Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
45 California opinions name it 4 courts 1903–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Humphreygreen2 sentences2024(See Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1094 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [“the objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but one based on the defendant’s perception of imminent harm or death” (italics added)].) For example, a defendant claiming self-defense may present evidence that the victim previously threatened or attacked the defendant, or had a reputation 11 for violence known to the defendant. 2022(See People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 (Humphrey); see also CALCRIM No. 3470.) The law of self-defense “recognizes that the objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but one based on the defendant’s perception of imminent harm or death. | 2 | 6 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Known *692 as the "residual clause," that clause used the following italicized language to identify particular prior convictions that would significantly increase a defendant's punishment: those for a crime that "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another ." ( Johnson , supra , 135 S.Ct. at pp. 2555-2556.) The Court held that "[t]wo features of the residual clause conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague." ( Johnson , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2557 .) The first feature was th 2019Known *692 as the "residual clause," that clause used the following italicized language to identify particular prior convictions that would significantly increase a defendant's punishment: those for a crime that "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another ." ( Johnson , supra , 135 S.Ct. at pp. 2555-2556.) The Court held that "[t]wo features of the residual clause conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague." ( Johnson , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2557 .) The first feature was th | 2 | 4 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences1949One further quotation on the general subject of the adaptability of the common law to changed conditions will suffice, this from Mitchell v. State (1937), 179 Miss. 814, 824 [ 176 So. 743, 745 , 121 A.L.R. 258 ]: “The common law, however, both in its substantive and in its adjective features, is not now, never has been, and never will be, static or stagnant. 1949One further quotation on the general subject of the adaptability of the common law to changed conditions will suffice, this from Mitchell v. State (1937), 179 Miss. 814, 824 [ 176 So. 743, 745 , 121 A.L.R. 258 ]: “The common law, however, both in its substantive and in its adjective features, is not now, never has been, and never will be, static or stagnant. | 2 | 2 |
Mushet v. Department of Public Servicegreen2 sentences1949If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances. ’ ” We content ourselves with merely citing two additional illustrative California authorities: Mushet v. Department of Public Service (1917), 35 Cal.App. 630, 638 [ 170 P. 653, 657 ], and Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust etc. Bank (1920), 182 Cal. 177, 182-184 [ 187 P. 425, 427, 428 ] 1949If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances. ’ ” We content ourselves with merely citing two additional illustrative California authorities: Mushet v. Department of Public Service (1917), 35 Cal.App. 630, 638 [ 170 P. 653, 657 ], and Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust etc. Bank (1920), 182 Cal. 177, 182-184 [ 187 P. 425, 427, 428 ] | 2 | 2 |
Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bankgreen2 sentences1949If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances. ’ ” We content ourselves with merely citing two additional illustrative California authorities: Mushet v. Department of Public Service (1917), 35 Cal.App. 630, 638 [ 170 P. 653, 657 ], and Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust etc. Bank (1920), 182 Cal. 177, 182-184 [ 187 P. 425, 427, 428 ] 1949If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances. ’ ” We content ourselves with merely citing two additional illustrative California authorities: Mushet v. Department of Public Service (1917), 35 Cal.App. 630, 638 [ 170 P. 653, 657 ], and Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust etc. Bank (1920), 182 Cal. 177, 182-184 [ 187 P. 425, 427, 428 ] | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rowlandgreen2 sentences2026If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that failure.” (See CALCRIM No. 361.) “It is error for a court to give an ‘abstract’ instruction, i.e., ‘one which is correct in law but irrelevant.’” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 282 .) “‘[I]n most cases the giving of an abstract instruction is only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.’” (Ibid.) Generally, “[s]uch 6 error does not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights and is subject to harmless error review under” Watson. 2015Furthermore, “ ‘in most cases the giving of an abstract instruction is only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.’ ” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 282 [quoting 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2950, p. 3624].) At most, the error is one of state law subject to harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . | 1 | 2 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1946As has been said before “It will be properly understood (at least upon deliberation) by those learned in the law as referring only to the interval between the fully formulated intent and its execution, and as necessarily presupposing that true deliberation and premeditation characterized the process of, and preceded ultimate, formulation of such intent.” (People v. Bender (1945), 27 Cal.2d 164, 182 [ 163 P.2d 8 ]; People v. Thomas (1945), 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 [ 156 P.2d 7 ].) But, as was also pointed out in the Bender case, holding that such declaration is a correct statement of an abstract prin 1945(People v. Thomas (1945), supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 .) But holding that such declaration is a correct statement of the abstract principle of law is not a holding that the same declaration made to a jury without explanation is not error. | 1 | 2 |
Valdez v. Himmelfarbgreen1 sentence2014Code, § 3706; see Valdez v. Himmelfarb (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268 .) Under the majority 2 Whether a home health care worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee presents more than an abstract inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2009(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 800 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211 , 187 P.3d 1041 ].) In any event, the prosecutor’s argument did not in the least suggest the existence of a more extensive criminal record than was established at trial, nor did it suggest an abstract rule that the sole appropriate punishment for failure on probation was the penalty of death. 2009(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 800 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211 , 187 P.3d 1041 ].) In any event, the prosecutor’s argument did not in the least suggest the existence of a more extensive criminal record than was established at trial, nor did it suggest an abstract rule that the sole appropriate punishment for failure on probation was the penalty of death. | 1 | 1 |
Concerned Citizens of Palm Desert, Inc. v. Board of Supervisorsgreen2 sentences2009(Concerned Citizens of Palm Desert, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 257, 270 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) On the other hand, defendant’s third procedural argument lacks merit. 2009(Concerned Citizens of Palm Desert, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 257, 270 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 328 ].) On the other hand, defendant’s third procedural argument lacks merit. | 1 | 1 |
