the right of way to “authorized pedestrians actually engaged in work upon the highway. . . .” 2 “Reversible error will not be found in the refusal of the trial court to give a charge which, while constituting a correct statement of an abstract principle of law, was not adjusted to the evidence introduced at trial.” (Citation omitted.) Campbell v. Cozad, 207 Ga. App. 175 (1) ( 427 SE2d 515 ) (1993).

2005The trial court properly charged the jury regarding Navy’s duty of care; the trial court charged the jury that a *183 driver has a duty to yield the right of way to “authorized pedestrians actually engaged in work upon the highway. . . .” 2 “Reversible error will not be found in the refusal of the trial court to give a charge which, while constituting a correct statement of an abstract principle of law, was not adjusted to the evidence introduced at trial.” (Citation omitted.) Campbell v. Cozad, 207 Ga. App. 175 (1) ( 427 SE2d 515 ) (1993).

1994The fact that the experts disagreed as to the specific amount, is not evidence that valuation by the fair market value approach would not provide adequate compensation. *551 “The issue of whether land taken or damaged in an eminent domain proceeding is unique or peculiar is a jury question. [Cit.] But, a charge to the jury on this subject which is correct as an abstract principle of law, if not supported by the evidence, may tend to confuse or mislead the jury and is error which is presumptively harmful to the losing party. [Cits.]” Id. at 353 .