abstract rule in New York

2025Although this Court is "not bound to adhere to federal standing requirements" ( US Bank N.A. v Nelson , 36 NY3d 998 , 1003 n 4 [2020] [Wilson, J., concurring]), under New York law, plaintiffs must nevertheless demonstrate that they suffered an "injury in fact" ( Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Daniels , 33 NY3d 44 , 50 [2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2008I say this only because of the gratuitous nature of the relief ordered in Stern , without explanation of whether it was ordered as reformation of the contract or as an adjunct of the Court’s broad equitable powers, and without citation of any supporting authority, and because the abstract rule announced in Edelman , that when “a party unilaterally breaches an agreement not to compete and the time period during which competition was precluded has since expired, such time period may be extended for the length of time that the offending party was in violation of the agreement” ( 42 AD3d at 322 ),

2007Defendant similarly failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in instructing the jury that defendant did “not raise any issue that the statement was obtained in violation of law” (see generally People v Robinson, 88 NY2d 1001 [1996]).

1989We have acknowledged this concept time and time again (see, e.g., People v Hooper, 112 AD2d 317 ; People v McCrimmon, 131 AD2d 598 ; People v Azzara, 138 AD2d 495 ) and, as an abstract rule, I agree with it.

1989We have acknowledged this concept time and time again (see, e.g., People v Hooper, 112 AD2d 317 ; People v McCrimmon, 131 AD2d 598 ; People v Azzara, 138 AD2d 495 ) and, as an abstract rule, I agree with it.

1989We have acknowledged this concept time and time again (see, e.g., People v Hooper, 112 AD2d 317 ; People v McCrimmon, 131 AD2d 598 ; People v Azzara, 138 AD2d 495 ) and, as an abstract rule, I agree with it.

1987(Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 NY 259, 267 ; see, International Harvester Co. v Kentucky, 234 US 579, 587-588 ; Simonson v International Bank, 14 NY2d 281 ; CPLR 301.) Although an abstract test for determining the presence of a foreign corporation has never been articulated, if it is doing business here, "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity” it is within the jurisdiction of our courts.

1987(Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 NY 259, 267 ; see, International Harvester Co. v Kentucky, 234 US 579, 587-588 ; Simonson v International Bank, 14 NY2d 281 ; CPLR 301.) Although an abstract test for determining the presence of a foreign corporation has never been articulated, if it is doing business here, "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity” it is within the jurisdiction of our courts.

1939(Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375 ; Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383 ; affd., without opinion, 185 N. Y. 550 .) As stated by the Appellate Division of the Second Department: “ The contemporaneous delivery and acceptance of a mortgage to secure the bond covering property in the State of New Jersey, however, imports an intention that the laws of that State should govern the right of action on the bond and mortgage if there be submission to its jurisdiction.

1939(Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375 ; Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383 ; affd., without opinion, 185 N. Y. 550 .) As stated by the Appellate Division of the Second Department: “ The contemporaneous delivery and acceptance of a mortgage to secure the bond covering property in the State of New Jersey, however, imports an intention that the laws of that State should govern the right of action on the bond and mortgage if there be submission to its jurisdiction.

1939(Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375 ; Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383 ; affd., without opinion, 185 N. Y. 550 .) As stated by the Appellate Division of the Second Department: “ The contemporaneous delivery and acceptance of a mortgage to secure the bond covering property in the State of New Jersey, however, imports an intention that the laws of that State should govern the right of action on the bond and mortgage if there be submission to its jurisdiction.

1930The Supreme Court of the United States in Payne v. Kansas ( 248 U. S. 112 , followed in Arnold v. Hanna, 276 U. S. 591 , affg. 315 Mo. 823 ) had before it a State law forbidding the sale of farm produce on commission without an annual license obtained on a *312 proper showing of character, responsibility, etc., and a bond conditioned to make honest accounting.

1930The Supreme Court of the United States in Payne v. Kansas ( 248 U. S. 112 , followed in Arnold v. Hanna, 276 U. S. 591 , affg. 315 Mo. 823 ) had before it a State law forbidding the sale of farm produce on commission without an annual license obtained on a *312 proper showing of character, responsibility, etc., and a bond conditioned to make honest accounting.

1930The Supreme Court of the United States in Payne v. Kansas ( 248 U. S. 112 , followed in Arnold v. Hanna, 276 U. S. 591 , affg. 315 Mo. 823 ) had before it a State law forbidding the sale of farm produce on commission without an annual license obtained on a *312 proper showing of character, responsibility, etc., and a bond conditioned to make honest accounting.

1927(Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 .) It defines citizens of the United States and of the several States, and provides that “ No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It is the contention of relators that under this statute (1) they are being deprived of property without due process of law, because there is provided no method of review of the assessment by the courts; and (2) they a

1927(Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 .) It defines citizens of the United States and of the several States, and provides that “ No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It is the contention of relators that under this statute (1) they are being deprived of property without due process of law, because there is provided no method of review of the assessment by the courts; and (2) they a

1903S. 134, § 6, revised by Laws of 1896, chap. 547, § 207) and reliance is had upon Sturtevant v. Sturtervant ( 20 N. Y. 39 ); Wheeler v. Reynolds (66 id. 227), and kindred cases which do hold the abstract principle that a parol trust cannot be created.

1903Flinn v. World’s Dispensary, 64 App. Div. 490 , 72 N. Y.

1903Flinn v. World’s Dispensary, 64 App. Div. 490 , 72 N. Y.

1894It precedes those questions, and a decision upholding the jurisdiction of the court is entirely consistent with a denial of any equity in the plaintiff, or in any one else.” People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263 .

1891(National Bank v. Insurance Company, 104 U. S. *267 54, and the cases there cited; Wright v. Cabot, 89 N. Y. 570 ; Baker v. N. Y.

1889“The law,” says Chief Justice Kent, “has always hada regard to derivative titles when fairly procured, and though it may be true, as an abstract principle, that a derivative title cannot be better than that from which it was derived, yet there are many necessary exceptions to the operation of this principle.” (Jackson v. Henry, 10 Johns. 184 .) In the case of fraudulent conveyances, which the statute declares to be “ utterly void,” it has been well settled “ that a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, has a good title, though he purchases from one who has obtained his title

1887In such a case there being no pretense of collusion and no reason to impute carelessness or inattention to the judges, the determination should be considered final and conclusive upon all persons m interest or who may become interested in the question, as well as upon the parties to the particular action.” '(Chase v. Chase, 95 N. Y. 373 .) *197 The application of this doctrine to the case in hand seems peculiarly appropriate, inasmuch as a large estate has been administered by the present plaintiffs, in accordance with the principles declared in the former decision, and the entire known proper

1881In the case of Mosher v. Hotchkiss ( 3 Keyes, 161 ), although it was a case of guaranty of collection, the court lays down the abstract rule, as one of the reasons why the guarantor should not be allowed to have the costs of an action against the principal deducted from an amount collected from him and applied to the principal,—that where a sum of money has been collected by action against the principal debtor, the surety can have no equity to demand that so much of the money as shall be necessary to pay the expense of the collection, shall be withheld from that object, and be applied exclusiv