| Ortega-Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Toledogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Semonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York Times Co. v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Modestogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Blevinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeParcq v. O'Briengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jorgensen v. Jorgensengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thiriot v. Santa Clara Elementary School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bendergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cross
green
2 sentences2026(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) “ ‘The test for determining whether instructions on a particular theory of guilt are appropriate is whether there is substantial evidence which would support conviction on that theory. [Citation.] To determine whether there is substantial evidence to support a conviction we must view the record in a light most favorable to conviction, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of conviction. 2016(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 ; People v. Roehler (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 393 .) The only evidence the People can muster as a basis for the instruction are three instances in defendant’s testimony. | 3 | 2015–2026 |
People v. . Minifie
green
2 sentences2025The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances it might ‘ “expect[] to operate on [defendant’s] mind . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065 .) “Evidence that a victim had previously threatened or harmed others is relevant to a defendant’s claim of self-defense only if the defendant knew of the victim’s prior threatening conduct.” (People v. Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9-10 , italics omitted.) “As a defendant’s ‘ “perceptions are at issue,” ’ prior known threats by the victim ‘ “may color [the defendant’s] perceptions of that individual.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 10, quot 2025The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances it might ‘ “expect[] to operate on [defendant’s] mind . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065 .) “Evidence that a victim had previously threatened or harmed others is relevant to a defendant’s claim of self-defense only if the defendant knew of the victim’s prior threatening conduct.” (People v. Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9-10 , italics omitted.) “As a defendant’s ‘ “perceptions are at issue,” ’ prior known threats by the victim ‘ “may color [the defendant’s] perceptions of that individual.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 10, quot | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Elize
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Elize (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 615 .) Speculation is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense. 2021(People v. Elize (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 615 .) Speculation is insufficient to require an instruction on a lesser included offense. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wader
green
2 sentences2021While it may be true, as an abstract principle, that a jury may believe parts of a witness’s testimony and reject others 19 (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 641 ), for an instruction on a defense theory to be required, there must still be substantial evidence in the entire record to support it. 2021While it may be true, as an abstract principle, that a jury may believe parts of a witness’s testimony and reject others 19 (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 641 ), for an instruction on a defense theory to be required, there must still be substantial evidence in the entire record to support it. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Maston
green
2 sentences2019Maston 's observation that "kidnapping is one of the most serious of all crimes" ( Maston, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 565 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 164 ), is certainly true as an abstract principle, but in assessing Palmer's culpability for the offense he committed, the relevant question is what danger and injury he in fact subjected his victim to, not what danger, force and violence may be present in a kidnapping for robbery. 2019Maston 's observation that "kidnapping is one of the most serious of all crimes" ( Maston, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 565 , 109 Cal.Rptr. 164 ), is certainly true as an abstract principle, but in assessing Palmer's culpability for the offense he committed, the relevant question is what danger and injury he in fact subjected his victim to, not what danger, force and violence may be present in a kidnapping for robbery. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Roehler
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 ; People v. Roehler (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 393 .) The only evidence the People can muster as a basis for the instruction are three instances in defendant’s testimony. 2015(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 ; People v. Roehler (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 393 .) The only evidence the People can muster as a basis for the instruction are three instances in defendant’s testimony. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People v. Falaniko
green
1 sentence2026(People v. Falaniko (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1247 .) The instruction here was abstract because Letchaw did not testify at all, so he could not fail to explain or deny incriminating evidence during his nonexistent testimony. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Bates
green
1 sentence2025The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances it might ‘ “expect[] to operate on [defendant’s] mind . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065 .) “Evidence that a victim had previously threatened or harmed others is relevant to a defendant’s claim of self-defense only if the defendant knew of the victim’s prior threatening conduct.” (People v. Bates (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1, 9-10 , italics omitted.) “As a defendant’s ‘ “perceptions are at issue,” ’ prior known threats by the victim ‘ “may color [the defendant’s] perceptions of that individual.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 10, quot | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1060 , 1065–1066 (Minifie); People v. Davis (1965) 63 Cal.2d 648, 656 .) “ ‘Common sense and experience tell us that it is reasonable for a person threatened by another to be on heightened alert upon encountering that threatener, and to reasonably take [the threat] into account in deciding the necessity for, and the amount of, defensive action, in response to any act on the part of the threatener reasonably appearing to be calculated to carry out that threat.’ ” (Minifie, at p. 1065.) A defendant is entitled to corroborate their testimony that they fe | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Aris
green
1 sentence2015Finally, we reiterate that, just as with perfect self-defense or any defense, '[a] trial court need give a requested instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense.' (People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1192 , italics added.)" (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783 .) The Supreme Court elaborated on the narrowness of self-defense in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073 , 1094: "The law thus recognizes that the objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but one based on the defendant's percep | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Christian S.
