abstract principle (Kansas) · Go Syfert
← Kansas issues

abstract principle in Kansas

10 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1909–1993 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
State ex rel. Godard v. Johnsongreen
kan · 1900 · cited in 1 Kansas opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
1 sentence

1993In exercising such power, whether by the legislature or by a commission, general rules prescribing the duties, fixing the rights and regulating the conduct of persons and corporations in the future are made, and the combining of such a power with those essentially judicial, or vesting it in a court, is a palpable and flagrant violation of the constitutional principle and limitation regulating the separation of the sovereign powers." ( Johnson at pp. 820-821) The second factor involving the degree of control by the judiciary over the executive branch is obvious because this essentially executiv

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Robert R. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company green
· 1908
2 sentences

1979In Gawith v. Gage’s Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 *438 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966 (1970), Justice Schroeder (now Chief Justice) cites with approval what he calls the “classic statement setting out the abstract test” to be used in determining between an administrative entity performing a judicial or legislative function and quotes Justice Holmes from the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 , 53 L.Ed. 150 , 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908), as follows: “ . .

1977Another test is whether the function the administrative agency performs is one that courts historically have been accustomed to perform and had performed prior to the creation of the administrative body, [cases cited] [p. 178] “The classic statement setting out the abstract test to be applied by courts in distinguishing the judicial power from legislative power when examining administrative agencies was made by Justice Holmes speaking for the court in Prentise v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 , 53 L.

41970–1979
Garfield v. United States Ex Rel. Allison green
scotus · 1908
2 sentences

1979In Gawith v. Gage’s Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 *438 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966 (1970), Justice Schroeder (now Chief Justice) cites with approval what he calls the “classic statement setting out the abstract test” to be used in determining between an administrative entity performing a judicial or legislative function and quotes Justice Holmes from the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 , 53 L.Ed. 150 , 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908), as follows: “ . .

1975Another test is whether the function the administrative agency performs is one that courts historically have been accustomed to perform and had performed prior to the creation of the administrative body. [Citations omitted.] "The classic statement setting out the abstract test to be applied by courts in distinguishing the judicial power from legislative power when examining administrative agencies was made by Justice Holmes speaking for the court in Prentise v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 , 53 L.Ed. 150 , 29 S.Ct. 67 .

41970–1979
Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. green
kan · 1970
1 sentence

1979In Gawith v. Gage’s Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 206 *438 Kan. 169, 476 P.2d 966 (1970), Justice Schroeder (now Chief Justice) cites with approval what he calls the “classic statement setting out the abstract test” to be used in determining between an administrative entity performing a judicial or legislative function and quotes Justice Holmes from the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 , 53 L.Ed. 150 , 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908), as follows: “ . .

11979–1979
Herrold v. Amrine green
kan · 1941
1 sentence

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

11973–1973
State v. Lammon green
kan · 1941
1 sentence

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

11973–1973
State v. Myers green
kan · 1942
2 sentences

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

11973–1973
State v. Decker neutral
kan · 1971
2 sentences

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

1973(State v. Decker, 207 Kan. 374 , 485 P.2d 171 ; State v. Myers, 154 Kan. 648 , 121 P. 2d 286 ; and State v. Lammon, 153 Kan. 822 , 113 P. 2d 1052 .) An examination of those cases reveals that the court was dealing with presumption of intent as an abstract principle of law and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish intent in a particular case.

11973–1973
Gibbs v. Erbert green
kan · 1967
2 sentences

1970Plaintiff cites decisions of this court to the effect that parol evidence is admissible to supply an omission in a written contract such as in Gibbs v. Erbert, 198 Kan. 403 , 424 P. 2d 276 , where it was held: “Where a written contract is incomplete or silent in some essential point incident thereto, parol evidence is admissible to aid in its construction or to show the complete agreement of the parties of which the writing is only a part.” (Syl. f3.) As an abstract principle of law, the correctness of the rule cited by plaintiff must be conceded, but it is inapplicable with respect to the ins

1970Plaintiff cites decisions of this court to the effect that parol evidence is admissible to supply an omission in a written contract such as in Gibbs v. Erbert, 198 Kan. 403 , 424 P. 2d 276 , where it was held: “Where a written contract is incomplete or silent in some essential point incident thereto, parol evidence is admissible to aid in its construction or to show the complete agreement of the parties of which the writing is only a part.” (Syl. f3.) As an abstract principle of law, the correctness of the rule cited by plaintiff must be conceded, but it is inapplicable with respect to the ins

11970–1970
Hollingsworth v. Sell neutral
kan · 1949
2 sentences

1969(See Hollingsworth v. Sell, 167 Kan. 405 , 207 P. 2d 406 .) However, it is not applicable to a contract qualified by an absolving clause, as found in the present case.

1969(See Hollingsworth v. Sell, 167 Kan. 405 , 207 P. 2d 406 .) However, it is not applicable to a contract qualified by an absolving clause, as found in the present case.

11969–1969
Bales v. Wichita Midland Valley Railroad green
kan · 1914
2 sentences

1959With respect to business loss or loss of profits we conclude that as an abstract principle of law no allowance may be made for the loss of profits to a business in a condemnation proceeding (Bales v. Railroad Co., 92 Kan. 771 , 141 Pac. 1009 ), however, we know of no rule which forbids an expert witness to take into account the fact that the business conducted on the premises was a profitable one.

1959With respect to business loss or loss of profits we conclude that as an abstract principle of law no allowance may be made for the loss of profits to a business in a condemnation proceeding (Bales v. Railroad Co., 92 Kan. 771 , 141 Pac. 1009 ), however, we know of no rule which forbids an expert witness to take into account the fact that the business conducted on the premises was a profitable one.

11959–1959
Troy Housing Authority v. Clemente Bros. neutral
nyappdiv · 1957
1 sentence

1959We think that an expert witness may properly consider that fact as tending to show the property could be and had been adapted to a use which was profitably carried on ( Troy Housing Authority v. Clemente Brothers, Inc., 164 N.Y.S.2d 555 ).

11959–1959
Phillips v. W. A. Crips & Brother green
iowa · 1899
1 sentence

1909Held, that where some thirteen hundred questions and answers are set out in full, and the remaihing answers printed in full, simply omitting questions, thereby bringing into the record a mass of irrelevant matter, the court will affirm the judgment, as authorized by rule 21.” (Phillips v. Crips, 108 Iowa, 605 , syllabus, 79 N. W. 373 .) The abstract rule was adopted, however, for the benefit of the court, to aid it in the decision of causes, and not for the purpose of affording parties new grounds upon which to secure dismissals or affirmances.

11909–1909
Hurley v. Hurley neutral
iowa · 1902
2 sentences

1909It would be entirely proper to dismiss the proceeding or to affirm the judgment of the district court because the defendant has violated the abstract rule. • “Where the appellant disregarded the rules of - the supreme court requiring the abridgment of evidence, and printed in his abstract the complete transcript- of the evidence, the decree will be affirmed.” (Hurley v. Hurley, 117 Iowa, 621 , syllabus, 91 N. W. 895 .) .“Supreme court rule 20 provides that the abstract shall contain so much of the record as may be necessary to an understanding of the question to be determined.

1909It would be entirely proper to dismiss the proceeding or to affirm the judgment of the district court because the defendant has violated the abstract rule. • “Where the appellant disregarded the rules of - the supreme court requiring the abridgment of evidence, and printed in his abstract the complete transcript- of the evidence, the decree will be affirmed.” (Hurley v. Hurley, 117 Iowa, 621 , syllabus, 91 N. W. 895 .) .“Supreme court rule 20 provides that the abstract shall contain so much of the record as may be necessary to an understanding of the question to be determined.

11909–1909

Where else courts name it

TX 167 (1867–2026) GA 143 (1900–2025) CA 45 (1903–2026) MS 35 (1957–2024) MO 32 (1882–2018) OH 29 (1952–2023) OR 27 (1905–2014) AL 27 (1846–2016) NC 26 (1889–2025) IL 24 (1886–2019) WV 21 (1924–2024) AR 20 (1898–2016) CO 18 (1904–2016) MD 17 (1932–2022) FL 15 (1848–2015) NY 14 (1881–2025) AZ 12 (1922–2020) WA 12 (1904–2026) KS 10 (1909–1993) KY 10 (1922–2013) IA 10 (1941–2021) IN 10 (1886–1984) PA 9 (1917–2025) NJ 8 (1952–2026) CT 7 (1934–2011) MA 7 (1928–2019) MI 6 (1920–2026) NM 5 (2009–2020) OK 5 (1925–1970) DE 5 (1968–2008) VA 5 (1900–2010) MT 4 (1920–1936) TN 4 (1947–2003) RI 3 (1980–2023) MN 3 (1908–2007) DC 3 (2011–2018) UT 3 (1982–2007) NV 3 (2018–2018) WY 3 (1924–2023) LA 3 (1850–2000) SD 2 (1909–2025) ME 2 (1935–1969) NE 2 (1920–1921)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check