green
1 sentence2015Finally, we reiterate that, just as with perfect self-defense or any defense, '[a] trial court need give a requested instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense.' (People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1192 , italics added.)" (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783 .) The Supreme Court elaborated on the narrowness of self-defense in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073 , 1094: "The law thus recognizes that the objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but one based on the defendant's percep | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Guiton
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 .) “Under Watson, reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.”6 (Ibid.) Applying the Watson standard, we conclude inclusion of the instruction was harmless. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2015Furthermore, “ ‘in most cases the giving of an abstract instruction is only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal.’ ” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 282 [quoting 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2950, p. 3624].) At most, the error is one of state law subject to harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Albright v. Oliver
green
1 sentence2014(Albright v. Oliver, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 271 ; Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization (1979) 441 U.S. 600, 617 . [“‘one cannot go into court and claim a “violation of § 1983”—for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything’”].) There are no facts or argument setting out a violation of the right of association.13 Likewise, the “right to own property” and the right to be free of government intrusion are not commonly understood on those terms as constitutional rights. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Curtis
green
1 sentence2014Because his state of mind is a critical issue, he may explain his actions in light of his knowledge concerning the victim. [Citations.] Antecedent threats as well as the victim’s reputation for violence, prior ‘assaults, and other circumstances [are] relevant to interpreting the attacker’s behavior.’ [Citations.] While such considerations alone do not establish a right of self-defense [citation], they illuminate and reflect on the reasonableness of defendant’s perception of both the imminence of danger and the need to resist with the degree of force applied. [Citation.] They may also justify t | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Zamos v. Stroud
green
1 sentence2014(Zamos v. Stroud, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 965 .) No relief exists for an abstract violation of section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code; a claim may only be stated for substantive, specific federal rights conferred in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization
green
1 sentence2014(Albright v. Oliver, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 271 ; Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization (1979) 441 U.S. 600, 617 . [“‘one cannot go into court and claim a “violation of § 1983”—for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything’”].) There are no facts or argument setting out a violation of the right of association.13 Likewise, the “right to own property” and the right to be free of government intrusion are not commonly understood on those terms as constitutional rights. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Houston
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1225 .) III Evidence in Support of Assault on Officers Boyd, Bell, and Nicodemus Defendant next contends insufficient evidence supported his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon on Officers Boyd, Bell, and Nicodemus.4 Specifically, he asserts there was no “evidence that shots were fired in their direction” because “the shots may have been fired in the air, or in another direction.” We disagree. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Sorden
green
1 sentence2005The majority further holds that "[o]nly the most disabling of conditions ... would qualify under the standard [it] announces today." ( Ibid. ) As an abstract principle, I agree. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Smith v. United States green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Molinaro v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Redinger
green
1 sentence2002(See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States (1993) 507 U.S. 234, 241 [ 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1204 , 122 L.Ed.2d 581, 592 ]; People v. Redinger, supra, 55 Cal. at pp. 298-299.) In Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, 396 U.S. 365 [ 90 S.Ct. 498 , 24 L.Ed.2d 586 ], for instance, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the criminal defendant’s appeal after the defendant, who had been free on bail, failed to surrender himself to state authorities. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Perry v. Sindermann green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Fowler green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| People v. Lapin green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| People v. Glover green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Huntington green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Soules green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Sanquírico v. Registrar of Property of Caguas green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Hatchett green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Keys green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Campanella green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Conkling green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Hinshaw green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Nickell v. Rosenfield green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Burnett v. Caldwell neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Fornaris v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Hall v. Wallace neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Cosme v. Candelario green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| De La Cuesta v. Calkins green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.